Safeguarding the Homeland from Unmanned Aerial Systems (U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence, Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security)

Hearing	Safeguarding the Homeland from Unmanned Aerial Systems
Committee	U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence, Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security
Date	December 10, 2024

 

Hearing Takeaways:

• Unmanned Ariel System (UAS) Threats to the Public and Private Sectors: The hearing focused on the growing threats that UASs pose to the public and private sectors. Members and the hearing’s witnesses raised concerns that transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), terrorists, and foreign adversaries are employing UAS technology to evade traditional security measures, gather intelligence, smuggle contraband, disrupt transportation systems, and launch attacks on the U.S. homeland. They also noted how UAS technology is rapidly improving and becoming cheaper and asserted that the U.S. must promptly respond to UAS threats.
  • Threats to the U.S.’s Borders: Several Members and Mr. Jones expressed concerns over the high prevalence of unauthorized drones at the U.S.’s borders. They noted how bad actors (including TCOs) are using these drones to surveille U.S. law enforcement and to transport contraband (including fentanyl) in some instances. Mr. Jones testified that the U.S. had made 45,000 drone detections in 2023 on the U.S.’s southern border. He indicated that 2,500 of these drones had made an incursion. He noted how much of the unauthorized drone surveillance is occurring outside of the U.S.’s jurisdiction in foreign airspace. He commented that this situation makes it challenging for the U.S. to mitigate many drones. He testified that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had mitigated 86 UAS threats at U.S. borders in fiscal year (FY) 2023, 60 UAS threats in FY 2024, and three UAS threats in FY 2025 thus far.
  • Threats to U.S. Military Operations: Members and Dr. Schwennesen also discussed how UASs have played a significant role in recent military conflicts (including in Ukraine and Russia). They noted that UASs can be used as weapons and intelligence gathering tools, which will impact future military conflicts. They stated that the U.S. must bolster its UAS capabilities so that it can remain militarily competitive.
  • Threats to U.S. Critical Infrastructure, Public Spaces, and Events: Members, Mr. Wheeler, Mr. Wiegmann, and Mr. Baumgartner stated that UASs pose a critical threat to U.S. infrastructure, including power grids, oil refineries, airports, water treatment plants, and transportation systems. They warned that rogue drones can surveille facilities, deliver hazardous payloads, disrupt operations, and conduct cyber intrusions. They also raised concerns that UASs could be used to surveille and attack public spaces and events.
  • Counter-UAS Technologies: Members, Mr. Jones, Mr. Wiegmann, and Dr. Schwennesen expressed interest in ensuring that the U.S. possesses sufficient counter-UAS technologies to respond to UAS-related threats. Members and Dr. Schwennesen raised concerns that many current counter-UAS technologies (such as signal jamming) cannot fully respond to the latest UAS technologies (including drones employing artificial intelligence (AI) technology). Mr. Jones indicated that he did not want to discuss the full extent of the U.S.’s counter-UAS technologies given the hearing’s public nature. He testified however that CBP is exploring all options (including kinetic options) to address drones that are not susceptible to electronic counter-warfare techniques. Mr. Wiegmann discussed how law enforcement agencies currently focus on intercepting rogue drones rather than kinetically destroying such drones. He commented that this approach enables law enforcement agencies to obtain important information from the drones and avoid causing collateral damage. Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence Chairman August Pfluger (R-TX) and Dr. Schwennesen expressed interest in having the U.S. study how Ukraine has employed UAS technology in its conflict with Russia so that the U.S. can develop better UAS and counter-UAS technologies.
  • Chinese-Manufactured Drones: Members expressed concerns over the widespread prevalence of Chinese-manufactured drones within the U.S. They raised particular concerns over the popularity of Chinese drone manufacturer DJI and stated that DJI’s systems pose national security concerns for the U.S. Mr. Jones testified that CBP does not use Chinese-manufactured drones. He also raised concerns that Mexican cartels could be either knowingly or unknowingly collecting information for the CCP through their use of Chinese-manufactured drones.
  • Recent Sightings of Suspicious UASs in New Jersey and New York: Members, Mr. Wheeler, Mr. Wiegmann, and Dr. Schwennesen raised concerns over the recent sightings of suspicious UASs in New Jersey and New York. They highlighted how these suspicious UASs have been spotted over U.S. military installations and critical infrastructure and stated that these drones could pose risks to these sites. Mr. Wheeler testified that the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Newark field office is working with state and local partners to investigate the recent unexplained drone sightings in New Jersey. He testified that the FBI has not yet attributed these unexplained drones to an individual or group. He also stated that he did not know whether the suspicious drones sighted over New York and New Jersey are part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER) Program.
  • Additional Sightings of Suspicious UASs: Members further raised concerns over other instances of suspicious UAS sightings over U.S. military instillations. These include suspicious drones flown over Langley Air Force Base in 2023 and a Chinese spy balloon that flew over the U.S. in 2023.
• Consideration of New Counter-UAS Authorities and Capabilities: Members and the hearing’s witnesses expressed interest in adopting and developing new counter-UAS authorities and capabilities.
  • The Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act: Several Members, Mr. Jones, Mr. Wheeler, and Mr. Baumgartner called on Congress to pass the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act to ensure that the U.S. possesses sufficient counter-UAS authorities. This legislation would renew and reform the federal government’s current counter-UAS legal authorities (which are set to expire on December 20, 2024). This legislation would modify and improve the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) counter-UAS authorities, enhance civil liberty protections for Americans using UASs in a legal and responsible manner, and strengthen public safety. The legislation would also require DHS to establish a counter-UAS mitigation pilot program in which select state and covered law enforcement agencies may mitigate unauthorized UAS operations on behalf of covered entities. Mr. Wheeler added that a long-term extension of the law would enable the FBI and its federal partners to plan their budgets and staffs so that they can effectively execute a long-term strategy. Several Members stated however that Congress must ensure that these counter-UAS authorities appropriately protect the privacy and civil liberties of Americans and do not have unintended impacts on the safety of U.S. airspace. Mr. Wheeler and Mr. Wiegmann provided assurances that the U.S.’s counter-UAS authorities can appropriately protect the privacy and civil liberties of Americans. They testified that the FBI and the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) minimize the data that they collect from drones and focus on collecting communications data between drones and their operators. They stated that the FBI and the DoJ do not collect personal information as part of their counter-UAS activities.
  • Current Federal Counter-UAS Authorities: Members also expressed interested in assessing current federal counter-UAS authorities. Mr. Wheeler stated that the U.S. can obtain authorization to mitigate inflight UASs and commented that the U.S. could obtain this mitigation authorization when a UAS incurs on a sensitive site. Dr. Schwennesen suggested however that U.S. military personnel may be hesitant to respond to suspicious UASs because a response could trigger administrative consequences. He also stated that U.S. military personnel could be concerned that their response to suspicious UASs could result in collateral damage. Mr. Jones also noted how the DHS Secretary has designated certain areas along the U.S. borders as covered facilities and indicated that CBP possesses the capabilities and authorities to mitigate unauthorized drones in these areas. He testified however that the U.S. cannot address 95 percent of the suspicious drones on the U.S.’s southern border because these suspicious drones are operating outside of the U.S.’s territory.
  • Potential Policies to Bolster U.S. Counter-UAS Authorities and Capabilities: The hearing’s witnesses made several policy recommendations for bolstering the U.S.’s counter-UAS authorities and capabilities. Mr. Baumgartner called on Congress to provide critical infrastructure companies with limited authority to deploy advanced detection and counter-UAS technologies. He commented that investments in “cutting edge” counter-UAS systems will ensure that the U.S. can address current and emerging threats effectively. Dr. Schwennesen remarked that the U.S. must immediately reduce regulatory barriers associated with developing UAS technologies and asserted that the U.S. must immediately work to develop these technologies. He commented that such an approach would support the ability of innovators to improve their counter-UAS technologies. He also stated that the U.S. should adopt a more centralized counter-UAS strategy. He further recommended that the U.S. establish a task force to collect information from Ukraine’s use of UAS technology so that it can modernize its own drone strategy. He suggested that the U.S. leverage its strong relationships with Ukraine to obtain greater information about counter-UAS technologies and strategies.
  • Federal Funding for Counter-UAS Activities: Several Republican Members raised concerns that the U.S.’s current expenditures on counter-UAS activities are too low. They stated that these low expenditures have diminished the U.S.’s capabilities to respond to suspicious UASs in New York, in New Jersey, and on the U.S.’s southern border. Mr. Wheeler testified that the FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group spends less than $500,000 on drone technology and deployment. He clarified however that this spending does not include the FBI’s Newark field office’s expenses related to its investigation into recent suspicious drone sightings. Mr. Jones noted that Congress had provided no direct appropriations for the CBP’s counter-UAS activities last year. He testified that CBP had therefore used other funding to pay for its counter-UAS activities. He indicated that he did not know the exact amount of money that CBP had spent on counter-UAS activities and expressed his willingness to follow up with the Subcommittees on this spending.
  • State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Counter-UAS Authorities: Several Members, Mr. Jones, Mr. Wheeler, and Mr. Wiegmann expressed interest in extending counter-UAS authorities to state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies. They stated that the federal government lacks sufficient capacity to provide counter-UAS support for all major events demanding this support, which can leave the public unprotected. Mr. Wiegmann noted how there are several bills that would provide differing degrees of counter-UAS authorities to states. He noted that these bills vary in terms of providing states with counter-UAS detection authority and establishing state and local counter-UAS pilot programs. Rep. Clay Higgins (R-LA) asserted however that the Tenth Amendment already extends counter-UAS authorities to state law enforcement agencies. He remarked that state and local law enforcement agencies should have access to the same technologies that are currently reserved for select federal agencies.
  • Private Sector Counter-UAS Authorities: Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence Ranking Member Seth Magaziner (D-RI) and Mr. Baumgartner expressed interest in extending counter-UAS authorities to private sector entities in limited instances so that these entities can better protect critical infrastructure assets. Mr. Baumgartner stated that fusion centers could support companies in engaging in efforts involving state and local law enforcement agencies at a single location. He also mentioned how the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) convenes state and local law enforcement agency partners in a regional fashion. He commented that the E-ISAC provides a forum for conversation and relationship building between private industry and law enforcement agencies.
  • CBP’s Collaboration with Foreign Law Enforcement Authorities: Mr. Jones testified that CBP communicates directly with foreign law enforcement partners and described this communication as “healthy.” He noted how the CBP must rely upon Mexican law enforcement agencies to respond to their drone-related requests. He stated that Mexican law enforcement agencies are often slow to respond to these drone-related requests because the requests involve areas with low populations, areas that are remote in nature, or cartel-controlled areas. He remarked however that these slow responses from Mexican law enforcement agencies are not attributable to a lack of effort or a lack of communication.

Hearing Witnesses:

Panel I:

1. Mr. Keith Jones, Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner of Air and Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
2. Mr. Robert W. Wheeler Jr., Assistant Director of the Critical Incident Response Group, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation
3. Mr. Brad Wiegmann, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for National Security, U.S. Department of Justice

Panel II:

1. Dr. Paul Schwennesen, PhD, Co-Director, Global Strategy Decisions Group
2. Mr. Jeffrey Baumgartner, Vice President of National Security and Resilience, Berkshire Hathaway Energy

Note: Ms. Cathy Lanier (Chief Security Officer of the National Football League) was supposed to be a witness on Panel II and did not appear at the hearing.

Member Opening Statements:

 Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence Chairman August Pfluger (R-TX):

• He remarked that the hearing’s purpose is to receive expert testimony from witnesses representing the public and private sectors regarding the growing threat that UASs pose to national security.
  • He also indicated that the hearing would consider policy solutions for mitigating these risks.
• He stated that the U.S. is at a “critical juncture” in the evolution of military technology, commercial innovation, and cybersecurity and that UASs have become a “transformative force.”
  • He noted how there have been numerous positive applications of UAS technology, including agriculture logistics, film production, humanitarian relief, and law enforcement.
• He remarked however that UAS technology has introduced “significant” security challenges and discussed how the domestic and foreign proliferation of this technology has raised serious concerns regarding their potential misuse in criminal activities, espionage, and national security threats directed at the U.S.
  • He indicated that these risks include foreign adversaries exploiting UASs for surveillance and intelligence gathering and UASs being weaponized to attack critical infrastructure and sports stadiums.
• He asserted that the risks posed by commercial and military grade UASs from rogue states, non-state actors, terrorist organizations, and individuals cannot be overstated.
• He mentioned how there have already occurred several troubling incidents where UASs have penetrated U.S. airspace.
  • He commented that these penetrations have compromised U.S. national security and public safety.
• He also remarked that the manufacturing of products that Americans frequently use can pose threats to the U.S. homeland and raised concerns over the widespread use of DJI-manufactured drones.
  • He explained that DJI is a Chinese company whose products are “deeply embedded” in U.S. industries and critical sectors.
• He stated that DJI’s systems raise national security concerns, including risk of unauthorized data access and system vulnerabilities.
• He discussed how multiple U.S. departments and agencies have already admonished against or banned the procurement of certain UASs that originate from the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
  • He mentioned how the CBP has blocked the importation of some DJI-produced UASs due to potential violations of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.
  • He explained that the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act prohibits the importation of goods into the U.S. that are produced in whole or in part using forced labor out of the PRC.
• He stated that the U.S. must work to protect communications equipment while strengthening U.S. supply chains through ensuring that foreign-manufactured technologies that pose security threats cannot operate in U.S. networks.
• He remarked that the threats posed by UASs continue to present challenges and commented that UAS technologies pose significant threats to the U.S. border.
  • He mentioned how UASs have already been used to circumvent traditional border security measures, such as fences, walls, and surveillance towers.
  • He also mentioned how UASs have been used to smuggle drugs and weapons across the border and to surveil CBP locations so that human smugglers can evade detection.
• He highlighted how CBP officials have consistently raised concerns that Mexican narco-terrorist gangs are using weaponized UASs both near and inside the U.S.
• He also remarked that UASs pose a critical threat to U.S. infrastructure, including power grids, oil refineries, airports, water treatment plants, and transportation systems.
  • He warned that a single UAS carrying explosives could potentially cause widespread damage, interrupt services, and result in significant economic loss for the U.S.
• He further discussed how recent events illustrate the diverse roles that UASs have played in both state-on-state conflict and asymmetric engagements.
  • He noted how UASs have been used in Ukraine and Israel, as well as in potential intelligence gathering operations near sensitive military installations both domestically and abroad.
• He stated that the U.S. must learn from these conflicts to help protect its homeland security.
• He mentioned how DHS and the DoJ were given counter-UAS authorities as part of the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018.
  • He noted how the current authorities under the law are set to expire on December 20, 2024.
• He discussed how DHS and the DoJ have used their statutory authorities to protect covered facilities and assets against credible UAS threats.
  • He indicated that these actions are notwithstanding laws (such as the Wiretap Act or the Aircraft Sabotage Act of 1984) that could otherwise limit such activities.
• He called it important for Congress to extend the current authorities under the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 and to reform the current legal authorities that provide federal agencies with critical tools to mitigate credible UAS threats.
• He applauded Full Committee Chairman Mark Green (R-TN) and Full Committee Ranking Member Bennie Thompson (D-MS) for their bipartisan work to introduce the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act.
  • He indicated that Full Committee Chairman Green and Full Committee Ranking Member Thompson had worked on this legislation with members of the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary and the U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
• He explained that the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act would renew and reform current counter-UAS legal authorities.
  • He also commented that the legislation would modify and improve the FAA’s counter-UAS authorities, enhance important civil liberty protections for Americans using UASs in a legal and responsible manner, and strengthen public safety.
• He noted how the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act would require DHS to establish a counter-UAS mitigation pilot program.
  • He explained that this program would have select state and covered law enforcement agencies operate approved counter-UAS mitigation systems and mitigate unauthorized UAS operations on behalf of covered entities.
• He further discussed how there are several ongoing incidents involving unauthorized UASs and stated that these UASs pose real threats.
  • He expressed hope that the hearing would help Congress to develop policies to address these unauthorized UASs.

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence Ranking Member Seth Magaziner (D-RI):

• He remarked that the proliferation of UASs has created a “technological arms race” between criminals and law enforcement agencies.
  • He noted how criminals are using UAS technology to plot acts of terror, traffic fentanyl and other illegal substances, and invade the privacy of ordinary Americans.
• He stated that both criminals and law enforcement agencies are innovating at a “rapid” rate and called it important for the federal government to keep pace with this innovation.
• He remarked that Congress must expand the authority of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to better utilize monitoring, tracking, and signal jamming technologies to protect critical areas (including the U.S.’s borders), large public events, prisons, and sensitive government facilities.
  • He also asserted that Congress must ensure the civil liberties of drone operators as part of any new UAS policies.
• He stated that the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act seeks to accomplish the aforementioned objectives and indicated that he is a co-sponsor of the legislation.
• He discussed how DHS, the DoJ, and other federal agencies have long briefed the Committee on the threats posed by malicious and unauthorized UASs.
  • He noted how drones have been shot down at airports, how drones have interrupted major sporting events, and how the FBI had recently arrested a White supremacist that had planned to use a drone to attack a power grid.
• He remarked however that drones are also useful tools for many occupations and hobbyists and highlighted how drones have practical uses for search and rescue, navigation, and agriculture.
  • He commented that these positive benefits of drone technology necessitate that the U.S. take a measured approach to overseeing drones.
• He expressed hope that this hearing would help support the passage of the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act.

Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL):

• He discussed how the popularity and accessibility of drones have “skyrocketed” in recent years and noted how there are currently over 880,000 registered drone operators within the U.S.
  • He added that there remain additional people operating drones without registration or training.
• He remarked that while many drone operators use drones for legitimate recreational and commercial purposes, he asserted that there exists an “undeniable” threat from parties that misuse drone technology through ignorance or malicious intent.
  • He noted how uninformed drone operators can inadvertently disrupt air traffic or incur on sensitive areas, which creates safety risks that strain law enforcement agencies and aviation systems.
• He acknowledged that while uniformed drone operators pose risks, he asserted that the impact of these operators is negligible compared to the dangers posed by nefarious actors with malicious intent.
  • He indicated that these nefarious actors include TCOs, terrorists, and foreign adversaries.
• He discussed how these nefarious actors can exploit drones to evade traditional security measures, gather intelligence, smuggle contraband, disrupt transportation systems, and launch attacks on the U.S. homeland.
• He remarked that the threats posed by nefarious actors using drones are real and escalating.
  • He highlighted how cartels are increasingly employing drones along the U.S.’s borders to smuggle drugs and to surveille law enforcement operations.
• He stated that the U.S. must consider all appropriate actions to ensure that foreign adversaries (such as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)) are not using drones under the guise of legitimate activities to relay sensitive information back to China or other entities seeking to harm the U.S.
• He warned that critical infrastructure (such as airports, power plants, and ports) face growing risks from rogue drones capable of conducting surveillance, causing disruptions, or carrying out acts of sabotage.
  • He noted how the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has documented nearly 2,000 drone sightings near airports since 2021.
  • He added that major airports have experienced drone incursions on an almost daily basis.
• He also mentioned how the FBI has reported 235 incidents of suspicious drone flights at or near chemical plants near Louisiana between 2021 and 2022.
  • He added that similar UAS activity has been observed at oil storage facilities in Oklahoma and natural gas facilities in Texas.
• He further discussed how the conflict in Ukraine has highlighted the weaponization of drones in modern warfare and noted how both Russia and Ukraine have employed drones for reconnaissance, targeting, and direct attacks.
  • He commented that this conflict underscores the ability to use drones to transform the dynamics of conflict.
• He remarked that the aforementioned domestic incidents and international conflicts demonstrate the need for the U.S. to bolster its defenses against the misuse of drones within its borders.
• He stated that the threats posed by drones will continue to grow given that the U.S. will host the 2026 World Cup and the 2028 Summer Olympics.
  • He asserted that the U.S. must confront potential threats stemming from drones to safeguard critical infrastructure and to ensure the safety of travelers, participants, and spectators.

Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security Ranking Member Shri Thanedar (D-MI):

• He discussed how drones have become increasingly affordable and useful within agriculture, law enforcement, search and rescue, photography, and other industries.
• He remarked that Congress must ensure that the U.S. government is prepared and empowered to protect the safety and security of U.S. critical infrastructure and the American public.
• He recounted how Congress had enacted initial authorities for the Executive Branch in 2018 to begin testing and operating counter-drone technologies.
  • He commented that these authorities have begun the interagency coordination and technology development needed to carry out counter-drone efforts.
• He stated however that these authorities remain limited and have relied upon numerous short-term extensions.
  • He expressed hope that Congress would act early next year to advance legislation to extend and expand these counter-drone authorities.
• He asserted that Congress must ensure that the federal government’s counter-drone activities appropriately protect privacy and civil liberties and do not have unintended impacts on the safety of U.S. airspace.
• He expressed particular interest in ensuring that airports are protected from threats posed by drones.
  • He noted how errant drones have already caused major airport shutdowns and that these shutdowns have caused significant delays.
• He stated that introducing new technologies that impact radio signals is especially sensitive within airport and other urban environments and asserted that the U.S. must ensure that such technologies are carefully tested.
• He expressed interest in exploring how Congress can advance the U.S.’s counter-drone efforts into a new phase in a “measured yet meaningful” manner.

Panel I Opening Statements:

Mr. Keith Jones (Air and Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection):

• He noted how Air and Marine Operations is CBP’s executive agent for counter-UAS operations and discussed how Air and Marine Operations works alongside U.S. Border Patrol and Office of Field Operations counterparts to detect, track, and mitigate UAS threats along the U.S.’s borders.
  • He also mentioned how Air and Marine Operations collaborates with DoJ and FBI partners on investigations.
  • He further mentioned how Air and Marine Operations works with the CBP Innovation Team, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and private industry to identify technologies that can improve its mitigation and domain awareness capabilities.
• He testified that UAS activity on the U.S.’s borders is increasing rapidly and mentioned how CBP sensors had recorded more than 6,900 drone flights within close proximity of the U.S.’s borders over a six-week period.
• He remarked that these drone flights (particularly in areas of high illicit activity) present the greatest threat to the safety of the CBP’s frontline personnel, pose a serious collision risk to the U.S.’s crewed aircrafts, and diminish the effectiveness of U.S. border security operations.
  • He indicated that while the intent behind these drone flights cannot be derived from border proximity alone, he testified that CBP has associated a large percentage of these drone flights with nefarious activities on the ground.
• He discussed how TCOs have fully integrated UAS technology into their operations and raised concerns regarding the widespread use of drones to conduct reconnaissance of CBP law enforcement personnel, their locations, and their activities.
  • He commented that UAS technology enables smugglers to guide non-citizens and transport contraband across the U.S.’s borders without encountering any law enforcement.
• He also noted that while most drones have limited payload capacity, he asserted that the ability of TCOs to transport contraband over the U.S.’s borders still poses significant risk.
  • He commented that a few pounds of narcotics (such as fentanyl) or a few pounds of explosives could cause serious harm.
• He then remarked that the authorities provided under the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 are “essential” for CBP to detect and counter the serious threats posed by drones.
• He discussed how CBP (in accordance with the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018, DHS policy guidance, and internal policy) conducts counter-UAS operations in ten high-risk sectors along the U.S.’s southwest and northern borders as authorized by the DHS Secretary.
  • He noted how CBP’s operations target specific threats to covered facilities or assets while safeguarding privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
• He stated that obtaining authorization to implement counter-UAS authorizations is a rigorous and precise process that requires a credible determination based on extensive analysis and evidence and correlation with actionable law enforcement information.
• He testified that CBP had mitigated 86 UAS threats at U.S. borders in FY 2023 and 60 UAS threats in FY 2024.
  • He also mentioned that CBP had mitigated 16 UAS Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) events in FY 2023 and 49 SEAR events in FY 2024.
  • He further testified that CBP has mitigated three unmanned aircraft systems thus far in FY 2025.
• He then discussed how TCOs are “rapidly” obtaining larger and more maneuverable drones with higher payload capacities and the ability to fly longer, higher, and farther.
• He also mentioned how CBP is tracking the threat of drones used for kinetic attacks with payloads containing explosives, firearms, or weapons of mass destruction.
  • He indicated that Mexican drug cartels are already using drones to attack militaries, police, and their rivals.
• He remarked that these growing threats posed by drones necessitate that CBP obtain critical authorities and advanced technologies to maintain the Agency’s strategic advantage and continued commitment to achieving persistent domain awareness.
  • He commented that Congressional support will enable CBP to counter the “rapidly evolving” threat posed by drones and expand its risk-based implementation of counter-UAS operations along the U.S.’s borders.

Mr. Robert W. Wheeler Jr. (Critical Incident Response Group, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation):

• He mentioned how he leads the FBI’s efforts for pre-crisis planning and response to critical incidents and major investigations.
  • He indicated that he has responsibility for the FBI’s counter-unmanned aircraft program.
• He discussed how the public, commercial, military, and law enforcement sectors are increasingly using UASs and stated that UAS technology lends itself to malicious use from state, non-state, and lone actors.
• He asserted that UAS technology poses unique security challenges for the U.S. and mentioned how UASs have increasingly been used to commit crimes with the intent to cause injury to U.S. persons on U.S. soil.
  • He mentioned how a Chinese national had recently plead guilty to two misdemeanor counts for using a UAS to conduct espionage at a U.S. Naval facility in January 2024.
• He expressed the FBI’s belief that UASs are being flown over sensitive facilities across the U.S. and mentioned how a subject had recently been arrested in Tennessee for attempting to destroy an energy facility with a UAS containing an explosive device.
  • He indicated that an ideology to disrupt society through the collapse of the national power grid had driven this subject.
• He discussed how the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 had granted the FBI with necessary authority to mitigate various UAS threats to protect special events, emergency response, federal investigations, personnel, and facilities.
  • He specifically noted how this law authorized the DoJ and DHS to conduct counter-UAS operations in limited circumstances to identify, track, and mitigate credible threats.
• He called on Congress to reauthorize the counter-UAS authorities under the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 and indicated that these authorities are set to expire on December 20, 2024.
  • He warned that Congress’s failure to extend these authorities would undermine the FBI’s ability to protect the public from UASs.
• He also asserted that Congress must pursue a “durable” extension of the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018’s counter-UAS authorities.
  • He commented that short-term extensions of these authorities prevent the FBI and its federal partners from budgeting and staffing in ways that enable them to effectively execute a long-term strategy.
  • He expressed appreciation for Congress’s consideration of a five-year or greater extension of the law.
• He then expressed the FBI’s support for the pursuit of expanded counter-UAS authorities for state, local, tribal, and territorial partners.
  • He testified that these partners have “routinely” informed the FBI that their existing counter-UAS authorities are inadequate.
• He mentioned how the FBI has adopted 69 operational missions and has provided limited support to 121 other events since it had been granted counter-UAS authority in 2009.
• He testified that the FBI had detected over 1,000 UASs in violation of federal law during these missions.
  • He recounted how the FBI had mitigated a UAS threat at the 2024 Boston Marathon, which had resulted in the capture and prosecution of the suspect.
• He remarked that the FBI alone cannot protect the over 40,000 SEAR events annually held in the U.S., as well as handle the “countless” other requests for counter-UAS support at mass gatherings.
• He stated that the use of counter-UAS capabilities to protect against adverse situations is “crucial” and asserted that expanding the FBI’s capability to include state and local partners would help address these needs.
• He concluded by expressing the FBI’s commitment to countering the malicious use of UAS technology and calling on Congress to provide a long-term extension of the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018.

Mr. Brad Wiegmann (U.S. Department of Justice):

• He expressed the DoJ’s commitment to protecting Americans from illicit drone threats and stated that the DoJ requires additional legal authority to carry out this mission.
  • He asserted that current authorities are insufficient for addressing the growing prevalence of drones in U.S. airspace.
• He recounted how he had previously testified (alongside DHS and FAA officials) before a U.S. Senate Committee on growing drone threats and the need for a more durable and significantly expanded legal framework for drones.
• He noted how Congress has subsequently provided extensions of existing counter-drone authorities and has considered how to best expand these authorities.
  • He expressed gratitude that the U.S. House and Representatives and the U.S. Senate agree that these authorities should not be allowed to lapse.
• He warned that the absence of legal authority for counter-drone activities could render the most effective types of drone detection and counter-drone technologies illegal.
  • He indicated that current laws prohibit the destroying or disabling aircrafts in flight and the intercepting signals of communications.
• He noted that the DoJ’s current counter-drone authorities are set to lapse within the next ten days and asserted that the DoJ’s first priority is for Congress to reauthorize the existing law.
  • He also stated that Congress is working on legislation to expand existing counter-drone authorities and expressed interest in working with Congress on such legislation.
• He remarked that the two most important counter-drone-related issues to the DoJ are broadening the types of sites that law enforcement agencies can protect from nefarious and suspicious drone uses and empowering state and local law enforcement agencies and critical infrastructure operators to engage in counter-drone efforts themselves.
  • He elaborated that the types of sites that could be protected from nefarious and suspicious drone uses should include airports and critical infrastructure (such as power plants and chemical facilities).
• He stated that the federal government alone cannot carry out counter-drone operations and noted how the FBI can cover less than 0.5 percent of U.S. events each year that might need counter-drone support.
  • He commented that the demand for counter-drone protection throughout the U.S. “vastly exceeds” federal resources.
• He also remarked that the U.S.’s counter-drone activities can and must involve safeguards for the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.
• He testified that the DoJ’s counter-drone technologies typically detect only communications being passed between the operator’s controller and the drone.
  • He indicated that these technologies do not extract text messages, emails, or internet search histories from the phones or tablets used to control drones.
  • He also indicated that these technologies do not enable law enforcement agencies to listen to voice calls.
• He testified that the DoJ collects information regarding the drone vendor and model, the drone and controlling device serial number, the geolocation of the drone, the location of the drone controller, and the most recent takeoff and home location.
  • He commented that this collected information is similar to the information that must be broadcast by manned aircrafts.
  • He added that the FAA’s Remote Identification (ID) regulation requires drones to broadcast this information. 
• He stated that the DoJ uses the information collected from drones to further investigate when a crime involving a drone is suspected.
• He testified that the DoJ would continue to have guidance that contains explicit protections for privacy, civil liberties, and associated training.
  • He also indicated that state and local law enforcement agencies (if empowered to engage in counter-drone activities) would be required to adhere to the same rules.

Panel I Congressional Question Period:

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence Chairman August Pfluger (R-TX):

• Chairman Pfluger asked the witnesses to discuss the recent unexplained drone sightings in New Jersey.
  • Mr. Wheeler testified that the FBI’s Newark field office is working with state and local partners to investigate the recent unexplained drone sightings in New Jersey. He noted how these unexplained drone sightings have occurred near sensitive sites and areas of concern. He testified that the FBI has not yet attributed these unexplained drones to an individual or group. He also discussed how the FBI has enlisted the help of interagency partnerships and the general public to investigate these unexplained drones. He mentioned how the FBI is soliciting tips from the public on these unexplained drones via a toll-free phone number and website. He called the situation “concerning.”
• Chairman Pfluger interjected to ask Mr. Wheeler to indicate whether these unexplained drone sightings put public safety and national security at risk.
  • Mr. Wheeler remarked that while it does not appear that these unexplained drone sightings pose public safety and national security risks, he stated that he could not provide a conclusive answer to Chairman Pfluger’s question.
• Chairman Pfluger remarked that the Subcommittees had decided to hold the current hearing in response to the recent unexplained drone sightings. He also mentioned how unidentified drones had flown over Langley Air Force Base in 2023. He noted how Langley Air Force Base is a very sensitive military operation with F-22s and other weapons systems. He asked the witnesses to explain why the U.S. cannot take action against drones flying over sensitive sites.
  • Mr. Wheeler remarked that the U.S. can obtain authorization to mitigate inflight UASs and noted that the U.S. can obtain this mitigation authorization when a UAS incurs on a sensitive site. He indicated that while he could not speak on the DoD’s behalf regarding their responses to UASs that incur on DoD sites, he expressed the FBI’s commitment to support the DoD in addressing such UASs. He emphasized however that the DoD is responsible for addressing UASs that incurs on DoD sites.
• Chairman Pfluger then mentioned how CBP officials in the Rio Grande Valley had told him that they had experienced 20,000 incidents in a single quarter involving cartel-operated drones. He asked Mr. Jones to discuss the dangers that drones along the U.S.’s southern border pose to the safety of U.S. citizens.
  • Mr. Jones described the volume of drone activity on the U.S.’s borders as “staggering.” He testified that CBP has deployed drone detection technology. He raised concerns over the amount of counter-surveillance activity involving drones. He elaborated that bad actors are constantly surveilling U.S. law enforcement activities and noted that drones enable surveillance without the need for parties to obtain higher ground.
• Chairman Pfluger interjected to ask Mr. Jones to indicate whether CBP has the authority to mitigate unauthorized drones.
  • Mr. Jones noted how the DHS Secretary has designated certain areas along the U.S. borders as covered facilities. He indicated that CBP possesses the capabilities and authorities to mitigate unauthorized drones in these areas.
• Chairman Pfluger asked Mr. Jones to indicate whether the CBP is actively mitigating unauthorized drones in the areas deemed to be covered facilities.
  • Mr. Jones answered affirmatively.
• Chairman Pfluger asked Mr. Jones to indicate how many events involving unauthorized drones are occurring each year along the U.S.’s southern border.
  • Mr. Jones testified that the U.S. had made 45,000 drone detections in 2023 on the U.S.’s southern border. He indicated that 2,500 of these drones had made an incursion. He noted how much of the unauthorized drone surveillance is occurring outside of the U.S.’s jurisdiction in foreign airspace. He commented that this situation makes it challenging for the U.S. to mitigate such drones.
• Chairman Pfluger indicated that his question period time had expired.

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence Ranking Member Seth Magaziner (D-RI):

• Ranking Member Magaziner mentioned how many CBP officers had told him that drones were posing challenges along the U.S.’s southern border. He noted how cartels are primarily using drones to surveil U.S. law enforcement so that the cartels can more effectively traffic people, firearms, and narcotics across the U.S.’s southern border. He asked Mr. Jones to indicate whether these cartels are using drones to move contraband (such as fentanyl) across the U.S.’s southern border.
  • Mr. Jones testified that the CBP had not yet observed fentanyl being moved across the U.S.’s southern border via UASs. He stated however that other narcotics have been moved across the U.S.’s southern border via UASs. He indicated that these movements have involved small quantities. He stated that it is not economically effective for cartels to move fentanyl via UASs given how UASs have small payload capacities. He elaborated that UASs containing fentanyl would need to make multiple trips. He testified however that the CBP has observed cartels use UASs to transport cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and weapons across the U.S.’s southern border. He concluded that there exists a threat of UAS-enabled contraband transports across the U.S.’s southern border.
• Ranking Member Magaziner noted how Mr. Jones’s written testimony had indicated that there have been periods where CBP has detected 1,000 unauthorized drones per week. He noted however that the CBP’s number of drone mitigations at the U.S.’s southern border was 86 in FY 2023 and 60 in FY 2024. He asked Mr. Jones to explain this low number of drone mitigations and to discuss the barriers that prevent CBP from engaging in drone mitigations.
  • Mr. Jones noted that many of the CBP’s detections of unauthorized drones occur in foreign airspace and stated that CBP cannot mitigate these drones. He indicated that a very small percentage of unauthorized drones incur within the U.S. He highlighted how only 5 percent of the detected unauthorized drones near the U.S.’s southern border had incurred within the U.S. He stated that CPB maintains very strict criteria for engaging in drone mitigation. He indicated that the 60 unauthorized drones mitigated in FY 2024 had met the criteria for mitigation.
• Ranking Member Magaziner asked Mr. Jones to indicate whether the criteria for mitigating unauthorized drones that enter the U.S.’s airspace is too narrow. He expressed interest in determining why the U.S. mitigates just a small number of unauthorized drones.
  • Mr. Jones noted that many of the unauthorized drones that are detected are repeat offenders and that a single unauthorized drone could be detected multiple times.
• Ranking Member Magaziner then asked Mr. Jones to indicate whether the CBP possesses the technological ability to track unauthorized drone operators and to alert Mexican and Canadian law enforcement authorities about these operators. He also asked Mr. Jones to discuss the CBP’s cooperation process with foreign law enforcement authorities. 
  • Mr. Jones testified that CBP communicates directly with foreign law enforcement partners and described this communication as “healthy.”
• Ranking Member Magaziner asked Mr. Jones to indicate whether the CBP’s efforts to cooperate with foreign law enforcement agencies to address unauthorized drone operators have been successful.
  • Mr. Jones noted that the CBP must rely upon Mexican law enforcement agencies to respond to their drone-related requests. He stated that Mexican law enforcement agencies are often slow to respond to these drone-related requests because the requests involve areas with low populations, areas that are remote in nature, or cartel-controlled areas. He remarked that these slow responses from Mexican law enforcement agencies are not attributable to a lack of effort or a lack of communication.
• Ranking Member Magaziner then asked Mr. Wiegmann to elaborate on the importance of providing state and local law enforcement agencies with expanded counter-drone authorities to address SEAR events. He also asked Mr. Wiegmann to recommend appropriate guardrails for such expanded counter-drone authorities.
  • Mr. Wiegmann noted how the FBI and DHS can cover a limited number of special events and indicated that these special events include the Super Bowl, the World Series, and the Indianapolis 500. He stated however that there exist even more events that could be subject to an attack or a drone threat. He remarked that providing state and local law enforcement agencies with expanded counter-drone authorities to address SEAR events would therefore significantly broaden counter-drone protection capabilities.
• Ranking Member Magaziner interjected to acknowledge the need to provide state and local law enforcement agencies with expanded counter-drone authorities to address SEAR events. He stated that training would be key for enabling the expanded counter-drone authorities for state and local law enforcement agencies. He noted how many people operate drones at events (such as high school football games) for legitimate reasons. He commented that the U.S. would need to ensure that state and local law enforcement agencies would use their expanded counter-drone authorities to pursue bad actors without overly penalizing good actors.
  • Mr. Wiegmann expressed agreement with Ranking Member Magaziner’s comments regarding the importance of training state and local law enforcement agencies on counter-drone operations.

Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL):

• Chairman Gimenez remarked that many current drone mitigation techniques would be rendered useless with the increasing deployments of AI technologies. He elaborated that AI technology would enable unpiloted drones that can self-execute provided objectives. He asked the witnesses to indicate whether the U.S. could use projectiles to bring down drones or use high energy systems that can disable drones.
  • Mr. Jones stated that he did not want to publicly answer Chairman Gimenez’s question because the answer could provide valuable information to the U.S.’s adversaries. He expressed his willingness to provide Chairman Gimenez with a briefing on this topic. He also indicated that CBP shares Chairman Gimenez’s concerns regarding the U.S.’s current counter-drone capabilities.
• Chairman Gimenez raised concerns that AI technology-enabled drones pose risks to the safety of CBP personnel, airports, and large events. He then noted how Mr. Jones had indicated that the CBP currently possesses legal authority to disable and mitigate drones in certain areas. He asked Mr. Jones to indicate the amount of the U.S.’s borders that the CBP can mitigate drones on.
  • Mr. Jones stated that he did not want to publicly answer Chairman Gimenez’s question. He expressed his willingness to respond to Chairman Gimenez’s question in a closed setting.
• Chairman Gimenez then discussed how Mexican cartels are working with the CCP to produce fentanyl and noted that fentanyl is killing thousands of Americans each year. He asked Mr. Jones to indicate whether there exist any links between the CCP and the drone technology that is being used to surveille the U.S.’s borders and to traffic people, drugs, and guns into the U.S.
  • Mr. Jones stated that the preponderance of UAS technology is being manufactured in China and that the Mexican cartels are using this UAS technology. He indicated that CBP shares Chairman Gimenez’s concerns regarding Chinese-manufactured drones and testified that CBP does not use Chinese-manufactured drones. He also raised concerns that Mexican cartels could be either knowingly or unknowingly collecting information for the CCP through their use of Chinese-manufactured drones.

Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security Ranking Member Shri Thanedar (D-MI):

• Ranking Member Thanedar discussed how the operation of counter-UAS technologies to intercept drones is sensitive given how it generally requires warrantless seizures of property. He noted how counter-UAS technology operators must generally hack into a drone’s signals, which can entail hacking into the drone operator’s signal or computer. He mentioned how Congress has waived certain wiretapping and other privacy protections for carrying out these activities. He asked the witnesses to discuss how their respective departments and agencies have formally enshrined protections for privacy and civil liberties when operating counter-UAS technologies.
  • Mr. Wheeler remarked that the FBI is “very sensitive” to concerns that counter-UAS technologies may infringe upon privacy and civil liberties. He testified that the FBI only collects telemetry information related to the control of drones. He stated that the FBI’s counter-UAS technology does not capture any personal information if the technology is tracking a personal device-operated drone. He further testified that the FBI does not maintain possession of the information it collects if the information does not pertain to a threat. He stated that the FBI follows existing guidelines for maintaining evidence if it collects drone information related to an investigation. He concluded that the FBI is “very sensitive” to privacy concerns related to drone information and works to ensure that such information is collected properly.
• Ranking Member Thanedar then discussed how Congress is currently considering whether to authorize a pilot program that would permit state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies to operate counter-UAS technologies. He stated that expanding these counter-UAS authorities must be done carefully. He noted how such expansions would require the waiving of wiretap protections and other critical privacy and civil liberty protections. He asked the witnesses to address how Congress could ensure that federal law enforcement authorities would work with and oversee state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies in operating counter-UAS technologies. He also asked Mr. Wiegmann to address how Congress can protect privacy and civil liberties in its use of counter-UAS technologies.
  • Mr. Wiegmann remarked that there would need to be counter-UAS training for state and local law enforcement officials if the U.S. were to permit state and local governments to operate counter-UAS technologies. He also stated that such counter-UAS authorities would necessitate that state and local law enforcement officials follow established procedures. He indicated that these procedures would govern the technologies that could be used, the types of data that could be collected, the rules of engagement, and the types of facilities that could be corrected. He further stated that the DoJ, DHS, and FAA would need to approve all state and local law enforcement agency counter-UAS activities. He remarked that the DoJ is envisioning a labor-intensive process for any pilot program that permits state and local law enforcement agencies to operate counter-UAS technologies. He added that these state and local law enforcement agency counter-UAS operations would need to protect privacy and civil liberties.

Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC):

• Rep. Bishop asked Mr. Wiegmann to indicate whether he had asserted that the U.S. requires expanded counter-UAS authorities because the effective counter-UAS technologies could violate laws related to intercepting in-flight aircrafts and intercepting transmissions.
  • Mr. Wiegmann answered affirmatively.
• Rep. Bishop asked Mr. Wiegmann to explain why the U.S. could not simply adopt a rule dictating that any drones that fly near a mass spectator event be destroyed in the air.
  • Mr. Wiegmann noted that a mass spectator event (such as a football game) would be considered a temporary flight restricted area where drones could not fly. He indicated that law enforcement agencies would apply differing levels of scrutiny for the drones flying in the areas surrounding the temporary flight restricted area. He stated that law enforcement agencies would track drones that approach the temporary flight restricted area to determine whether the drones are being used for legitimate purposes (such as package delivery). He also discussed how counter-drone operations typically focus on jamming the suspicious drones rather than destroying the suspicious drones. He explained that drone jamming involves electronically interfering with the drone’s navigation system, which forces the drone to land.
• Rep. Bishop noted that the destruction of drones in air is generally unpopular. He commented that such destruction could pose debris risks.
  • Mr. Wiegmann stated the kinetic destruction of drones in air would have some associated hazards.
• Rep. Bishop asked Mr. Jones to commented on whether counter-UAS technologies that electronically force drones to land are reliable.
  • Mr. Jones remarked that there exist non-destructive kinetic capabilities for bringing down drones. He noted that law enforcement agencies can obtain information from captured drones. He also stated that law enforcement agencies seek to avoid or minimize collateral damage when taking down drones.
• Rep. Bishop expressed concerns over expanding current counter-UAS authorities. He stated that the U.S. government has previously abused its authorities to obtain and interpret information about Americans. He asked the witnesses to address the validity of these concerns and why Congress should extend and expand current counter-UAS authorities.
  • Mr. Wiegmann expressed support for expanding the U.S.’s current counter-UAS authorities. He remarked that the types of drone signals that law enforcement agencies collect from drones are the same types of information that must be broadcast. He elaborated that FAA rules make this drone information publicly available to everyone. He stated that the U.S. is focused on obtaining information regarding communications between drones and controllers. He indicated that law enforcement agencies want this information to determine the identity of the drone controller, the drone’s registration and model, and how to address the suspicious drone. He asserted that the privacy interest in this context is limited.
• Rep. Bishop indicated that his question period time had expired.

Rep. Lou Correa (D-CA):

• Rep. Correa discussed how his Congressional District contains several large venues, including Disneyland Park, the Honda Center (which is home to the Anaheim Ducks professional hockey team), and the OC Vibe (which is currently under construction). He also mentioned how SoFi Stadium (which will host 2026 World Cup games and 2028 Summer Olympic events) is located near his Congressional District. He described these venues as “target rich environments” for drones. He noted how Mr. Wiegmann had testified that the federal government lacks the bandwidth to protect all major sites and events from unauthorized drones. He also remarked that federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies cannot share authorities and information to address these unauthorized drones. He stated that these law enforcement agencies must respond promptly to drone threats. He asked the witnesses to indicate whether there exist any efforts currently underway to coordinate counter-UAS activities across different levels of law enforcement.
  • Mr. Jones testified that the CBP works with its federal, state, and local partners on a daily basis on counter-UAS and other activities. He remarked that CBP requires the authority to designate select state and local law enforcement agencies to carry out counter-UAS operations with approved equipment.
• Rep. Correa interjected to ask Mr. Jones to indicate whether federal legislation is required to enable the CBP to support state and local law enforcement agencies in carrying out counter-UAS operations.
  • Mr. Jones answered affirmatively.
• Rep. Correa commented that Congress could pass such federal legislation. He also asked the witnesses to comment on the U.S.’s current cooperation with Mexico on efforts to address unauthorized drones.
  • Mr. Jones described the CPB’s relationships and information sharing with Mexican local governments and the Mexican national government as “healthy.”
• Rep. Correa asked Mr. Wheeler to indicate whether there are any efforts to coordinate laws to support state and local law enforcement agencies in carrying out counter-UAS operations.
  • Mr. Wheeler discussed how the FBI’s Newark Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTFF) is composed of many state and local law enforcement officers. He stated that this JTFF is actively investigating the unexplained drones that have been observed in New Jersey.
• Rep. Correa asked Mr. Wheeler and Mr. Wiegmann to indicate whether there exist any legislative efforts that would provide state and local law enforcement agencies with the authority to neutralize and monitor suspicious drones.
  • Mr. Wheeler expressed support for capacity building for state and local law enforcement agency counter-UAS efforts.
  • Mr. Wiegmann noted how there are several bills that would provide differing degrees of counter-UAS authorities to states. He noted that these bills vary in terms of providing states with counter-UAS detection authorities and establishing state and local counter-UAS pilot programs.
• Rep. Correa interjected to ask Mr. Wiegmann to indicate whether there exist any additional counter-UAS authorities that state and local law enforcement agencies need.
  • Mr. Wiegmann remarked that Congress should focus on passing the existing bills under consideration to expand counter-UAS authorities for state and local law enforcement agencies.

Rep. Clay Higgins (R-LA):

• Rep. Higgins noted how there exist federal laws that prohibit the intercepting of aircrafts and the intercepting of communications signals.  He also noted that there do not exist federal laws that authorize local law enforcement agencies to use available technologies to mitigate against UAS threats. He asserted that the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution already extends counter-UAS authorities to state law enforcement agencies. He remarked that current federal law does not preclude states from authorizing their own state and local law enforcement agencies from using these same technologies in a law enforcement capacity. He contended that state and local law enforcement agencies should have access to the same technologies that are currently reserved for select federal agencies. He asked Mr. Jones to confirm that CBP uses counter-UAS technologies primarily to track suspicious drones and that the CBP does not use counter-UAS technologies to primarily land suspicious drones.
  • Mr. Jones remarked that CBP is using counter-UAS technologies to track drones and to intercept and land drones at a place of their discretion.
• Rep. Higgins asked Mr. Jones to indicate the percentage of tracked drones that the CBP will intercept and land.
  • Mr. Jones testified that the CBP had landed 60 suspicious drones at the U.S.’s southern border in FY 2024.
• Rep. Higgins stated that the CBP uses counter-UAS technologies to land a very small percentage of the drones that it tracks. He asserted that states should possess counter-UAS authorities under the Tenth Amendment.

Rep. Tony Gonzales (R-TX):

• Rep. Gonzales asked the witnesses to confirm that the U.S. cannot explain the suspicious drones currently being sighted in New Jersey.
  • Mr. Wheeler confirmed that the U.S. cannot explain the suspicious drones currently being sighted in New Jersey.
• Rep. Gonzales called it “crazy” that the U.S. cannot explain the suspicious drones currently being sighted in New Jersey. He also asked Mr. Jones to confirm that the U.S. cannot address 95 percent of the suspicious drones on the U.S.’s southern border because these suspicious drones are operating outside of U.S. territory.
  • Mr. Jones confirmed that the U.S. cannot address 95 percent of the suspicious drones on the U.S.’s southern border because these suspicious drones are operating outside of U.S. territory.
• Rep. Gonzales remarked that the U.S.’s inability to address suspicious drones is causing frustration for many U.S. taxpayers. He stated that federal agencies will soon need to explain the effectiveness of their expenditures. He asked Mr. Wheeler to indicate the percentage of the FBI’s budget that goes toward counter-UAS activities.
  • Mr. Wheeler testified that the FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group spends less than $500,000 on counter-UAS activities.
• Rep. Gonzalez described the FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group’s expenditures on counter-UAS activities as “nothing.” He asked Mr. Wheeler to explain why these expenditures are so low. He also commented that these low expenditures help explain the U.S.’s lack of understanding regarding recent suspicious drone sightings.
  • Mr. Wheeler clarified that the $500,000 figure that he had previously cited does not include the FBI Newark field office’s expenses for its investigation into suspicious drone sightings. He stated that the $500,000 figure refers to the FBI’s expenditures on drone technology and deployment.
• Rep. Gonzalez remarked that Congress wants to support the Executive Branch in addressing suspicious drones. He expressed his willingness to provide the Executive Branch with additional funding to address these suspicious drones. He raised concerns however that the U.S.’s current counter-UAS activities appear to be ineffective. He asked Mr. Jones to indicate the CBP’s current budget for counter-UAS activities.
  • Mr. Jones noted that Congress had provided no direct appropriations for the CBP’s counter-UAS activities last year. He testified that CBP had therefore used other funding to pay for its counter-UAS activities. He indicated that he did not know the exact amount of money that CBP had spent on counter-UAS activities. He expressed his willingness to follow up with Rep. Gonzalez on his question.
• Rep. Gonzalez mentioned how he serves on the U.S. House Committee on Appropriations. He stated that Congress’s failure to fund the CBP’s counter-UAS activities reduces the likelihood that these activities will be successful. He mentioned how his Congressional District includes part of the U.S.’s southern border. He called it unfair to expect CBP officials to effectively patrol the U.S.’s southern border without funding for counter-UAS activities. He expressed interest in determining the resources that U.S. law enforcement agencies need to address suspicious drones. He remarked that there already exist robust counter-UAS technologies and noted how drones have existed for a long time. He asserted that the U.S. must address suspicious drones and warned that the U.S.’s failure to address these drones could result in unfavorable outcomes.

Rep. Anthony D’Esposito (R-NY):

• Rep. D’Esposito mentioned how the New York City Police Department (NYPD) has one of the fastest growing drone programs in the country. He discussed how drones in New York and New Jersey are flying over critical infrastructure and expressed frustration that the U.S. cannot explain these suspicious drones. He remarked that the U.S. must find an explanation for these suspicious drones. He criticized the U.S.’s low expenditures on counter-UAS activities and expressed hope that Congress would bolster these activities. He then discussed how drone technology is rapidly advancing and how drones are becoming increasingly available. He also stated that the threats that drones pose have “rapidly” increased. He noted how local law enforcement agencies are restricted from pursuing counter-UAS activities, which means that federal law enforcement agencies are primarily responsible for pursuing these activities. He asked Mr. Wiegmann and Mr. Wheeler to indicate whether federal law enforcement agencies can assist local law enforcement agencies with their counter-UAS capabilities in all instances of need.
  • Mr. Wiegmann answered no. He stated that Congress should empower federal law enforcement agencies to assist local law enforcement agencies with their counter-UAS capabilities.
  • Mr. Wheeler expressed agreement with Mr. Wiegmann’s response.
• Rep. D’Esposito asked Mr. Wiegmann and Mr. Wheeler to indicate whether there exist events that would benefit from having counter-UAS capabilities that federal law enforcement agencies cannot currently provide.
  • Mr. Wiegmann answered affirmatively.
  • Mr. Wheeler answered affirmatively.
• Rep. D’Esposito noted how Mr. Wiegmann and Mr. Wheeler had both stated that the U.S. must empower state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies to protect their jurisdictions from emergency threats. He mentioned how his Congressional District had recently hosted the 2024 International Cricket World Cup. He noted that while there had been drone threats from ISIS before the event, he indicated that the federal government could only assist with their counter-UAS capabilities for a small portion of the event. He asked the witnesses to discuss the impact of local law enforcement agencies lacking counter-UAS authorities.
  • Mr. Wheeler remarked that the U.S. requires more capacity to carry out counter-UAS operations. He expressed support for providing state and local law enforcement agencies with capacity and authority to carry out these counter-UAS operations.
  • Mr. Wiegmann remarked that federal law enforcement agencies will require more resources if Congress provides state and local law enforcement agencies with greater counter-UAS authorities. He stated that federal law agencies would need to train state and local law enforcement agencies to operate counter-UAS programs and would need to approve such programs.
• Rep. D’Esposito remarked that there exists a false perception that law enforcement agencies do not want counter-UAS authorities and responsibilities. He mentioned how the Nassau County, New York Police Department Commissioner has told the Committee that local law enforcement agencies want and need counter-UAS authorities. He raised concerns that federal law enforcement agencies cannot always provide robust counter-UAS support for major events. He remarked that Congress must provide state and local law enforcement agencies with counter-UAS authorities. He then indicated that his question period time had expired.

Rep. Eli Crane (R-AZ):

• Rep. Crane asked Mr. Wheeler to comment on what the FBI knows about the recent suspicious drone sightings over New York and New Jersey.
  • Mr. Wheeler noted that there are public reports and eyewitness sightings of unidentified drones. He described these eyewitness sightings as “very credible” and indicated that these sightings have come from police personnel (as well as other people). He testified that the FBI does not know the specific details of these drones. He noted that some of these drones have been described as being larger than commercially available drones and that these drones have included both fixed-wing and rotary-wing models. He also testified that the FBI has helped to analyze videos and pictures of these unidentified drones. He stated however that the FBI does not know the operators behind these unidentified drones and that the FBI is working to identify these operators.
• Rep. Crane asked Mr. Wheeler to indicate how much money the FBI is currently spending on its counter-UAS efforts.
  • Mr. Wheeler stated that the FBI’s budget for counter-UAS technologies is $500,000.
• Rep. Crane commented that the FBI’s current budget for counter-UAS technologies appears inadequate. He asked Mr. Wheeler to address why the FBI is not seeking to keep pace with modern warfare needs and modern threats. He also asked Mr. Wheeler to indicate the FBI’s current budget.
  • Mr. Wheeler stated that the FBI’s current budget is approximately $11 billion.
• Rep. Crane remarked that there are occurring drastic changes in how warfare is being conducted. He asked Mr. Wheeler to address why the FBI is not taking the threats posed by drones more seriously. He commented that the FBI’s current expenditures on counter-UAS technologies demonstrate that the FBI does not prioritize these technologies.
  • Mr. Wheeler remarked that the FBI has a limited capability that is embedded within its emerging threats unit for surveillance issues. He stated that this allocation of resources will likely grow over time.
• Rep. Crane asked Mr. Wheeler to comment on how terrorist cells might respond to the hearing and the FBI’s current inability to determine the source of suspicious drones.
  • Mr. Wheeler expressed his desire to be measured in his comments regarding the FBI’s current counter-UAS capabilities and limitations. He stated however that the FBI’s current counter-UAS capabilities could be improved and expressed the FBI’s commitment to continue improving these capabilities.
• Rep. Crane commented that the FBI’s low expenditures on counter-UAS capabilities likely results in these capabilities being poor.
  • Mr. Wheeler remarked that the FBI’s counter-UAS challenges are enterprise-wide (and not confined to technology). He stated that most of the FBI’s budget goes toward addressing threats to Americans (including drone threats). He asserted that the FBI’s $500,000 expenditures on UAS technology adequately captures the FBI’s commitment to protecting Americans.
• Rep. Crane then asked the witnesses to discuss how the federal government is working to respond to drones that are not susceptible to electronic counter-warfare techniques (such as fiber optic drones).
  • Mr. Jones testified that the CBP is exploring all options (including kinetic options) to address drones that are not susceptible to electronic counter-warfare techniques.
• Rep. Crane asked Mr. Jones to indicate whether he knows that non-expensive kinetic drone options are currently available.
  • Mr. Jones remarked that there exist many different drone technologies. He testified that CBP has experimented with some technologies that have been “very successful.”

Rep. Nicole Malliotakis (R-NY):

• Note: Rep. Malliotakis is not a member of the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security and was waived onto the Committee for the hearing.
• Rep. Malliotakis mentioned how several suspicious drones have flown over her Congressional District. She noted how some of her constituents had observed these suspicious drones fly over a power plant in Brooklyn, New York and over the Verrazzano-Narrows Bridge. She emphasized that there are U.S. military installations on both sides of the Verrazzano-Narrows Bridge. She called it concerning that these suspicious drones are flying over sensitive infrastructure and facilities. She also called it concerning that the U.S. does know the operators and the objectives of these drones. She recounted how a Chinese spy balloon had previously flown over multiple U.S. military installations and expressed concerns that these suspicious drones might be engaged in similar activities. She asked the witnesses to indicate whether these suspicious drones could pose a threat to the U.S.
  • Mr. Wheeler remarked that the FBI is cognizant of the various threats that recently sighted suspicious drones could pose. He elaborated that these threats could involve sophisticated state actors, adversaries, terrorists, hackers, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), criminals, and nuisances. He expressed concerns that the U.S. does not know the identities of the operators behind the recently sighted suspicious drones and the objectives of these drones.
• Rep. Malliotakis asked Mr. Wheeler to indicate whether the FBI is working with the DoD, the FAA, and DHS to identify the source of these suspicious drones. She commented that the FBI is not solely responsible for determining the source of the suspicious drones flying over New York and New Jersey.
  • Mr. Wheeler stated that while he would not speak on behalf of other federal departments and agencies, he described the FBI’s efforts with other federal departments and agencies as “extremely collaborative.” He also stated that the FBI is engaged in robust collaboration with state and local law enforcement agencies.
• Rep. Malliotakis asked Mr. Wheeler to identify the federal department or agency that is taking the lead on efforts to uncover the source of suspicious drones flying over New York and New Jersey.
  • Mr. Wheeler testified that the FBI has an open investigation predicated on the notion that unsafe operation is occurring within the U.S.’s airspace. He indicated that the FBI has some jurisdiction regarding this topic. He remarked that the identification of the responsible parties behind these suspicious drones would be useful for determining which federal department or agency should address these drones. He testified that the FBI is “actively” investigating these suspicious drones and does not have more details regarding these drones.
• Rep. Malliotakis noted that suspicious drones flying over New York and New Jersey could be carrying chemical weapons and asserted that federal departments and agencies must identify the source of these suspicious drones. She asked the witnesses to indicate whether these suspicious drones could be part of DHS’s SAVER Program. She explained that the SAVER Program tests various technologies meant for search and rescue, disaster response, and law enforcement purposes.
  • Mr. Wheeler stated that he did not know whether the suspicious drones sighted over New York and New Jersey are part of the DHS’s SAVER Program.
• Rep. Malliotakis expressed interest in further discussing the suspicious drones sighted over New York and New Jersey with Mr. Wheeler. She called on the FBI to work with other federal departments and agencies to address these suspicious drones. She stated that if these suspicious drones are not nefarious and part of another government program, then the government departments or agencies behind these drones must coordinate their activities with local law enforcement agencies.
  • Mr. Wheeler expressed agreement with Rep. Malliotakis’s statements.

Rep. Chris Smith (R-NJ):

• Note: Rep. Smith is not a member of the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security and was waived onto the Committee for the hearing.
• Rep. Smith expressed frustration that Congress has repeatedly failed to adequately assess threats throughout his 44-year career in Congress. He expressed concerns that the recent suspicious drone sightings over New York and New Jersey are another example of a poorly assessed threat. He mentioned that he had recently met with local law enforcement officials in Island Beach State Park in Ocean County, New Jersey. He noted that one law enforcement officer at this location had claimed to have observed 50 drones come in off the ocean. He also mentioned how a U.S. Coast Guard officer at this location had told him that between 12 and 30 drones had followed a U.S. Coast Guard lifeboat. He highlighted how there do not exist clear rules governing how the U.S. Coast Guard can engage with suspicious drones. He further mentioned how he had talked with the commanding officer of U.S. Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst about the base’s inability to bring down suspicious drones. He noted how the commanding officer had indicated that the base lacks the authority to bring down suspicious drones outside of its parameters. He mentioned how he had written a letter to U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin requesting that the DoD use its existing authorities to address the suspicious drones observed over New York and New Jersey. He also remarked that the DoD should share its counter-UAS authorities with DHS, the FBI, and other federal departments and agencies to determine the cause of these suspicious drones. He further suggested that China might be responsible for the suspicious drones over New York and New Jersey. He asked the witnesses to respond to his statements.
  • Mr. Wheeler indicated that he shares Rep. Smith’s concerns and frustrations regarding the suspicious drones sighted over New York and New Jersey. He expressed the FBI’s interest in working with the DoD to bolster federal counter-UAS activities.
• Rep. Smith remarked that the DoD should deploy and share its counter-UAS capabilities to address the suspicious drones sighted over New York and New Jersey. He emphasized that these suspicious drones are appearing daily. He called on the U.S. to take down these suspicious drones so that the U.S. can understand their source.

Panel II Opening Statements:

Mr. Jeffrey Baumgartner (Berkshire Hathaway Energy):

• He discussed how his company, Berkshire Hathaway Energy, provides reliable, secure, and low-cost energy to more than 13 million customers across the U.S., Great Britain, and Canada.
• He remarked that Berkshire Hathaway Energy’s commitment to its customers requires the company to secure its infrastructure from all threats, which includes UAS threats.
  • He commented that energy sector infrastructure (as well as transportation, communications, and water infrastructure) face increasing threats from UASs.
• He stated that while recent UAS technology innovations offer “tremendous potential” (such as enabling faster damage assessments of energy infrastructure), he noted how these innovations can also empower malicious actors.
  • He explained that adversaries can employ UAS technology to surveille facilities, deliver hazardous payloads, disrupt operations, and conduct cyber intrusions.
• He noted how the DHS’s Homeland Threat Assessment highlights UASs as a persistent and growing risk to critical infrastructure.
  • He asserted that DHS’s warning is not hypothetical and mentioned how federal agents had recently arrested an individual planning to use a UAS to attack an electric substation.
  • He expressed hope that the U.S. can proactively address UAS-related threats before a significant UAS incident occurs.
• He remarked that existing federal laws and regulations have not kept pace with the rapid proliferation of UAS technology.
• He stated that current legislative and regulatory frameworks for UAS primarily address safety and airspace management issues and lack robust provisions to counter malicious UAS activities.
  • He commented that these shortcomings leave critical infrastructure companies vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated threats.
• He remarked that the U.S. must modernize its UAS defenses while balancing UAS security measures with civil liberty protections.
  • He asserted that a comprehensive strategy that incorporates technology innovation, appropriate legal frameworks, and public-private collaboration is essential.
• He called on Congress to provide critical infrastructure companies with limited authority to deploy advanced detection and counter-UAS technologies.
  • He commented that investments in “cutting edge” counter-UAS systems will ensure that the U.S. can address current and emerging threats effectively.
• He stated that Congress should identify formal mechanisms for sharing actionable information regarding UAS technology threats.
  • He also asserted that Congress should provide all levels of law enforcement with tools and legal authorities to address UAS threats effectively.
• He then remarked that collaborative research and development (R&D) would improve the U.S.’s ability to neutralize UAS threats without collateral damage.
• He further called on the U.S. to develop a comprehensive strategy to align legislative, technological, and operational efforts at federal, state, and local levels.
  • He also commented that the U.S. should address privacy concerns and establish clearly defined legal parameters for UAS operations.
• He noted that while the private sector owns most of the U.S.’s critical infrastructure, he asserted that protecting these critical infrastructure assets is a collaborative effort.
  • He commented that the White House National Security Memorandum on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience correctly emphasizes the need for a partnership between the public and private sectors to protect these assets.
• He mentioned how existing counter-UAS authorities for DHS and the DoJ are set to expire soon and warned that Congress’s failure to renew and expand these authorities could leave critical infrastructure defenseless against “evolving” UAS threats.
  • He asserted that the window of opportunity for addressing these challenges is closing.
• He remarked that modernizing UAS defenses, updating legal frameworks, and fostering collaboration would enable the U.S. to safeguard critical infrastructure, protect public safety, and maintain its leadership in security and innovation.

Dr. Paul Schwennesen, PhD (Global Strategy Decisions Group):

• He remarked that the U.S. faces significant UAS threats and that the U.S. lacks technical knowhow to assess and neutralize UAS threats.
• He stated however that Ukraine has demonstrated that UASs are a “revolution” in the application of lethal force.
  • He commented that the world’s most advanced weapons and tactics are being developed and deployed at scale in the Ukraine-Russian front at a remarkably low cost and without central direction.
• He asserted that the U.S. must learn military lessons regarding UAS development and deployment from Ukraine and warned that the U.S. is “rapidly” losing its strategic military advantage within the UAS environment.
  • He highlighted how China, North Korea, Iran, and other emerging powers are eagerly sending observers and technicians to Ukraine to study the military application of UASs
  • He commented that these adversarial countries are adopting these lessons learned into doctrines that seek to invert the military strengths of their Western geopolitical adversaries.
• He stated that modern arms races now favor small, cheap, and easily mastered weapons systems and commented that the advantages associated with these systems amplify through each innovation cycle.
  • He asserted that new technology improves exponentially faster and is deployed far more quickly than legacy countermeasures.
• He discussed how Ukrainian technicians are driving UAS innovation and highlighted how Ukrainian technology workers are developing and building UASs outside of their civilian jobs.
  • He stated that Ukraine has created an “ecosystem of invention” that is loosely coordinated through the country’s Ministry of Defense.
• He noted how Ukraine’s advances in UAS hardware and software are channeled into a “robust” system of decentralized training facilities and indicated that a first-person view (FPV) drone operator can be mission ready in less than three weeks.
  • He highlighted how Ukrainian drone operators with no previous military combat experience have been credited with as many as 1,500 confirmed kills.
• He stated that UAS technology enables one side of a conflict to impose “extraordinary” damage on the exquisite, expensive, and difficult-to-master weapon systems of their adversaries.
  • He added that UAS technology enables the one side of a conflict to impose this damage at a much lower cost than their enemy.
• He remarked that the U.S. and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have a “very narrow window of opportunity” to address the shift in comparative advantage provided by drones.
  • He commented that the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated how a smaller innovative fighter can effectively wage battle against a larger hidebound military power.
• He raised concerns that the U.S. will most likely fail to keep pace in the global development and deployment of UAS technology and will only start to respond to UAS-related threats in the aftermath of a crisis.
  • He commented that this situation is already being exemplified in the U.S.’s response to suspicious drone sightings in New Jersey.
• He contended that the U.S. could avoid such an undesirable scenario through a well-orchestrated demonstration of its current vulnerabilities.
  •  He commented that such demonstrations can shift doctrine development and tactical training in new and constructive ways.
• He recommended that the U.S. establish a task force to collect information from Ukraine’s use of UAS technology so that the U.S. can modernize its own drone strategy.

Panel II Congressional Question Period:

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence Chairman August Pfluger (R-TX):

• Chairman Pfluger asked Dr. Schwennesen to indicate whether the U.S.’s UAS challenges are technology-related or policy-related.
  • Dr. Schwennesen remarked that the U.S.’s UAS challenges are both technology-related and policy-related. He asserted that the federal bureaucracy is stifling UAS innovation. He also commented that Ukraine’s recent war experience has demonstrated that there exist technical solutions for addressing current UAS challenges. He remarked that the U.S. must immediately reduce regulatory barriers associated with developing UAS technologies. He also asserted that the U.S. must immediately work to develop these technologies.
• Chairman Pfluger then discussed how there are suspicious UASs flying over New Jersey and emphasized that these suspicious UASs have flown over U.S. Coast Guard vessels. He asked Dr. Schwennesen to recommend actions that the U.S. should take to address these suspicious UASs.
  • Dr. Schwennesen suggested that U.S. military personnel may be hesitant to respond to suspicious UASs because a response could trigger administrative consequences. He also stated that U.S. military personnel could be concerned that their response to suspicious UASs could result in collateral damage. He remarked that the U.S.’s current policy environment is influencing U.S. military personnel to exhibit self-restraint when responding to suspicious UASs.
• Chairman Pfluger stated that the U.S. should focus on its offensive technology and identify lessons learned from Ukraine’s use of drones in its conflict with Russia. He also stated that the U.S. needs to focus on its counter-UAS policies and ensure that these policies protect the privacy of U.S. citizens.
  • Dr. Schwennesen expressed agreement with Chairman Pfluger’s statements.
• Chairman Pfluger then asked Mr. Baumgartner to identify the most catastrophic type of event related to critical energy infrastructure that policymakers should be working to prevent.
  • Mr. Baumgartner remarked that a drone carrying a dangerous payload could inflict significant damage on critical energy infrastructure. He recounted how a bad actor in Tennessee had attempted to use a drone to drop a dangerous payload onto an electric substation. He warned that drones may be used to carry out similar attacks on energy generation stations, energy substations, and pipelines.
• Chairman Pfluger mentioned how his Congressional District includes part of the Permian Basin and noted how the Permian Basin produces about six million barrels of oil per day. He asked Mr. Baumgartner to indicate whether private companies should be delegated certain counter-UAS authorities to identify and mitigate potential threats to the Permian Basin.
  • Mr. Baumgartner remarked that energy infrastructure located in Chairman Pfluger’s Congressional District should be protected. He stated that the U.S. could take actions to empower the private sector to protect energy infrastructure. He mentioned how Berkshire Hathaway Energy has “great” relationships with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. He expressed the company’s willingness to work with these law enforcement agencies to better understand counter-UAS technologies and to eventually implement these technologies.
• Chairman Pfluger then asked Dr. Schwennesen to comment on how the DoD (and specifically the U.S. Air Force) is implementing counter-UAS technologies.
  • Dr. Schwennesen described the DoD’s implementation of counter-UAS technologies as “below average.” He asserted that the DoD is not taking drone-related threats seriously enough, despite acknowledging that drones pose a growing threat. He stated that the DoD is operating under the assumption that other parties are addressing counter-drone threats and is not working diligently to address these drone-related threats. He recommended that the U.S. leverage its strong relationships with Ukraine to obtain greater information about counter-UAS technologies and strategies. He specifically recommended that the U.S. send officials to Ukraine to learn about these technologies and strategies.
• Chairman Pfluger indicated that his question period time had expired.

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence Ranking Member Seth Magaziner (D-RI):

• Ranking Member Magaziner first thanked Dr. Schwennesen for helping Ukraine in the country’s war with Russia. He stated that Russia is an adversary that threatens U.S. interests throughout the world. He then asked Dr. Schwennesen to elaborate on his skepticism regarding the effectiveness of drone signal jamming and other counter-UAS technologies both in military and non-military contexts.
  • Dr. Schwennesen first emphasized that he does not possess engineering experience related to drone warfare. He then described the war between Ukraine and Russia as the world’s most intense electronic warfare battlespace. He stated that this war has demonstrated that many views on drone signal jamming are obsolete. He also mentioned how new technologies are being developed to respond to existing counter-UAS technologies. He highlighted how Ukraine is employing AI pixel lock drone technology that involves no radio frequency. He also noted how Ukraine is employing ambush drone technology that does not require communication between the operators and the drones. He contended that drone signal jamming should not be viewed as a “silver bullet” for counter-UAS efforts. He stated however that drone signal jamming may still be useful as one of many tools for counter-UAS operations.
• Ranking Member Magaziner asked Dr. Schwennesen to provide recommendations for how the U.S. can become a global leader in counter-UAS technology. He noted how Dr. Schwennesen had previously called on the U.S. to make procurement reforms and to foster innovation within the counter-UAS technology space. He asked Dr. Schwennesen to address whether the U.S. should consider adopting new counter-UAS training programs.
  • Dr. Schwennesen remarked that the U.S.’s ingenuity is one of its competitive strengths and asserted that the U.S. must take advantage of this strength. He recommended that the DoD deploy drones to the operational level of units. He commented that this approach would enable U.S. military personnel to experiment and develop firsthand experience with drones. He contended that a centrally managed approach to counter-UAS technology will be insufficient. He stated that providing U.S. military personnel with drones will enable the personnel to quickly improve counter-UAS technologies and strategies.
• Ranking Member Magaziner called Dr. Schwennesen’s recommendation sensible. He then expressed interest in exploring potential partnership opportunities between private industry and state and local law enforcement agencies related to counter-UAS efforts. He asked Mr. Baumgartner to identify best practices for supporting collaborations on counter-UAS efforts between private industry and state and local law enforcement agencies.
  • Mr. Baumgartner remarked that Berkshire Hathaway Energy works diligently to establish and maintain relationships with law enforcement agencies in all of the states and localities that the company serves. He acknowledged that these relationships require his company to expend significant manpower and time and commented that these efforts have associated challenges. He stated that fusion centers could support companies in engaging in efforts involving state and local law enforcement agencies at a single location. He also mentioned how the E-ISAC convenes state and local law enforcement agency partners in a regional fashion. He commented that the E-ISAC provides a forum for conversation and relationship building between private industry and law enforcement agencies.

Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL):

• Chairman Gimenez expressed agreement with Dr. Schwennesen’s view that the U.S. faces challenges in confronting UAS threats. He commented that these challenges are present both in warfare and homeland security contexts. He expressed concerns that the U.S.’s current counter-UAS strategy is fragmented across multiple federal departments and agencies and that the U.S.’s counter-UAS efforts lack coordination. He asked Dr. Schwennesen to indicate whether the U.S. should adopt a more centralized counter-UAS strategy and focus on UAS threats posed to the U.S. homeland.
  • Dr. Schwennesen stated that the U.S. should adopt a more centralized counter-UAS strategy. He highlighted how Ukraine has established a special body focused on UASs within their Ministry of Defense.
• Chairman Gimenez remarked that Ukraine’s lack of an air force had necessitated that Ukraine pursue innovative strategies to combat Russia. He stated that the fact that the U.S. possesses an air force makes it resistant to change in defending against emerging threats. He contended that the U.S. must overhaul its counter-UAS strategy. He stated that the DoD has a bias toward using existing technologies to accomplish its objectives. He also remarked that the U.S. must be more proactive in responding to emerging UAS threats before a UAS attack occurs. He expressed interest in having to pursue a more centralized strategy for countering UAS threats.

Rep. Anthony D’Esposito (R-NY):

• Rep. D’Esposito remarked that the proliferation of drone technology across foreign adversaries (including Russia, China, and Iran) has impacted conflicts throughout the world. He asked Dr. Schwennesen to address the risks of U.S. domestic actors or TCOs obtaining or replicating such technologies. He also asked Dr. Schwennesen to indicate how the U.S. can disrupt these drone supply chains.
  • Dr. Schwennesen remarked that foreign adversaries have most likely already supplied drone technologies to U.S. domestic actors or TCOs. He contended that the only way to mitigate these drone threats is to “out-innovate” the threats. He commented that while the U.S. has historically demonstrated a strong capacity for innovation, he stated that the U.S. has thus far failed to sufficiently innovate within the drone space.
• Rep. D’Esposito then recounted how a Tennessee man had recently been arrested for plotting to destroy a Nashville power substation using a drone carrying an explosive. He highlighted how there have been additional incidents involving suspicious drone activity near power substations. He asked Mr. Baumgartner to discuss the physical security risks that drones pose to energy sector assets.
  • Mr. Baumgartner remarked that drones could inflict damage on critical energy infrastructure through either the dropping of payloads or through simply ramming the infrastructure. He discussed how Berkshire Hathaway Energy seeks to protect its critical energy infrastructure through adding shielding and obfuscating certain targets. He further warned that drones could be used to enable cyber-intrusions of critical energy infrastructure.