Going Nuclear on Rosatom: Ending Global Dependence on Putin’s Nuclear Energy Sector (U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe)

Hearing	Going Nuclear on Rosatom: Ending Global Dependence on Putin’s Nuclear Energy Sector
Committee	U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe
Date	March 12, 2024

 

Hearing Takeaways:

• Rosatom: Rosatom is Russia’s state-owned corporation responsible for the country’s civil nuclear program and military nuclear enterprises. The hearing considered potential actions that the U.S. could take to address Rosatom and to prevent Russia from using Rosatom as a tool for malign influence. Mr. Albright highlighted how Rosatom has experienced significant revenue growth since 2022. Subcommittee Members and the hearing’s witnesses raised concerns over Rosatom’s involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine, support of nuclear energy projects in adversarial countries, and global market dominance of the nuclear energy supply chain. They expressed interest in working to reduce global reliance on Rosatom for nuclear energy supplies and services. They stated that this would require a buildout of nuclear energy production, processing, and transportation capabilities.
  • Current Efforts to Reduce Western Dependence on Rosatom: Subcommittee Members and the hearing’s witnesses discussed how the U.S. and its allies are currently engaged in efforts to reduce global dependence on Rosatom for nuclear energy supplies and services. They mentioned how Western companies (including Westinghouse Electric Company and Urenco) are working to provide alternatives to Rosatom’s nuclear energy supplies and services, the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 had included a $700 million investment in the domestic development of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), the U.S. is working through the Group of Seven (G7) to mobilize alternative supply chains, Western countries are developing alternative suppliers of uranium (such as Kazakhstan), and the Biden administration had initiated a critical minerals dialogue with Central Asian partners through the C5+1 mechanism in February 2024. They also argued that regulatory reforms will be needed to ensure the viability of the domestic nuclear industry. Prof. Sabonis-Helf remarked that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) recent licensing of small modular reactors (SMRs) is a “huge breakthrough.” She stated that the U.S. could not credibly sell SMR technologies to other countries if it does not domestically deploy these technologies.
  • Rosatom’s Seizure of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP): Subcommittee Members and the hearing’s witnesses expressed concerns over how Russia had seized the ZNPP as part of their invasion of Ukraine. They called this seizure illegal and stated that Rosatom is complicit in the human rights violations (including torture) of the plant’s Ukrainian personnel. They raised concerns that this seizure provides Rosatom with access to sensitive export control U.S. technology and increases the risk of a major nuclear accident.
  • Rosatom’s Involvement Building Russian Weapons Systems: Mr. Albright discussed how Rosatom actively contributes to the production of Russian weapons systems used against Ukraine. He highlighted how Rosatom subsidiary JSC Umatex is helping to build Shahed-136 Kamikaze drones. He explained that the subsidiary provides carbon fiber to the plant producing the drones. He noted how the U.S. has sanctioned JSC Umatex for its supply of carbon fiber to Russia’s military industrial complex. 
  • Rosatom’s Involvement with Iran: Subcommittee Republicans, Mr. Albright, and Mr. Ruggiero raised concerns over Rosatom’s support for Iran’s nuclear energy program and warned that this involvement could eventually enable Iran to develop nuclear weapons. Mr. Albright expressed concerns over Rosatom’s support for Iran’s Bushehr power reactor. He stated that this reactor has multiple safety deficiencies and that Iran’s infrastructure is too weak to support the reactor. He warned that a major reactor accident in Iran would risk spreading radiation over nearby gulf states. He further noted how Rosatom is supporting the construction of additional Bushehr nuclear reactors and indicated that these projects are valued at approximately $8 billion. He commented that the amount of money that Rosatom receives from Iran for nuclear energy activities will be significant.
  • Rosatom’s Involvement with China: Subcommittee Republicans, Mr. Albright, and Mr. Ruggiero also raised concerns that Rosatom is supporting Chinese nuclear energy projects, including the construction of a breeder reactor. They noted how this breeder reactor could be used to produce plutonium, which would be key to expanding China’s nuclear weapons capabilities.
  • Rosatom’s Involvement with Other Countries: Subcommittee Members and the hearing’s witnesses raised concerns over Rosatom’s efforts to partner with other countries on nuclear energy projects. Mr. Albright commented that while Rosatom’s nuclear reactors may be economically appealing to purchase, he warned that the operation of these nuclear reactors would create significant economic liabilities. He warned that the economic downsides of Rosatom’s nuclear reactors would be significantly aggravated in the event of a serious nuclear reactor accident. He stated that Rosatom seeks customers without proper regard for a country’s stability or ability to ensure the safety and security of a nuclear reactor.
• Consideration of U.S. Sanctions Against Rosatom: The hearing also considered the feasibility of having the U.S. increase its sanctions on Rosatom. Subcommittee Chairman Tom Kean, Jr. (R-NJ) and Mr. Ruggiero expressed frustration with the U.S.’s sanctions against Rosatom thus far and noted how these sanctions had been limited to a small number of Rosatom’s subsidiaries and corporate officers. Most Subcommittee Members, Mr. Albright, and Mr. Ruggiero expressed interest in having the U.S. pursue additional sanctions against Rosatom, its subsidiaries, and its senior personnel. They argued that sanctions would economically cripple the company (and Russia by extension) and incentivize a transition to alternative nuclear energy suppliers from U.S. and allied nuclear industries. Prof. Sabonis-Helf cautioned however that sanctions against Rosatom will neither constrain Russia significantly nor address global nuclear fuel imbalances. She warned that sanctions against Rosatom could disrupt markets in ways that would boost Rosatom’s revenue while disadvantaging the U.S. and its allies. She also warned that some sanctions could even threaten nuclear power plant safety if applied incautiously. Rep. Keith Self (R-TX) and Prof. Sabonis-Helf further expressed concerns that the U.S. and its European allies lack the capacity to replace their current nuclear energy sources if they were to pursue additional sanctions against Rosatom.
  • Republican Sanctions Legislation: Subcommittee Chairman Kean mentioned how he is currently drafting a “tough” sanctions bill against Rosatom that would mandate that the Executive Branch decouple the U.S. and its allies from Rosatom. He stated that his sanctions bill would complement the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, which prohibits the U.S. from importing Russian low-enriched uranium (LEU) with a waiver authority that terminates after 2027. He noted how his sanctions bill would include a similar waiver authority to address current dependencies responsibly and rapidly. These dependencies include those that relate to medical and industrial isotopes. He commented however that this waiver authority will be narrow. He stated that his sanctions bill and the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act together will send much-needed market signals to the U.S. civil nuclear industry to bolster its production capabilities.
  • Democratic Sanctions Legislation: Subcommittee Ranking Member Bill Keating (D-MA) discussed how he had worked with Full Committee Ranking Member Gregory Meeks (D-NY) to develop legislation that would sanction Rosatom officials that undermine the ZNPP’s stability and that would hold the officials accountable for their actions.
  • Waiver Authority Considerations: Subcommittee Chairman Kean, Mr. Albright, and Mr. Ruggiero stated that any federal sanctions legislation against Rosatom will need to provide a narrow waiver authority to the Executive Branch. They indicated that this narrow waiver authority would ensure that the U.S. and its Western allies will maintain access to critical materials while they build up their domestic production capabilities. Mr. Ruggiero noted how there exist multiple reports suggesting what an appropriate timeline would look like for Rosatom waivers. He mentioned how some reports have recommended a 2028 end date for Rosatom waivers. He noted how Rosatom is integrated into many parts of the nuclear energy supply chain. He further mentioned how U.S. sanctions already have carve outs that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other United Nations (UN) organizations might use to continue working with Rosatom. 
  • Review of the U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Mr. Ruggiero also stated that Congress could require a review of the U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement to ensure that the Agreement is consistent with the new approach to civil nuclear cooperation with Russia.
  • Impact of Sanctions on Nuclear Energy Safety: Prof. Sabonis-Helf discussed how Rosatom’s sustained relationship with the IAEA plays an essential role in keeping Russian nuclear energy and the world safer. She warned that using sanctions to isolate Rosatom is bad for global nuclear safety and noted how the nuclear power community has made integration of Russian plant operators and leaders a high priority since the early post-Soviet era. She commented that these efforts have raised nuclear facility standards and promoted a culture of safety. She stated that a nuclear accident or major incident will impact global confidence in nuclear power. She asserted that keeping Rosatom and Russia engaged in the global community of nuclear professionals is a safety imperative. Mr. Albright stated however that Rosatom’s involvement with Iran’s Bushehr power reactor indicates that the company does not properly prioritize safety. He warned that Rosatom’s ongoing partnerships with foreign countries pose global nuclear safety risks.
• Other Policy Issues: The hearing further considered many Rosatom-adjacent policy topics related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and nuclear energy development.
  • National Security Supplemental Package: Subcommittee Ranking Member Bill Keating (D-MA) expressed frustration with the U.S. House of Representatives for failing to approve a national security supplemental package. He highlighted how the U.S. Senate had already passed this package by a wide bipartisan margin. He indicated that this package includes $2.72 billion to support domestic uranium enrichment, $149 million to support the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) response to the nuclear security situation in Ukraine, and $98 million in investments to support the development and production of isotopes.
  • Growth in Foreign Nuclear Enrichment Capabilities: Rep. Keith Self (R-TX) and Prof. Sabonis-Helf raised concerns over how China is currently working to significantly bolster their nuclear energy capabilities. Prof. Sabonis-Helf highlighted how China now has 55 operable nuclear reactors and 27 nuclear reactors under construction. Rep. Self further noted how other countries (including Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, and Iran) are expected to increase their nuclear energy enrichment capabilities by eight times by 2030. 
  • U.S. Efforts to Deploy Nuclear Energy Internationally: Subcommittee Ranking Member Keating and Prof. Sabonis-Helf expressed interest in the U.S.’s efforts to support nuclear energy projects both domestically and abroad. They highlighted how the U.S. had recently made nuclear energy investments in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. Prof. Sabonis-Helf noted how older Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) requirements have limited the amount of economic support that the U.S. could provide to foreign countries to develop nuclear energy programs. She explained that these OECD requirements were meant to keep European countries from competing against each other. She lamented that these OECD requirements had led Russia and China to offer more substantial nuclear energy support packages, which often enabled countries that could not support nuclear energy programs to puruse such programs. She further stated that the U.S.’s promotion of nuclear energy will support the creation of many well-paying jobs throughout the U.S. Subcommittee Ranking Member Keating further asserted that the deployment of nuclear energy will be critical to addressing climate change.

Hearing Witnesses:

1. Mr. David Albright, President, Institute for Science and International Security
2. Mr. Anthony Ruggiero, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies 
3. Professor Theresa Sabonis-Helf, Concentration Chair for Science, Technology, and International Affairs, Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service

Member Opening Statements:

Subcommittee Chairman Thomas Kean, Jr. (R-NJ):

• He remarked the hearing would consider ways to use U.S. sanctions to pressure Rosatom (which is Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy monopoly) and to prevent Russian President Vladimir Putin from using Rosatom as a tool for malign influence.
• He noted how Russia had invaded Ukraine two years ago and asserted that President Biden’s “sluggish” policies have prevented Ukraine’s victory, provided Russian President Putin with opportunities to continue his actions, and prolonged the conflict.
  • He alleged that President Biden has “slow walked” the critical weapons systems (including long-range attack missiles) that Ukraine needs to win the conflict.
• He expressed frustration that the Biden administration has only recently pushed European allies to transfer frozen Russian sovereign assets to Ukraine and asserted that this action should have been taken earlier.
• He stated that the sanctions against Russia have not convinced Russian President Putin to end his country’s war against Ukraine.
  • He noted how Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 3 percent in 2023 had exceeded the GDP growth of all of the G7 economies.
  • He also noted that Russia’s 2024 forecasted GDP growth is expected to exceed the GDP growth of all of the G7 economies.
• He then remarked that Rosatom is one of the most nefarious tools for Russian malign influence.
  • He discussed how Rosatom has its personnel engaging in the Russian military occupation of Ukraine’s ZNPP, supporting Russia’s efforts to evade Western sanctions, supporting China’s nuclear energy endeavors, creating “dangerous dependencies” around the world that enable Russian President Putin to exert influence over the U.S. and its allies, and helping to develop Iran’s nuclear energy program.
• He lamented how the U.S. has only sanctioned a “handful” of Rosatom’s subsidiaries and corporate officers and commented that Rosatom itself remains “untouched.”
• He mentioned how he is currently drafting a “tough” sanctions bill against Rosatom that would require the Executive Branch to decouple the U.S. and its allies from Rosatom.
• He stated that U.S. and ally country companies (including Westinghouse Electric Company and Urenco) are taking major actions to provide Western alternatives to Rosatom.
  • He highlighted how Ukraine has eliminated its dependence on Rosatom and noted how other U.S. allies (including Sweden, Finland, and the Czech Republic) are reducing their dependence on the company.
• He contended however that tougher sanctions are needed to more quickly reduce dependence on Rosatom.
• He stated that his sanctions bill would complement the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act (which the U.S. House of Representatives has passed).
  • He explained that the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act prohibits the U.S. from importing Russian LEU with a waiver authority that terminates after 2027.
• He noted how his sanctions bill would include a similar waiver authority to address nuclear-related dependencies responsibly and rapidly (such as those that relate to medical and industrial isotopes).
  • He commented that this waiver authority will be narrow.
• He stated that his sanctions bill and the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act together will send much-needed market signals to the U.S. civil nuclear industry.
  • He commented that these bills will result in a safer supply of nuclear fuel for the U.S. and its allies.
• He remarked that Rosatom’s revenues directly finance Russian President Putin’s belligerence against Ukraine and contribute to China’s growing nuclear arsenal.
  • He called on the U.S. to take swift action to address Rosatom.

Subcommittee Ranking Member Bill Keating (D-MA):

• He remarked that Russia had launched an unprovoked and full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2024.
  • He commented that Russia had failed in this war effort and attributed Russia’s failure to both the global coalition formed by U.S. leadership and the work of the Ukrainian population.
• He stated however that Russia has continued to succeed in its goals of spreading malign influence and undermining democratic governance.
• He noted how the hearing would focus on Rosatom, which he explained is Russia’s state-owned corporation responsible for the country’s civil nuclear program and military nuclear enterprises.
  • He described the company as a Russian government-run “agent of influence.”
• He discussed how Rosatom has long spread its malign influence through contracts in Europe and around the world to build nuclear reactors and to provide nuclear fuel at cheaper prices.
  • He stated that Rosatom’s recent complicity and support of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, occupation of the ZNPP, and continued market share in the nuclear fuel establishment fabrication sectors have enabled Russian President Putin to “recklessly” use the company to spread malign influence and push imperialistic goals.
• He noted how Congress and the Biden administration have responded to Rosatom’s posed threats through sanctioning Rosatom’s subsidiaries and cutting off key revenue streams.
  • He commented that Russian President Putin uses these revenue streams to fund his war against Ukraine.
• He mentioned how President Biden had worked with G7 partners in 2023 to mobilize $4.2 billion in government-led investments to develop a secure and reliable nuclear energy supply chain.
• He further mentioned how the Biden administration had initiated a critical minerals dialogue with Central Asian partners through the C5+1 mechanism in February 2024.
  • He commented that this effort seeks to increase Central Asia’s involvement in global critical mineral supply chains and strengthen economic cooperation.
• He stated that the Biden administration’s recent actions build upon the U.S.’s historic partnerships between U.S. nuclear energy companies and foreign governments, including Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria.
• He lamented how Russia is continuing its “brutal” war in Ukraine and noted how this effort includes the targeting of energy supply lines and critical infrastructure.
  • He highlighted how Russia is holding the ZNPP and its workers hostage.
  • He further stated that Russia’s attacks on Ukraine seek to damage Ukraine’s environmental stability through poisoning the country’s land and starving citizens of critical resources.
• He then discussed how he had worked with Full Committee Ranking Member Gregory Meeks (D-NY) to develop legislation that would sanction Rosatom officials that undermine the ZNPP’s stability and hold the officials accountable for their actions.
• He then called on the U.S. to promote continued investments in capacity building for alternative sources of nuclear energy and next generation nuclear reactor designs.
  • He commented that Russia currently maintains a “significant presence” in these areas of the nuclear energy supply chain.
• He asserted that these alternative sources must be cost effective with competitive prices to ensure long-term success.
• He also remarked that the Subcommittee must follow up on the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022’s $700 million investment in the development of HALEU.
  • He noted how HALEU is used in many SMRs and advanced nuclear reactors.
• He contended that U.S. investments in nuclear infrastructure will have positive impacts abroad, support Ukraine’s war effort, and combat Russia’s malign influence.
• He then mentioned how it had been nearly one month since the U.S. Senate had passed its national security supplemental package by a wide bipartisan margin.
  • He criticized former President Trump for opposing additional U.S. aid to Ukraine in conversations with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.
  • He noted how the Hungarian government had just welcomed Rosatom’s CEO to discuss Hungary and Rosatom’s shared priorities. 
• He contended that the quickest and most direct way for the U.S. to combat Rosatom and Russia is for the U.S. House of Representatives to pass the national security supplemental package.
  • He highlighted how this package includes nearly $3 billion to boost domestic nuclear fuel production and enrichment.
• He criticized U.S. Speaker of the House Mike Johnson (R-LA) for not holding a vote on the national security supplemental package.
  • He commented that most Members of Congress support this package and described Speaker Johnson’s actions as anti-democratic.

Witness Opening Statements:

Mr. David Albright (Institute for Science and International Security):

• He remarked that Rosatom, its subsidiaries, and its senior personnel deserve greater sanctions and argued that Rosatom is not a benign commercial nuclear energy supplier.
• He stated that Rosatom has actively participated in the illegal seizure of the ZNPP.
  • He commented that this seizure has increased the risk of a major nuclear accident occurring and that Rosatom officials are not authorized to operate the power station’s reactors.
  • He also stated that Rosatom is complicit in violating the human rights of Ukrainian plant personnel and indicated that these violations include torture.
• He discussed how Rosatom actively contributes to the production of Russian weapons systems used against Ukraine and mentioned how Rosatom subsidiary JSC Umatex is helping to build Shahed-136 Kamikaze drones.
  • He noted how this subsidiary helps produce these drones under a contract with the Russian Defense Ministry and indicated that the contract involves extensive aid from Iran.
  • He explained that the subsidiary provides carbon fiber to the plant producing the drones.
• He noted how the U.S. has sanctioned JSC Umatex for its supply of carbon fiber to Russia’s military industrial complex.
  • He indicated however that the U.S. has not sanctioned Rosatom for supporting Russia’s production of Shahed-136 Kamikaze drones or for supporting Russia’s military industrial complex.
• He stated that Rosatom and its predecessor organizations have taken risks to obtain lucrative contracts in countries that are not prepared institutionally or culturally to deal with the complex array of issues involved in operating nuclear reactors safely, preventing reactor accidents, and preparing for such accidents when they occur.
  • He identified Iran’s Bushehr power reactor as an example of such a reactor project.
• He also stated that Russia’s nuclear export enterprises have shown in their willingness to ignore the Iranian regime’s secret drive for nuclear weapons and Iran’s violations of IAEA safeguards.
• He recounted how Rosatom had provided a nuclear reactor to Iran with multiple safety deficiencies and noted how Iran’s infrastructure was too weak to support the reactor.
  • He noted how the IAEA’s Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) have documented these deficiencies and the difficulties associated with fixing them.
• He expressed uncertainty regarding whether Iran’s Bushehr power reactor is currently safe enough to operate, despite years of intensive safety modifications and improvements.
  • He added that a major reactor accident in Iran would risk spreading radiation over nearby gulf states within 12 hours.
• He stated that many problems have resulted from Russia and Rosatom’s “less than acceptable” designs and parts at Iran’s Bushehr power reactor.
• He discussed how Iran’s Bushehr power reactor’s issues have necessitated many replacements of faulty parts, the creation of new operating manuals, changes in operation, and the creation of safety and emergency procedures.
  • He commented that these efforts have sought to bring the reactor up to modern safety standards and characterized these efforts as incomplete.
• He remarked that countries contemplating or building nuclear reactors for the first time should avoid partnering with Rosatom.
  • He commented that while Rosatom’s nuclear reactors may be economically appealing to purchase, he warned that the operation of these nuclear reactors creates significant economic liabilities.
• He warned that the economic downsides of Rosatom’s nuclear reactors would be significantly aggravated in the event of a serious nuclear reactor accident.
  • He noted how many developing countries contemplating nuclear reactors lack adequate supporting infrastructure and emergency response capabilities to respond to a nuclear reactor accident.
• He stated that Rosatom seeks customers without proper regard for a country’s stability or ability to ensure the safety and security of a nuclear reactor.
• He acknowledged that moving from warning to sanctioning Rosatom may seem harsh, even with the necessary appropriate waivers.
  • He commented that these waivers include considerations for nuclear reactor safety and operating nuclear reactors and provide a wind down period for other existing foreign contracts with Rosatom.
• He concluded that sanctioning Rosatom, its subsidiaries, and its key personnel is deserved and overdue given the company’s illegal occupation of the ZNPP and support for Russia’s illegal military attacks against Ukraine.

Mr. Anthony Ruggiero (Foundation for Defense of Democracies):

• He noted how Rosatom had boasted a 15 percent export revenue increase in 2022 with a ten-year portfolio of foreign orders worth $200 billion.
  • He also mentioned how the company had forecasted that its 2023 revenue would increase by 40 percent.
• He remarked that there are two main drivers for how the nuclear company of an aggressor state has expanding revenue while the country is largely shunned from the international community.
  • He indicated that the first driver is the Biden administration’s failure to articulate a strategy for ensuring that the U.S. and its allies end their reliance on Russia’s nuclear sector.
  • He indicated that the second driver is the U.S. government’s treatment of Russia as a partner in civil nuclear cooperation (which enabled Rosatom and Russia to undercut and destroy U.S. and Western companies competing in the same market).
• He also stated that Rosatom and Russia are engaged in activities that are contrary to American foreign policy and national security interests.
  • He mentioned that his written testimony details how Rosatom and Sino-Russian nuclear cooperation plays a critical role in enhancing China’s nuclear weapons capabilities, including China’s effort to build 1,500 nuclear weapons by 2035.
  • He also mentioned how his written testimony reviews Rosatom’s role in a potential nuclear disaster at Ukraine’s ZNPP (which is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe).
• He noted that while the Biden administration had used sanctions in February 2023 against a few Russian nuclear and Rosatom-linked individuals and entities, he stated that these sanctions were not part of a coordinated strategy.
  • He highlighted how the Biden administration has not sanctioned a single member of Rosatom’s management board, even though the United Kingdom (UK) had sanctioned the entire board in March 2023.
• He stated that the Biden administration understands the problems posed by Rosatom and mentioned how a senior U.S. Department of Energy official had recently raised concerns that U.S. nuclear reactors recieve about 20 percent of their fuel from Russia.
  • He commented that recent “promising” reports suggest that the Biden administration and the U.S. nuclear industry are becoming more receptive to a potential ban on Russian nuclear fuel imports.
• He called on Congress to mandate a strategy for ending reliance on Rosatom and to require that the Biden administration to make a sanctions determination within 60 days on Rosatom, its management board, its supervisory boards, and related entities and individuals.
  • He commented that this strategy should include plans to respond to potential Russian retaliatory actions, including the ending of enriched uranium and other product exports to the U.S. and its allies.
• He also stated that Congress could require a review of the U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement to ensure that it is consistent with the new approach to civil nuclear cooperation with Russia.
• He then recommended that the Biden administration use existing sanctions authorities to prohibit activities with Rosatom over a wind down period ranging between one and four years.
  • He indicated that these activities should include purchases of nuclear reactor fuel, nuclear reactor services, and nuclear reactor construction, as well as other related services.
• He stated that the U.S. could use this wind down period to work with allies and the nuclear industry to facilitate a transition to alternative suppliers.
• He remarked that the U.S. requires a coordinated strategy for dealing with Rosatom and commented that this strategy would reinforce that the U.S. and its allies will not return to the status quo ante bellum with Russia following the end of the Russia-Ukraine war.
  • He asserted that this effort should incentivize a transition to U.S. and ally country nuclear industries as alternative suppliers over a four-year period in order to end Russia’s domination and ensure that China does not fill any voids.
• He stated that Congress should mandate the aforementioned sanctions proposal through legislation if the Biden administration is unwilling to pursue it.

Prof. Theresa Sabonis-Helf (Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service):

• She called the Russian government’s behavior in Ukraine and in Russia “shocking and infuriating.”
• She remarked however that sanctioning Rosatom would likely not be effective at limiting Russia’s reach and ambition.
  • She commented that while most sanctions against Rosatom might be intuitively appealing, she asserted that these sanctions will neither constrain Russia significantly nor address current global nuclear fuel imbalances.
• She warned that sanctions against Rosatom could disrupt markets in ways that would boost Rosatom’s revenue while disadvantaging the U.S. and its allies.
  • She further warned that some sanctions could even threaten nuclear power plant safety if applied incautiously.
• She remarked that Congress should consider three key factors regarding their future moves against Rosatom: the security of supply, the safety of nuclear energy, and development of a more resilient pool of nuclear fuel sources.
• She discussed how the European Union’s (EU) shift to U.S. natural gas was possible only because the U.S. had an available supply of natural gas and commented that such flexibility does not exist within the nuclear fuel space.
  • She mentioned how 18 percent of EU reactors are Russian or Soviet-designed and commented that fuel rods are an issue for these reactors.
  • She noted that while Westinghouse Electric Company has developed substitute fuel rods for Ukraine, she indicated that the company does not yet have capacity or licensing to supply all of Europe.
• She also noted how Rosatom and its affiliates are “deeply embedded” in nuclear fuel production and other services.
  • She commented that reliance on Rosatom is widespread globally (and not just in Europe) and mentioned how the U.S. purchases 20 percent of its LEU from a Rosatom subsidiary.
• She asserted that the U.S. is not yet in a position to meet all of its own domestic nuclear fuel needs, let alone extend nuclear energy supply security to allies.
• She then acknowledged that the criticisms of Rosatom are justified and noted how the company has been complicit in Russia’s nuclear piracy.
  • She added that the company illegally manages the ZNPP in Ukraine.
• She stated however that Rosatom’s sustained relationship with the IAEA plays an essential role in keeping Russian nuclear energy and the world safer.
  • She mentioned how Rosatom’s Director-General Alexey Likhachev has met with the IAEA’s Director eight times since March 2022 for discussions regarding the ZNPP.
• She acknowledged that while Rosatom has not responded to all of the IAEA’s concerns regarding the ZNPP, she stated that Rosatom had taken measures to harden the facility, provided mobile diesel fuel boilers to enhance safety, and complied with the IAEA’s insistence that the ZNPP not be used to generate electricity.
  • She commented that Rosatom’s decision not to use the ZNPP to generate electricity enhances safety and reduces the gains to Russia of occupying the facility.
• She remarked that using sanctions to isolate Rosatom is bad for global nuclear safety and noted how the nuclear power community has made integration of Russian plant operators and leaders a high priority since the early post-Soviet era.
  • She commented that these efforts have raised nuclear facility standards and promoted a culture of safety.
• She stated that a nuclear accident or major incident will impact global confidence in nuclear power and asserted that keeping Rosatom and Russia engaged in the global community of nuclear professionals is a safety imperative.
• She remarked that the best approach for enhancing energy security in the nuclear sector would be to diversify fuel sources and noted how concerns about Russia have already spurred “substantial” innovation both within the U.S. and abroad.
  • She highlighted how the U.S. had produced 7,000 tons of uranium hexafluoride in 2023 and how U.S. production of HALEU fuel is currently underway.
  • She also highlighted how Westinghouse Electric Company is leading efforts to replace Russian fuel rods.
• She further discussed how Kazakhstan is finding new paths to bring its uranium to market and noted how the country had historically depended on Russia for uranium refinement, enrichment, and transport.
  • She mentioned how France is now expanding mining operations in Kazakhstan, increasing French enrichment capabilities, and shepherding an “ambitious consortium” to strengthen the Middle Corridor route (which reduces the region’s dependence on Russia for transport).
• She remarked that nuclear energy infrastructure realignment will take time to complete and asserted that reducing Rosatom’s relative role in world energy production is essential.
  • She commented that these objectives can be best accomplished through aggressively expanding the field of viable competent nuclear energy material producers (rather than through sanctions).
• She stated that the discipline of managed competition will serve the U.S. well considering China’s efforts to gain market share in the global nuclear energy sector.
  • She commented that the U.S. should strive to engage this competition together with its European allies.

Congressional Question Period:

Subcommittee Chairman Thomas Kean, Jr. (R-NJ):

• Chairman Kean asked Mr. Ruggiero to characterize Rosatom’s support for China’s nuclear weapons program.
  • Mr. Ruggiero noted how Rosatom has delivered fuel to some of China’s nuclear reactors. He mentioned how a senior U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) official had testified to Congress that these Chinese nuclear reactors are helping to produce plutonium. He added that the DoD had emphasized this part of the testimony in a press release.
• Chairman Kean asked Mr. Albright and Mr. Ruggiero to indicate whether a mandatory sanctions bill is necessary to push the Biden administration to increase pressure on Rosatom, its subsidiaries, and its corporate officers and to help the U.S. and its allies reduce their dependence on Rosatom.
  • Mr. Albright remarked that legislation would be “very helpful” and commented that the Biden administration has been slow to address Rosatom. He stated that Congress can play a useful role in increasing the sanctions on Rosatom and its subsidiaries and boosting the U.S.’s capabilities to replace Rosatom. He then discussed how Russia is supporting the construction of a breeder nuclear reactor in China. He stated that this reactor appears to be China’s only way of producing the plutonium needed to increase their nuclear weapons arsenal. He mentioned how Russia has not stated that its assistance to China could not be misused to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. He noted that the U.S. has always conditioned its foreign nuclear assistance on the recipient not using the assistance to build nuclear weapons. He indicated however that Russia does not impose such conditions on their foreign nuclear assistance. He warned that Russia’s assistance to China may provide China with its only pathway for increasing its nuclear weapons arsenal.
  • Mr. Ruggiero remarked that the U.S. must develop a strategy to reduce global reliance on Rosatom for its nuclear energy needs and to build up alternative suppliers. He acknowledged that the U.S. cannot immediately cut off Rosatom and asserted that a strategy will be required to reduce reliance on Rosatom over time. He lamented that the Biden administration is not currently developing a strategy to reduce U.S. reliance on Rosatom.
• Chairman Kean stated that any serious sanctions effort against Rosatom will require a “responsible but narrow” waiver authority. He asked Mr. Ruggiero to indicate how long such waivers would need to be for different parts of the nuclear energy supply chain. He expressed particular interest in determining the appropriate length for waivers related to enriched uranium.
  • Mr. Ruggiero noted how there exist multiple reports suggesting what an appropriate timeline would look like for Rosatom waivers. He mentioned how some reports have recommended a 2028 end date for Rosatom waivers. He noted how Rosatom is integrated into many parts of the nuclear energy supply chain. He further mentioned how U.S. sanctions already have carve outs that the IAEA and other UN organizations might use to continue working with Rosatom.
• Chairman Kean then asked Mr. Albright to provide an assessment of Rosatom’s commitment to nuclear safety and security. He also asked Mr. Albright to discuss the safety concerns associated with Rosatom-built nuclear energy plants that remain in operation in Europe and around the world.
  • Mr. Albright discussed how Iran’s Bushehr power reactor has “immense” safety problems and attributed these problems to the fact that Rosatom had provided Iran with a deficient reactor. He stated that Rosatom’s safety practices for its nuclear reactors lag behind those of Western nuclear reactors. He warned that Rosatom presents safety risks and raised concerns that Iran’s Bushehr power reactor could experience a major accident.

Subcommittee Ranking Member Bill Keating (D-MA):

• Ranking Member Keating noted how the recent U.S. Senate-passed national security supplemental package includes $2.72 billion to support domestic uranium enrichment, $149 million to support the NNSA’s response to the nuclear security situation in Ukraine, and $98 million in investments to support the development and production of isotopes. He asked Prof. Sabonis-Helf to address the importance of this national security supplemental package to addressing the risks posed by Rosatom.
  • Prof. Sabonis-Helf remarked that the U.S. must take appropriations for the HALEU fuel very seriously. She noted how the U.S. cannot move forward on its SMRs without access to HALEU and indicated that the U.S. currently depends on HALEU imported from Russia. She called it “urgent” for the U.S. to increase its HALEU product capacity so that it can be a leader in developing the next generation of nuclear reactors. She also stated that the national security supplemental package’s other provisions are critical. She further called on the U.S. to support the defense of Ukraine.
• Ranking Member Keating then discussed how the U.S. has recently made nuclear energy investments in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. He highlighted how Westinghouse Electric Company is playing a leading role in these investments. He commented that the growing role of U.S. suppliers within the nuclear energy space is critical. He asked the witnesses to comment on the importance of the U.S.’s engagement within the nuclear energy space in terms of combating Russia’s malign influence.
  • Prof. Sabonis-Helf noted how older OECD requirements have limited the amount of economic support that the U.S. could provide to foreign countries to develop nuclear energy programs. She explained that these OECD requirements were meant to keep European countries from competing against each other. She lamented that these OECD requirements had led Russia and China to offer more substantial nuclear energy support packages, which often enabled countries that could not support nuclear energy programs to pursue such programs. She asserted that the U.S.’s cooperation on nuclear energy projects with Poland is “absolutely essential.” She remarked that Poland possesses the requisite governance stability and grid membership to establish a successful nuclear energy program. She stated that the U.S.’s new partnership with Poland on nuclear energy serves as a model for how the U.S. can recapture a meaningful role in the export of essential nuclear energy technologies.
• Ranking Member Keating remarked that the U.S.’s efforts to promote the international deployment of nuclear energy is key to supporting the U.S.’s domestic security. He asked Prof. Sabonis-Helf to discuss how these international deployment efforts support domestic jobs and promote U.S. economic interests.
  • Prof. Sabonis-Helf remarked that the U.S. cannot treat nuclear energy as a purely commercial operation given its strategic importance. She highlighted however that the nuclear energy sector represents a significant number of jobs. She mentioned how the U.S. had recently relicensed its largest domestic nuclear facility and is building new nuclear energy facilities. She emphasized that the jobs accompanying nuclear energy pay well and are geographically distributed throughout the U.S. She stated that any U.S. nuclear energy strategy should consider how to leverage U.S. expertise to recapture its position within the global nuclear sector.
• Ranking Member Keating then remarked that climate change poses existential threats to the U.S. He also stated that climate change poses dangers to the U.S. military. He asserted that nuclear energy would help to address climate change. He then indicated that his question period time had expired.

Rep. Keith Self (R-TX):

• Rep. Self discussed how the Executive Branch is not using their existing discretionary sanctions authority against Rosatom. He expressed skepticism that additional sanctions authority from Congress will change the Executive Branch’s behavior. He then raised concerns that the U.S. will not be able to replace nuclear energy sources if it were to pursue sanctions against Russia. He noted how Russia and Urenco are expected to decrease their nuclear energy enrichment capabilities by 2030 and France is expected to keep their nuclear energy capabilities steady through 2030. He noted however that other countries (including Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, and Iran) are expected to increase their nuclear energy enrichment capabilities by eight times by 2030. He further indicated that China is expected to increase their nuclear energy enrichment capabilities by three times by 2030. He expressed concerns that many adversarial countries are expected to increase their nuclear energy enrichment capabilities over the next several years. He asked the witnesses to address how the U.S. could keep its nuclear energy industry viable if it were to pursue new sanctions against Russia. 
  • Mr. Albright remarked that sanctions could create pressures and incentives to create new nuclear energy supplies that will serve as alternatives to Rosatom’s nuclear energy supplies. He commented that sanctions and nuclear energy development can be complementary.
• Rep. Self remarked that a strategy for replacing Rosatom’s nuclear energy supplies must extend beyond merely promoting competition for nuclear energy supplies. He asked the witnesses to indicate whether the U.S. should invoke the Defense Production Act of 1950 to increase its production of nuclear energy supplies.
  • Prof. Sabonis-Helf remarked that the U.S. should prioritize replacement capacity over sanctions in dealing with Rosatom. She noted how Kazakhstan produces more mined uranium for the world market than any other nation. She indicated however that Kazakhstan had been wholly dependent on Russia for its uranium enrichment and transport until recently. She discussed how France has recently opened new uranium mines in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and provided transport and enrichment services for these countries. She called this a positive development. She remarked that the U.S.’s pursuit of critical materials with Central Asia will be important. She contended that improving the U.S.’s nuclear energy enrichment and processing capabilities should be a greater priority than enhancing the U.S.’s domestic mining capabilities. She also discussed how China is currently working to bolster its nuclear energy capabilities. She mentioned how China now has 55 operable nuclear reactors and 27 nuclear reactors under construction. She stated that China is working to meet its growing nuclear energy demands and indicated that China must still build out its nuclear energy grid.
• Rep. Self interjected to note that his question period time had expired. He emphasized that China is building nuclear power plants, coal power plants, solar energy facilities, and other types of energy production facilities.

Rep. Jim Costa (D-CA):

• Rep. Costa noted how the witnesses have called on the U.S. to develop a nuclear energy strategy that would involve eliminating the U.S.’s reliance on Russia for enriched uranium. He asked the witnesses to confirm his understanding of their suggested strategies.
  • Mr. Ruggiero confirmed that he had called for the U.S. to develop a strategy for eliminating the U.S.’s reliance on Russia for its nuclear energy needs.
  • Prof. Sabonis-Helf also confirmed that she had called for the U.S. to develop a strategy for eliminating the U.S.’s reliance on Russia for its nuclear energy needs.
  • Mr. Albright also confirmed that he had called for the U.S. to develop a strategy for eliminating the U.S.’s reliance on Russia for its nuclear energy needs.
• Rep. Costa asked the witnesses to recommend a timeline for having the U.S. eliminate its dependence on Russia for nuclear energy materials and develop its own nuclear energy supply capacities. He commented that the U.S. could work with European allies to eliminate its dependence on Russia for nuclear energy materials.
  • Mr. Ruggiero remarked that increasing the number of alternative suppliers to nuclear energy materials and improving sanctions against Russia can be mutually inclusive efforts. He described the U.S.’s current sanctions against Russia’s nuclear energy industry as pursuing “low hanging fruit” and asserted that the U.S. must increase its sanctions against Russia. He stated that U.S. sanctions against the Russian nuclear energy industry will spur the U.S. nuclear energy industry to bolster its domestic capacity. He noted how the U.S. nuclear energy industry has estimated that it could end its reliance on Russia by 2028 and commented that the U.S. should work to eliminate Russian nuclear energy imports by 2028.
• Rep. Costa interjected to ask Mr. Ruggiero to indicate whether his proposed 2028 deadline for eliminating the U.S.’s reliance on Russia for nuclear energy imports is based on conversations with Westinghouse Electric Company and other industry stakeholders.
  • Mr. Ruggiero noted how Urenco is expected to increase its nuclear energy capacities by 2028.
• Rep. Costa interjected to ask Mr. Ruggiero to indicate whether the U.S. will need to provide market signals to the private sector if it seeks to achieve nuclear energy independence.
  • Mr. Ruggiero answered affirmatively.
  • Prof. Sabonis-Helf stated that the U.S. nuclear energy industry had already received market signals to pursue nuclear energy independence prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. She mentioned how the U.S.’s largest nuclear energy facility had been mothballed and had received an extension to reopen in 2021. She noted how this facility has succeeded in producing 7,000 tons of uranium hexafluoride in 2023. She mentioned how the U.S. had previously produced 20 percent of the world’s uranium hexafluoride when this facility had been at its full capacity. She noted that this previous production level had resulted in a surplus of uranium hexafluoride for the U.S. She stated that supporting this reopened facility will be key for enabling the U.S. to achieve nuclear energy independence.
• Rep. Costa asked Prof. Sabonis-Helf to confirm that uranium hexafluoride production is a key step to developing nuclear fuel pellets.
  • Prof. Sabonis-Helf answered affirmatively.
• Rep. Costa then referenced how Prof. Sabonis-Helf had warned the U.S. against applying sanctions incautiously. He asked Prof. Sabonis-Helf to clarify what she meant when she had used the term “incautiously.”
  • Prof. Sabonis-Helf mentioned how Russia had manipulated gas prices because Russia had been concerned over perceived European actions within the gas market. She noted how most nuclear power plants store between two and three year’s worth of nuclear fuel on site. She expressed concerns that the length of the Russia-Ukraine war may cause European power plants to exhaust their stored nuclear fuel supplies.
• Rep. Costa then asked the witnesses to identify the greatest lessons learned following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
  • Mr. Albright called it “critical” for the U.S. to defeat Russia and stated that the U.S. should not remain dependent on Russia for nuclear energy imports.
• Rep. Costa interjected to call Russian President Putin a war criminal and a mob boss.
  • Mr. Albright expressed concerns over how Russia is building up its military infrastructure. He stated that the U.S.’s lack of support for Ukraine is directly threatening Europe’s security.
• Rep. Costa remarked that the U.S.’s lack of support for Ukraine threatens both Europe and the U.S. He then indicated that his question period time had expired and that he would submit additional questions for the hearing’s record.

Rep. Nathaniel Moran (R-TX):

• Rep. Moran raised concerns over global dependency on Russian uranium and Rosatom’s market share in the global uranium market. He asked Mr. Albright to identify the strategic risks associated with the U.S. and Europe’s continued reliance on Rosatom for nuclear energy products and services. He also asked Mr. Albright to indicate whether this dependence is comparable to Europe’s “crippling” dependence on Russian oil and natural gas prior to the start of the Russia-Ukraine war.
  • Mr. Albright remarked that the U.S. and Europe’s continued reliance on Rosatom for nuclear energy products and services is comparable to Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and natural gas prior to the start of the Russia-Ukraine war. He warned that Russia will eventually seek to manipulate its nuclear energy supply. He stated that the U.S. and Europe must start stockpiling critical resources in anticipation of such Russian manipulation.
• Rep. Moran asked Mr. Albright to discuss how Russia’s control of nuclear energy products and services poses military strategic risks to the U.S. and Europe.
  • Mr. Albright remarked that Russia’s control of nuclear energy products and services creates cost burdens and discomfort for the U.S. and Europe. He reiterated his call for the U.S. and Europe to prepare for potential Russian curtailments of nuclear energy imports.
• Rep. Moran asked Prof. Sabonis-Helf to indicate whether the U.S. ought to work toward independence from Rosatom with respect to uranium production and provision.
  • Prof. Sabonis-Helf answered affirmatively. She stated that Russia’s behavior will be “greatly moderated” if its share of the global uranium market were to shrink.
• Rep. Moran then stated that nuclear fuel cycle companies will need to commit to investing potentially billions of dollars to replace Russian nuclear supplies. He asked Mr. Ruggiero to indicate whether these companies require certainty in the form of clear government policy and tough sanctions. He commented that clear government policy and tough sanctions would ensure that a flood of Russian exports would not strand their future assets.
  • Mr. Ruggiero remarked that nuclear fuel cycle companies require certainty in the form of clear government policy and tough sanctions. He expressed concerns that the U.S.’s failure to develop a nuclear energy strategy would result in the U.S. reverting back to its reliance on Russia for nuclear energy supplies following the conclusion of the Russia-Ukraine war. He stated that the U.S. should develop a nuclear energy strategy right now and that this strategy should involve both sanctions and the identification of alternative suppliers for nuclear materials.
• Rep. Moran stated that uranium production is not simple. He commented that the uranium production process requires a significant amount of upfront capital investment, time, effort, and risk. He asked Mr. Ruggiero to indicate whether he agreed with this description of the uranium production process’s needs.
  • Mr. Ruggiero expressed agreement with Rep. Moran’s description of the uranium production process’s needs. He stated that the U.S. will need to determine what it wants to develop domestically and what it wants to rely upon allies for as part of its nuclear energy strategy. He commented that it would take time to set appropriate targets.
• Rep. Moran reiterated that it would take years for the U.S. to build nuclear production capacity to fully replace Russian nuclear production. He asked Mr. Albright and Prof. Sabonis-Helf to identify the regulatory barriers that prevent the U.S. from building its nuclear production capacity. He also asked Mr. Albright and Prof. Sabonis-Helf to recommend ways that Congress could reduce barriers to building this production capacity.
  • Mr. Albright remarked that the Executive and Legislative Branches must make building nuclear production capacity a priority. He stated that this effort will entail financial support so that companies have an incentive to pursue risky nuclear energy production projects. He highlighted how the U.S. government has previously supported the nuclear energy industry.
  • Prof. Sabonis-Helf remarked that the NRC’s licensing of SMRs is a “huge breakthrough.” She noted how this licensing of SMRs constitutes the first time in a long time that the U.S. has licensed a new nuclear reactor design. She stated that the U.S. could not credibly sell SMR technologies to other countries if it does not domestically deploy these technologies. She commented that the NRC’s licensing of SMRs removes a major barrier to developing future generations of nuclear reactors.
• Rep. Moran lastly asked Mr. Ruggiero to predict the global market implications that would arise from winding down global dependence on Russian nuclear fuel and sources.
  • Mr. Ruggiero remarked that the nuclear energy industry understands the need to reduce their dependence on Russian nuclear fuel and sources. He stated that the U.S. should pursue some targeted sanctions within the short-term to reinforce this need.

Rep. Joe Wilson (R-SC):

• Rep. Wilson remarked that the Biden administration has repeatedly waived sanctions against Rosatom in order to facilitate the company’s work with Iran’s nuclear program. He commented that these waivers come despite credible accusations that Rosatom is providing material support to aid Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military invasion of Ukraine. He asked Mr. Ruggiero to indicate whether Rosatom’s support for Iran’s nuclear program constitutes a form of sanctions evasion.
  • Mr. Ruggiero noted that the U.S. continues to work with Rosatom, despite the company’s work with China on its nuclear program and work with the ZNPP. He stated that the U.S. should work to reduce its reliance on Russia and Rosatom for nuclear energy supplies.
• Rep. Wilson asked Mr. Ruggiero to estimate the amount of money that the Biden administration is allowing Russia and Russian President Putin to make through Rosatom’s operations in Iran.
  • Mr. Ruggiero stated that he did not know the specific amount of money that Russia and Russian President Putin are making from Rosatom’s operations in Iran. He expressed his willingness to follow up on this question for the hearing’s record.
  • Mr. Albright stated that while the amount of money that Russia and Russian President Putin are making from Rosatom’s operations in Iran is not a public figure, he commented that internal documents from Iran’s Bushehr power reactor provide some insight into the matter. He noted how Russia had received millions of dollars from Iran to improve safety conditions at this plant and to write safety manuals for the plant. He stated that the overall figure is “substantially larger” than millions of dollars.
• Rep. Wilson asked Mr. Albright to indicate whether Russia is receiving revenue from Iran from its nuclear material-related trade and the sale of military equipment.
  • Mr. Albright noted how Rosatom is supporting the construction of additional Bushehr nuclear reactors and indicated that these projects are valued at approximately $8 billion. He commented that the amount of money that Rosatom receives from Iran for nuclear energy activities will be “significantly higher.” He reiterated that Rosatom is currently receiving money from Iran to fix the initial Bushehr power reactor’s safety problems.
• Rep. Wilson called it “inconceivable” that the Biden administration could provide sanctions waivers that would benefit the Iranian regime. He mentioned how Iran had recently supported drone attacks against U.S. military personnel that had killed and wounded many of these personnel. He then noted how the ZNPP contains sensitive export control U.S. nuclear technology. He mentioned how CNN had reported that the Biden administration had asked Rosatom in 2023 to not use this technology. He asked Mr. Albright to indicate whether Rosatom is likely to respect the Biden administration’s request. He also asked Mr. Albright to indicate whether Rosatom would benefit from respecting this request.
  • Mr. Albright expressed agreement with Rep. Wilson’s concerns over Iran’s recent drone attacks against U.S. military personnel. He stated that Russia is using Iranian assistance to perpetrate drone attacks in Ukraine and asserted that Iran’s drone program deserves more U.S. attention. He then stated that Russia has likely investigated the nuclear technology seized from the ZNPP, regardless of their public proclamations.
• Rep. Wilson expressed hope that the U.S. could respond in a bipartisan fashion to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Hamas’s invasion of Israel.

Subcommittee Chairman Thomas Kean, Jr. (R-NJ):

• Chairman Kean asked Mr. Albright to indicate whether Rosatom’s cooperation with the Iranian nuclear sector is limited entirely to Iran’s civilian nuclear energy program.
  • Mr. Albright testified that he was unaware of any evidence that Russia would convey nuclear weapons related technology to Iran. He noted however that Iran’s Bushehr power reactor is a “semi-modern” nuclear reactor. He stated that Iran is using the knowledge that it gains from operating the Bushehr power reactor to support the construction of smaller research nuclear reactors. He commented that these research nuclear reactors could be used in the future to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. He remarked that Russia’s nuclear energy technology is not well-protected or well-controlled.
• Chairman Kean interjected to ask Mr. Albright to indicate whether Rosatom could be assisting in Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon based on the dynamics that Mr. Albright had highlighted.
  • Mr. Albright stated that Rosatom may enable Iran to develop plutonium production capabilities and that Iran may use these capabilities to create a nuclear weapon.