The Future of U.S. Policy on Taiwan (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations)

Hearing	The Future of U.S. Policy on Taiwan
Committee	U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Date	December 8, 2021

 

Hearing Takeaways:

• Chinese Aggression Towards Taiwan: The hearing largely focused on China’s increasingly aggressive actions and rhetoric towards Taiwan. These actions and rhetoric from China against Taiwan include disinformation, political attacks, economic coercion, and military belligerence. Committee Members and the hearing’s witnesses raised concerns that miscalculations regarding Taiwan could negatively impact the U.S.’s allies and partners within the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, South Korea, and Australia.
  • Taiwan’s Defense Reforms: Committee Members and the hearing’s witnesses expressed support for Taiwan’s commitment to defense reforms, including an increased defense budget, the development of asymmetric capabilities, the planned establishment of an agency for civilian resilience, and modifications to reservist training requirements. Sen. Todd Young (R-IN) expressed concerns however that Taiwan was favoring counter strike weapons over the adoption of a porcupine strategy (which involved strategic denial capabilities).
  • Impact on Global Semiconductor Supply Chains: Committee Members and the hearing’s witnesses highlighted the importance of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry in terms of driving innovation and supporting domestic manufacturing within the U.S. They raised concerns that Chinese aggression towards Taiwan could harm global semiconductor supply chains. 
  • The Implications of Chinese Actions towards Hong Kong for Taiwan: Full Committee Ranking Member Jim Risch (R-ID) raised concerns over how China’s interventions in Hong Kong had resulted in “de minimis” repercussions for China and that this lack of repercussions could spur China to aggressively intervene in Taiwan. Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink asserted that it would be a “grave mistake” if China were to conclude that China had an opportunity to take coercive action against Taiwan based on their previous actions toward Hong Kong. Assistant Secretary Ratner stated that China’s actions towards Hong Kong had reinforced Taiwan’s belief that they could not enter into a Hong Kong-like governance arrangement with China.
• U.S. Support for Taiwan: Committee Members and the hearing’s witnesses contended that it was important for the U.S. to demonstrate robust and bipartisan support for Taiwan, especially in light of recent Chinese aggression. They argued that U.S. support for Taiwan was important for both economic and national security reasons. 
  • U.S. Military Support for Taiwan: Committee Members and the hearing’s witnesses expressed interest in having the U.S. provide continued military support to Taiwan. Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink indicated that the Executive Branch had notified Congress about more than $32 billion in arms sales to Taiwan since 2009. Of note, Full Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-NJ) expressed frustration with the U.S. Department of State’s lack of action on an outstanding DSP-5 license that would cover upgrades for Taiwan’s M60 tanks.
  • U.S. Maintenance of Credible Deterrence: There was some disagreement over how the U.S. should work to maintain credible deterrence within the Indo-Pacific region. Sen. Bill Hagerty (R-TN) emphasized that the U.S. needed to maintain a credible and extended deterrence commitment to its allies within the Indo-Pacific region, especially in light of China’s recent testing of nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons. He advocated against having the U.S. publicly adopt a no first use policy for nuclear weapons. However, Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA) contended that these concerns were overstated and noted how the U.S. already possessed a substantial weapons advantage over China. He also highlighted President Biden’s 2017 statement that it would be difficult to envision a plausible scenario in which the first use of nuclear weapons would be necessary for the U.S.
  • U.S. Direct Engagement of China: Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) expressed interest in how the U.S. was directly engaging China on their actions toward Taiwan.  Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink mentioned how President Biden had recently held a virtual meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping and stated that one of the main objectives of this meeting was to reduce the risk of miscalculation between the two countries. He also testified that the DoD had been working to renew military-to-military relations with China. He indicated that these efforts had been focused on questions of crisis communication and crisis management.
  • U.S. Cooperation to Deter Chinese Aggression: Committee Members and the hearing’s witnesses expressed interest in working to bolster the U.S.’s international cooperation both within the Indo-Pacific region and globally in order to counter Chinese aggression against Taiwan. They also noted how the U.S. was working to open and expand Taiwan’s diplomatic capabilities through enabling Taiwan to participate meaningfully in international organizations. Assistant Secretary Ratner mentioned how the U.S. had held “major” military exercises and multicarrier operations with partners from both inside and outside of the Indo-Pacific region to support Taiwan. Sen. Tim Kaine (D-VA) raised concerns however over France’s lack of participation in the recently formed partnership between the U.S., the United Kingdom (UK), and Australia and stated that this lack of participation could alienate a key partner within the Indo-Pacific region. Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD) and Sen. Mitt Romney (R-UT) also lamented the U.S.’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and asserted that this withdrawal had weakened the U.S.’s relationships within the Indo-Pacific region.
  • U.S. Support for Countries Experiencing Pressure from China due to their Support for Taiwan: Committee Members and the hearing’s witnesses highlighted how China had put pressure on Lithuania for its ties to Taiwan and expressed interest in how the U.S. could support countries like Lithuania that wanted to work with Taiwan. Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink noted how the U.S. was supporting Lithuania’s decision to maintain support for Taiwan through providing international financing through Export-Import Bank of the U.S. (EXIM) financing and sending private sector commercial delegations to the country. Sen. Cory Booker (D-NJ) also raised concerns over China’s influence within Africa and stated that China had successfully eroded diplomatic relations between African nations and Taiwan.
  • Protection of Taiwan’s Critical Technologies: Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink mentioned how the U.S. had worked to ensure that Taiwan carried out its export control and other screening policies designed to protect their most important technologies and trade secrets. 
  • Republican Criticisms of the Biden Administration’s Response to Chinese Aggression: Committee Republicans raised concerns that the Biden administration was not providing adequate public support to Taiwan and other victims of Chinese aggression. They asserted that this lack of support demonstrated weakness, which would invite further aggression from China. 
  • Legislation Under Development: Chairman Menendez mentioned that he was working on a large bipartisan legislative package regarding security assistance to Taiwan. He expressed his hope that this package could incorporate Full Committee Ranking Member Jim Risch’s (R-ID) Taiwan Deterrence Act, which would authorize $2 billion in foreign military financing for Taiwan every year through 2032.
• Other Issues: The hearing also addressed several other policy items within the Committee’s jurisdiction that impacted Taiwan.
  • Calls on the U.S. Senate to Confirm Vacant Ambassadorships: Committee Democrats and Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink noted how several important U.S. ambassadorships, including those to Japan, Vietnam, and China, were awaiting confirmation votes from the full U.S. Senate. They called on the full U.S. Senate to vote on these ambassadorships and stated that these current vacancies were hamstringing the ability of the U.S. to engage its Indo-Pacific regional partners and allies.
  • Need for Consistent Funding for Defense Items: Sen. Chris Coons (D-DE) and Assistant Secretary Ratner contended that the U.S. military needed stability in its budgeting cycles. They asserted that funding the U.S. government through a year-long continuing resolution (CR) would harm the U.S.’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
  • U.S. Allowance of the Display of Taiwanese National Symbols of Sovereignty: Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) mentioned how the Biden administration had imposed a policy that forbid Taiwan from displaying national symbols of their sovereignty on U.S. soil. He noted how he had introduced bipartisan legislation to permit Taiwan from displaying national symbols of their sovereignty on U.S. soil.  Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink noted that the U.S. had maintained a policy of prohibiting Taiwanese partners from displaying national symbols of sovereignty on U.S. facilities for the previous four decades. He stated that this policy remained in effect. Assistant Secretary Ratner noted that the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) guidance on the display of national symbols of sovereignty required adherence to the U.S. State Department’s guidance on this topic.

Hearing Witnesses:

1. The Hon. Daniel Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State
2. The Hon. Ely Ratner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs

Member Opening Statements:

Full Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-NJ):

• He remarked that China’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric and actions underscored how the Taiwan strait remained one of the world’s most dangerous divides.
  • He expressed concerns that miscalculations regarding Taiwan could result in a war with “potentially catastrophic” global consequences.
• He stated that Chinese President Xi Jinping had orchestrated China’s “hyper nationalist” aggression towards Taiwan for his own domestic ends.
  • He asserted that China’s “relentless” incursion into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) posed a significant threat to the Taiwanese people and the entire international community.
• He suggested that China might refrain from interfering with Taiwan during the next few months because of the increased international attention that China will receive for hosting the 2022 Winter Olympics.
  • He asserted however that China will remain interested in Taiwan during this period.
• He stated that the U.S. and its partners should use this period to reinvigorate their strategy with regard to Taiwan.
• He remarked that the U.S. must be unequivocal in its commitment to the Taiwanese people and in its obligation to safeguard Taiwan’s autonomy.
• He also asserted that any cross-strait military or kinetic contingency from China would directly impact the U.S. and the U.S.’s commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances.
  • He stated that the U.S. would respond “appropriately” in the event of such contingencies.
• He further remarked that the U.S. remained committed to the essential elements of deterrence across the “Grey Zone.”
• He stated that the U.S. must be prepared to assist Taiwan as it seeks to build its own security capabilities and to deter potential Chinese military pressure.
  • He expressed interest in how the DoD was approaching this topic.
• He mentioned that he was working on a large bipartisan legislative package regarding security assistance to Taiwan.
  • He expressed his hope that this package could incorporate Full Committee Ranking Member Jim Risch’s (R-ID) bill on the subject.
• He then discussed the important role that trade and economic ties played in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship and expressed interest in the outcomes of the most recent round of the U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue (EPPD).
  • He commented that U.S.-Taiwan commercial and trade ties were especially important given Taiwan’s centrality in efforts to secure global semiconductor supply chains.
• He remarked that building closer and more enduring economic ties between Taiwan and the world would be “crucial” for ensuring that Taiwan and other countries could withstand economic coercion from China.
  • He mentioned how China had put pressure on Lithuania for its ties to Taiwan and expressed interest in how the U.S. could support countries like Lithuania that wanted to work with Taiwan.
• He lastly expressed interest in how the Biden administration was working to open and expand Taiwan’s diplomatic capabilities through enabling Taiwan to participate meaningfully in international organizations, such as the World Health Assembly (WHA) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB).

Full Committee Ranking Member Jim Risch (R-ID):

• He remarked that China was taking “increasingly aggressive actions” to pressure Taiwan to unify with it and noted how there had been an uptick in disinformation, political attacks, economic coercion, and military belligerence from China related to Taiwan.
  • He commended the Committee for holding a hearing on the topic and for working to support Taiwan during this period.
• He stated that a unilateral change in the status quo regarding Taiwan would threaten the security and liberty of the Taiwanese people and damage vital U.S. interests and alliances within the Indo-Pacific region.
  • He elaborated that a change in the status quo would result in the loss of a model democracy within the region, provide China with a geographic asset to dominate the western Pacific region, and threaten Japan’s security (which would in turn undermine the U.S.-Japan alliance).
• He also discussed how a unilateral change in the status quo regarding Taiwan would provide China with control over semiconductor supply chains and embolden China in other territorial disputes.
• He contended that the U.S. must be “laser focused” on concrete actions to best position Taiwan to defend against China’s military.
• He mentioned how he had introduced the Taiwan Deterrence Act, which would authorize $2 billion in foreign military financing for Taiwan every year through 2032.
  • He commented that this proposal would accelerate Taiwan’s acquisition of asymmetric capabilities and incentivize closer U.S.-Taiwan joint defense coordination.
• He expressed interest in working with Full Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-NJ) to incorporate the Taiwan Deterrence Act into a broader legislative package.
• He then applauded Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s commitment to defense reforms, including recent purchases of key capabilities and the planned establishment of an agency for civilian resilience.
• He asserted however that more actions were needed to ensure that the Taiwanese military would undertake these reforms.
  • He stated that the U.S. government needed to prioritize getting the right capabilities to Taiwan quickly and enhancing other important forms of defense engagement.
• He then raised concerns that senior Biden administration officials were making confused and varying statements on the U.S.’s policy towards Taiwan.
  • He commented that this confusion demonstrated weakness, which would invite more aggression from China.
• He remarked that the U.S.’s policy towards Taiwan had always remained consistent and stated that the policy had always called for robust support for Taiwan’s defense.
  • He commented that this policy was enshrined within the Taiwan Relations Act.
• He lastly discussed how China was sending large numbers of military aircrafts into the Taiwan strait for what they deemed as “rehearsals” for future operations.
  • He stated that these “rehearsals” coupled with China’s “massive” military buildup created a hostile environment for Taiwan.

Witness Opening Statements:

The Hon. Daniel Kritenbrink (U.S. Department of State):

• He remarked that the U.S. maintained shared values, commercial and economic links, and interpersonal ties with Taiwan and that the U.S.’s views regarding Taiwan had been consistent across administrations of both parties.
  • He stated that the U.S.’s One China Policy, as guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances, had promoted peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region for more than 40 years.
• He testified that the U.S.’s cooperation with Taiwan had increased in recent years through the American Institute in Taiwan and mentioned how Taiwan had become an important U.S. partner in terms of trade and investment, health, semiconductor and other critical supply chains, investment screening, science and technology, education, and democratic governance.
• He stated that the Biden administration had advanced cooperative efforts with Taiwan in several ways, including convening the second annual U.S.-Taiwan EPPD and inviting Taiwan to share its expertise in combating disinformation and authoritarianism at the Summit for Democracy.
  • He also mentioned how the U.S. had expanded the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) in which the U.S., Japan, and Australia worked together to showcase Taiwan’s expertise globally.
• He specifically highlighted Taiwan’s role in providing the U.S. with “cutting edge” semiconductors and noted how Taiwanese semiconductor companies were making significant investments within the U.S.
  • He commented that these investments created high paying domestic manufacturing jobs and bolstered the resilience of U.S. semiconductor supply chains.
• He remarked that the U.S. viewed China’s growing military, economic, and diplomatic coercion towards Taiwan with “serious concern.”
  • He asserted that China’s actions were destabilizing to the Indo-Pacific region and could create problems for the global economy.
• He stated that the U.S. has and will continue to make available to Taiwan the defense articles and services necessary to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act.
  • He testified that the Executive Branch had notified Congress about more than $32 billion in arms sales to Taiwan since 2009.
• He also discussed how the U.S. was encouraging Taiwan to prioritize asymmetric capabilities that complicate Chinese planning and to implement defense reforms.
• He mentioned how China was continuing to execute campaigns to persuade Taiwan’s few remaining diplomatic partners (including Lithuania) into breaking official ties with the country and to block Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.
  • He commented that these efforts were part of broader Chinese efforts to diminish Taiwan’s international standing.
• He testified that the U.S. was working with like-minded countries to ensure that Taiwan was acknowledged as a “respected and constructive” democratic actor in global affairs.
• He called it critical that the U.S. Senate confirm U.S. ambassadors so that the U.S. could shore up its international alliances and push back against malign influence.
  • He noted how several important U.S. ambassadorships, including those to Japan, Vietnam, and China, were awaiting confirmation votes from the full U.S. Senate.
• He then discussed how the U.S. had both publicly and privately urged China to abide their commitment to peacefully resolve cross-strait issues and to engage Taiwan in a “meaningful” dialogue to de-escalate tensions.
• He mentioned how China’s aggressive actions towards Taiwan had led many countries to become more vocal in their support towards Taiwan.
  • He thanked Congress for its public support for Taiwan.

The Hon. Ely Ratner (U.S. Department of Defense):

• He discussed how Taiwan’s location was near many U.S. allies and partners within the Indo-Pacific region, as well as major trade lanes.
• He remarked that the Biden administration had affirmed the U.S.’s longstanding commitment to the One China Policy, as guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances.
• He asserted that Taiwan was integral to the Indo-Pacific and global economies and emphasized how Taiwan’s free market economy had made it a valuable economic and trade partner for the U.S.
  • He further called Taiwan a “beacon” of democratic values and ideals.
• He lamented how Chinese leaders had never renounced the use of military aggression against Taiwan and testified that the Chinese military was likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with China by force.
  • He indicated that China was simultaneously attempting to deter, delay, or deny third-party intervention on Taiwan’s behalf.
• He also discussed how the Chinese military was conducting a broader coercive campaign in the air and maritime domains around Taiwan and stated that these operations were destabilizing, intentionally provocative, and increased the likelihood of miscalculation.
• He contended however that China could be deterred through a combination of Taiwan’s own defenses, Taiwan’s partnership with the U.S., and growing support from like-minded democracies.
  • He asserted that bolstering Taiwan’s self-defenses was an “urgent” task and an essential feature of deterrence.
• He expressed appreciation for Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s prioritization of the development of asymmetric capabilities for Taiwan’s self-defense that were credible, resilient, mobile, distributed, and cost-effective.
  • He remarked that Taiwan must complement investments in their asymmetric capabilities with an equal focus on enhancing resilience, supporting civil-military integration, and building a strategy that included defense and depth.
• He also expressed the DoD’s commitment to maintaining the capacity of the U.S. to resist the resort to force or other forms of coercion that might jeopardize the security of the Taiwanese people.
• He testified that China was the DoD’s pacing challenge and that a Taiwan contingency was the DoD’s pacing scenario.
  • He stated that the DoD was modernizing its capabilities, updating the U.S.’s force posture, and developing new operational concepts accordingly.
• He remarked that the DoD’s efforts to deter Chinese aggression and enhance Taiwan’s defenses would not be in isolation and mentioned how other countries were concerned about these issues.
  • He indicated that the DoD was focused on enhancing its regional cooperation as a means of bolstering deterrence.
• He lastly thanked Committee Members for their strong bipartisan support for Taiwan and commented that the bipartisan nature of this support was significant.

Congressional Question Period:

Full Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-NJ):

• Chairman Menendez noted how some policymakers and analysts had called for an end to the policy of strategic ambiguity with regards to Taiwan. He asked the witnesses to discuss the benefits and drawbacks of having the U.S. maintain strategic ambiguity with Taiwan. He asked the witnesses to indicate whether the U.S. ought to either provide additional clarity or adopt a new framework for managing the cross-strait relations.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink remarked that China’s coercive and bullying behavior towards Taiwan was concerning and destabilizing. He stated however that the One China Policy and the Taiwan Relations Act’s framework provided the U.S. with all of the tools needed to counter the aforementioned threats coming from China.
• Chairman Menendez asked Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink to indicate whether China was convinced that the U.S. would provide robust support to Taiwan.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink remarked that the U.S.’s goal was to convince China that the U.S. would provide robust support to Taiwan. He stated that the U.S. urgently needed to contribute to regional stability and support deterrence efforts. He remarked that the U.S.’s policy towards Taiwan over the previous four decades had been consistent across administrations and Congresses. He asserted that this policy had been successful.
• Chairman Menendez interjected to highlight the importance of bipartisanship in foreign policy matters. He asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to indicate whether the DoD shared the U.S. Department of State’s views regarding the U.S.’s support for Taiwan.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner expressed agreement with Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink’s comments. He remarked that a change in U.S. declaratory policy regarding Taiwan would not meaningfully strengthen deterrence. He expressed his willingness to elaborate on his belief in a classified setting.
• Chairman Menendez expressed concerns that Chinese military operations near Taiwan had become more sophisticated and more frequent in recent years. He mentioned how China had recently engaged in an incursion into Taiwan’s ADIZ. He asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to provide an assessment of the current cross-state military balance between China and Taiwan. He asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to indicate whether he was concerned that China could take unilateral military action against Taiwan.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner raised concerns over China’s military modernization efforts and mentioned how the DoD had recently issued a report on this topic. He testified that China was engaging in increased coercion and aggressive behaviors towards Taiwan and other countries within the region. He warned that China’s actions could tempt miscalculations during periods of crisis. He also stated that China’s actions could impact Taiwan’s readiness. He remarked that the DoD must work to strengthen deterrence and convince China that it would be unwise to pursue military actions against Taiwan. He stated that the DoD was doing this through supporting Taiwan’s defenses and reforms, bolstering the U.S.’s own deterrence capabilities, and engaging the broader international community on the issue.
• Chairman Menendez asked Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink to indicate what types of events could trigger Chinese President Xi Jinping to take military action against Taiwan.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink expressed reluctance to speculate on President Xi Jinping’s thinking towards Taiwan. He remarked that the U.S. needed to take a “broad” range of steps to deter Chinese military action against Taiwan and provide regional stability. He expressed agreement with Assistant Secretary Ratner’s comments that the U.S. should not solely focus on military deterrence in order to accomplish regional stability. He stated that the U.S. must work to bolster and expand Taiwan’s international presence, deepen its own engagement with Taiwan, and help Taiwan to resist economic coercion.
• Chairman Menendez discussed how China was pressuring countries to cut their official relations with Taiwan. He noted how eight of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners had switched their diplomatic recognition to China since 2016 and mentioned how China was currently exerting significant economic pressure on Lithuania due to its relationships with Taiwan. He asked the witnesses to address how the Biden administration was supporting the U.S.’s democratic partners in terms of countering undue Chinese influence and helping Taiwan to establish and maintain formal relationships.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink remarked that the U.S. Department of State was working with a “range of partners” to demonstrate the benefits of engaging with Taiwan. He testified that the U.S. Department of State had taken several steps to assist Lithuania as they sought to maintain relations with Taiwan. He mentioned how senior leadership at the White House and U.S. Department of State (including the Secretary) had expressed their support for Lithuania’s efforts and noted how the EXIM had announced a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Lithuania to provide the country with $600 million in credits. He further mentioned how the U.S. had dispatched a private sector commercial delegation to Lithuania to assist the country in finding other markets and supply chains. He lastly highlighted how the U.S. had expanded the GCTF to help partners around the world engage with Taiwan and thanked Congress for its support of the program.

Full Committee Ranking Member Jim Risch (R-ID):

• Ranking Member Risch remarked that China’s pressuring of Lithuania over the country’s ties to Taiwan was not receiving enough attention globally. He stated that the U.S. needed to better publicize its willingness to support countries seeking to partner with Taiwan. He then discussed how China’s interventions in Hong Kong had resulted in “de minimis” repercussions for China. He expressed concerns that this lack of repercussions could spur China to aggressively intervene in Taiwan. He asked the witnesses to indicate whether China believed that the U.S. viewed China’s actions towards Taiwan “entirely different” than the U.S. viewed China’s actions towards Hong Kong.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink asserted that it would be a “grave mistake” if China were to conclude that China had an opportunity to take coercive action against Taiwan based on their previous actions toward Hong Kong. He remarked that the U.S. Department of State believed that its job was to provide a level of deterrence and stability across the Taiwan strait so that China was not tempted to take coercive action against Taiwan.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner asserted that China perceived that the U.S. viewed their actions towards Taiwan differently than the U.S. viewed their actions towards Hong Kong. He expressed his willingness to elaborate on his response in a classified setting. He then noted how Taiwan had taken “very careful” notice regarding what happened between Hong Kong and China. He stated that this situation had reinforced Taiwan’s belief that they could not enter into a Hong Kong-like governance arrangement with China.

Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD):

• Sen. Cardin asked the witnesses to address how China was engaging with Taiwan’s internal politics. He commented that there appeared to be “shifting politics” within Taiwan with regard to Taiwan’s attitudes towards China.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink remarked that a detailed response to Sen. Cardin’s question could be better provided within a classified setting. He stated however that China’s attempts to intimidate, coerce, and influence Taiwan involved activities within Taiwan. He called this development “deeply concerning.” He expressed skepticism regarding the effectiveness of China’s actions toward Taiwan. He stated that increased Chinese pressure directed towards Taiwan often made the Taiwanese people less supportive of China.
• Sen. Cardin then discussed how the U.S.’s withdrawal from the TPP had created a vacuum within the Asian Pacific region. He stated that the U.S.’s ability to have influence on matters relating to Taiwan was dependent on the perception of the U.S.’s interests regarding the Asian Pacific region. He asked the witnesses to discuss how the strategies of their Departments were being arranged to respond to China’s increasing activities within the China Seas and its efforts to compromise Taiwan’s security.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink remarked that the U.S. Department of State’s goal was to demonstrate the strength and the credibility of the U.S.’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific region and to the U.S.’s allies within the region. He mentioned how the first two world leaders that President Biden hosted at the White House were the Japanese Prime Minister and the South Korean President. He also noted how the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense had both made visits to Japan and South Korea. He further mentioned that U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken will travel to southeast Asia next week to visit Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. He then remarked that the U.S. was carrying out a “very aggressive policy” vis-a-vis the maritime domains in both the South China Sea and the East China Sea. He stated that these efforts were meant to garner support for pushing back against Chinese illegal behavior and bullying, as well as strengthen support for the international rule of law. He further discussed how the U.S. was providing hundreds of millions of dollars in maritime assistance to U.S. partners within the Indo-Pacific region to increase their domain awareness and their ability to defend their own interests. He also remarked that the U.S. was developing and exercising its own capabilities “on a regular basis” within the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and elsewhere within the Indo-Pacific region. He lastly mentioned how President Biden had announced in October his intention to launch an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and stated that the U.S. would make this Framework a focus of its engagement strategy within the coming weeks and months.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner noted how U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin had repeatedly stated that allies and partners were the U.S.’s greatest strategic advantage in its military competition with China given their capabilities and their support for the U.S.’s force posture and forward deployments within the region. He testified that he had personally observed strong defense relationships between the U.S. and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region throughout his current tenure at the DoD.

Sen. Mitt Romney (R-UT):

• Sen. Romney expressed concerns that the U.S. was likely failing to adequately support the Taiwanese people. He stated that while the Taiwanese people had low opinions of China due to China’s treatment of Uyghers, Hong Kong residents, and Tibetans, he asserted that the U.S. had been unsuccessful in terms of influencing the world opinion of the China-Taiwan situation. He mentioned how Taiwan was experiencing increasing diplomatic isolation. He also expressed doubts that China was becoming less concerned about the damages that they would suffer if they were to attack Taiwan. He then contended that the U.S. was failing to adequately communicate to China that there would occur a significant economic consequence if China were to engage in an incursion against Taiwan. He lastly expressed concerns that the U.S. was failing to adequately communicate its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region. He criticized the Trump administration’s decision to back out of the TPP and asserted that this decision demonstrated a weak commitment from the U.S. to the Indo-Pacific region. He asked the witnesses to respond to his assessment of the U.S.’s approach to Taiwan.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink contended that there existed reasons for optimism regarding the China-Taiwan situation. He called it significant that many of the U.S.’s international allies and partners had expressed their concerns publicly regarding the current situation in Taiwan. He specifically highlighted the public statements in support of Taiwan from the leaders of Japan, South Korea, the Group of Seven (G7), and the European Union (EU). He then remarked that the U.S. was working with Taiwan to develop an asymmetric defense against China. He stated that the economic consequences stemming from any Taiwan strait conflict would be “severe” and asserted that the U.S. must emphasize this point to China. He lastly remarked that the U.S.’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific region animated the Biden administration’s actions every day.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner remarked that he was more optimistic than Sen. Romney regarding the current situation in Taiwan. He indicated that while he shared Sen. Romney’s concerns about China’s military modernization efforts, he stated that Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen was taking important steps to modernize and reform Taiwan’s military. He noted how Taiwan was increasing its defense budget and focusing on developing asymmetric capabilities. He testified that the DoD was increasingly focused on addressing the China-Taiwan situation. He indicated that the DoD was currently working to update its capabilities and posture in the region, expedite experimentation and prototyping, and develop new operational concepts. He remarked that there was increasing concern and action from U.S. partners and allies with regard to Taiwan. He mentioned how the U.S. had recently held its first ever Taiwan strait transit with Canada. He also mentioned how the U.S. had held “major” military exercises and multicarrier operations with partners from both inside and outside of the Indo-Pacific region to support Taiwan. He further noted how many Indo-Pacific region countries were conducting their own Taiwan strait transits. He stated that many countries were increasing their military presence within the Indo-Pacific region and were becoming more publicly supportive of deterrence efforts.

Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH)

• Sen. Shaheen mentioned how the European Parliament had recently sent its first official parliamentary delegation to Taiwan and had adopted a non-binding resolution to deepen ties with Taiwan. She asked the witnesses to discuss the extent to which the Biden administration was engaging with the U.S.’s European allies on Taiwan-related matters.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink remarked that the Biden administration’s approach to the Indo-Pacific Region prioritized engaging the U.S.’s allies, partners, and friends. He added that the U.S.’s engagement efforts were focused on both partners within and outside of the Indo-Pacific region (including the EU). He testified that he had recently held consultations with his EU counterpart on Indo-Pacific region-related issues (including Taiwan). He also mentioned how the EU Secretary General of the European External Action Service (EEAS) had recently traveled to Washington, DC for official meetings and indicated that these meetings did address Indo-Pacific region-related issues. He testified that the U.S. had worked with its allies, partners, and friends to develop a shared set of principles for supporting peace and stability within the Indo-Pacific region. He stated that the U.S. and its allies, partners, and friends were now focusing on identifying concrete actions that could be taken within the region.
• Sen. Shaheen commented that the U.S.’s discussions with its international partners and allies would be even more effective were the U.S. to have ambassadors to the EU and to China confirmed. She asked Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink to discuss how these vacant U.S. ambassadorships were impacting the U.S.’s diplomatic efforts on Taiwan matters.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink remarked that the U.S. was “hamstrung” in the Indo-Pacific region when it did not have fully confirmed U.S. ambassadors within the region. He commented that while U.S. embassies possessed very capable representatives, he asserted that there were no substitutes for fully confirmed U.S. ambassadors in terms of their capabilities and legitimacy. He expressed the U.S. Department of State’s wishes for the U.S. Senate to take quick action to confirm as many U.S. ambassadors as possible.
• Sen. Shaheen called it concerning that Committee Members were holding up the confirmation votes of several U.S. ambassador nominees. She stated that Committee Members should be especially cognizant of the importance of having U.S. ambassadors in place. She asserted that the U.S. Senate’s failure to confirm ambassadors was undermining the U.S.’s interests in China.

Full Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-NJ):

• Chairman Menendez expressed agreement with Sen. Jeanne Shaheen’s (D-NH) concerns regarding the large number of U.S. ambassador nominees awaiting confirmation votes.

Sen. Bill Hagerty (R-TN):

• Sen. Hagerty mentioned how Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi had stated that the peace and stability of Taiwan were directly connected to Japan. He added that former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had stated that a Taiwanese emergency was a Japanese emergency. He mentioned how he had previously served as the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and asserted that Taiwan was strategically important to the U.S.-Japan alliance. He remarked that an emergency within the U.S.-Japan alliance would create problems for the U.S.’s alliances with South Korea and Australia. He contended that protecting the U.S.’s alliance with Taiwan was therefore key to protecting the U.S.’s various alliances within the Indo-Pacific region. He asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to indicate whether the security of Taiwan was important to the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific region.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner answered affirmatively.
• Sen. Hagerty asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to address how Taiwan impacted the U.S.’s defense posture within the Indo-Pacific region and the U.S.’s ability to work with and defend Japan, South Korea, and Australia.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner stated that the U.S.’s partnership with Taiwan was critical to its network of partners and allies within the Indo-Pacific region.
• Sen. Hagerty then discussed how China was currently engaged in a “deeply destabilizing” nuclear arms race and specifically raised concerns over China’s testing of nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons. He noted how the U.S.’s allies and partners within the Indo-Pacific region were increasingly concerned about China’s “laser focus and emphasis” on their strategic capabilities. He remarked that the U.S. needed to maintain a credible and extended deterrence commitment to its allies within the Indo-Pacific region. He asked Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink to indicate whether the U.S. should take all available actions in order to maintain credible deterrence.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink remarked that the U.S. should take all available actions in order to maintain credible deterrence. He asserted that such actions were in the U.S.’s national interests.
• Sen. Hagerty then noted how Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary had recently stated that the public adoption of a no first use policy for nuclear weapons would make it difficult to ensure Japan’s national security. He asked the witnesses to indicate whether the U.S. should consider the views of Japan and other Indo-Pacific region partners regarding the U.S.’s declaratory policies.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink remarked that the U.S. must demonstrate the credibility of its security treaty commitments. He stated that these commitments should pertain to the U.S.’s extended deterrence capabilities.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner testified that the DoD was currently conducting its nuclear posture review. He stated that the DoD had been engaging with allies around the world (including Indo-Pacific region allies) as part of this review process. He also mentioned how U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austen had spoken repeatedly about the importance of the U.S.’s extended deterrence commitments.
• Sen. Hagerty thanked Assistant Secretary Ratner for taking the views of the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific region allies into account as part of the DoD’s nuclear posture review.

Sen. Cory Booker (D-NJ):

• Sen. Booker first expressed agreement with the concerns of Full Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) regarding the current vacancies within the U.S.’s diplomatic corps. He also discussed how there remained several unfilled positions at the U.S. Department of State that were important to the U.S.’s national security. He asked Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink to indicate whether the current unfilled positions at the U.S. Department of State were important to the U.S.’s national security and therefore should not be held up.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink remarked that the vacancies that Sen. Booker had referred to were hindering the U.S.’s ability to execute its foreign policy. He requested that the U.S. Senate swiftly move to confirm both vacant U.S. ambassadorships and domestic U.S. Department of State positions.
• Sen. Booker then expressed skepticism towards China’s statements claiming that they were not seeking to confront Taiwan through their incursions into Taiwanese territory. He asked the witnesses to indicate whether China’s rhetoric regarding their incursions into Taiwanese territory was meant to satisfy internal Chinese political constituencies. He also asked the witnesses to address whether China was seeking to engage in a more overt conflict with Taiwan.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink remarked that the U.S. Department of State was “deeply concerned” regarding a range of destabilizing, aggressive, and coercive actions from China. He stated that these actions were being carried out in the maritime domain, on the China-India border, and economically. He remarked that the U.S. Department of State was “laser focused” on the threats posed by these actions. He asserted that the U.S. ought to be more focused on China’s actions than on China’s rhetoric. He remarked that the U.S.’s intention was to work with Indo-Pacific regional allies and partners to protect the Indo-Pacific region’s rules-based order from current Chinese threats.
• Sen. Booker then raised concerns over China’s influence within Africa and stated that China had successfully eroded diplomatic relations between African nations and Taiwan. He commented that China’s presence within Africa undermined the U.S.’s position and interests within Africa. He asked the witnesses to address how the U.S. government could reverse this erosion and encourage countries to support democratic principles and ideals.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink remarked that the Biden administration was focused on shoring up international support for Taiwan and ensuring the countries and regions around the world would not be subjected to Chinese coercion. He stated that the U.S. Department of State was reminding countries of the risks associated with accepting certain Chinese investments or incurring certain debts from China. He also remarked that the U.S. needed to demonstrate the benefits associated with partnering with the U.S. and other like-minded partners. He lastly contended that the U.S. must continue to highlight the importance of a rules-based order.
• Sen. Booker lastly expressed his pleasure with the fact that there existed a bipartisan commitment to the U.S.’s relationship with Taiwan.

Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD):

• Sen. Van Hollen discussed how China had taken aggressive actions towards Taiwan and stated that the U.S. was holding its position within the Indo-Pacific region. He asked the witnesses to discuss what the U.S. was currently doing to avoid miscalculations that could result in escalations of tensions and conflicts.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink remarked that the U.S. Department of State was taking a “range of actions” to demonstrate the strength of the U.S.’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific region and the U.S.’s deterrence capabilities. He also testified that the U.S. Department of State was working to strengthen the abilities of other countries to resist all forms of Chinese coercion. He stated that the Biden administration’s main focus was working to support the U.S.’s partners, allies, and friends across the Indo-Pacific region in withstanding Chinese pressure. He then mentioned how President Biden had recently held a virtual meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping and stated that one of the main objectives of this meeting was to reduce the risk of miscalculation between the two countries.
• Sen. Van Hollen expressed support for President Biden’s proposed strategy for dealing with Taiwan. He expressed particular interest in learning about was operationally in place to ensure that lines of communication between the U.S. and China remained open.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner remarked that a key priority for the Biden administration was to develop “guardrails” for the relationship between the U.S. and China. He testified that the DoD had been working to renew military-to-military relations with China. He indicated that these efforts had been focused on questions of crisis communication and crisis management.
• Sen. Van Hollen remarked that the U.S.’s communications with China would be better if the U.S. had an ambassador in place in China. He lamented how President Biden’s nominee for U.S. Ambassador to China had not yet received a confirmation vote. He then discussed how China had long desired control over Taiwan. He asked the witnesses to address whether Chinese President Xi Jinping had changed his position and/or tone when discussing Taiwan as compared to President Xi Jinping’s predecessors.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink remarked that neither the tone nor rhetoric from President Xi Jinping regarding Taiwan had been “dramatically” different from the tone and rhetoric of his predecessors. He stated that China had never ruled out the use of force to resolve their issues with Taiwan. He remarked that the “dramatic” change that had occurred regarding China’s approach to Taiwan involved China’s coercive actions and bullying behaviors. He commented that China’s actions (rather than China’s rhetoric) were the primary driver of the U.S.’s response to the situation.

Sen. Todd Young (R-IN):

• Sen. Young discussed how recent press reports had highlighted “concerning” developments with Taiwan’s domestic defense strategy and capabilites. He stated that Taiwan’s reserve forces were in need of reform and that there were concerns that Taiwan was favoring counter strike weapons over the adoption of a porcupine strategy (which involved strategic denial capabilities). He asked the witnesses to discuss what the Biden administration was doing to support Taiwan’s domestic military readiness beyond weapon sales.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner remarked that the U.S. government needed to consider items beyond weapons purchases when assessing Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. He commented that reserve force reforms were an important element of improving Taiwan’s domestic defense strategy and capabilities. He stated that Taiwan’s shift to an all-volunteer force and the subsequent decrease of its active force strength had forced Taiwan to ensure that its reserve forces were prepared to assume increasingly difficult missions. He mentioned how Taiwan had recently approved reforms to reservist training requirements and had developed more realistic combat training. He also noted how Taiwan was set to establish an All-out Defense Mobilization Agency (ADMA) in 2022, which he commented would better align training, exercises, and force development requirements. He stated that Taiwan was making “real, tangible progress” regarding their domestic military readiness and testified that the U.S. would work to support Taiwan’s efforts. He expressed his willingness to elaborate on the U.S.’s actions to support Taiwan’s domestic military readiness efforts in a classified setting. He testified however that the U.S. was taking a more proactive approach to supporting Taiwan.
• Sen. Young interjected to express his desire to hear Assistant Secretary Ratner’s response in a classified setting. He then asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to identify the capabilities that were most needed for asymmetric defense. He commented that the legacy systems that Taiwan had previously relied upon were likely inadequate for providing a robust defense of Taiwan at the moment.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner expressed agreement with Sen. Young’s comments. He indicated the Biden administration’s support for Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s commitment to achieve a greater balance of asymmetric capabilities. He stated that the capabilities that were most needed for asymmetric defense included coastal defense cruise missiles, short- and medium-range air defenses, defensive naval mines, and Command, Control, Communications, Computers Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR).
• Sen. Young asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to project the time period that he foresaw the greatest risk for conflict between China and Taiwan.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner remarked that the China challenge would remain persistent for the foreseeable future. He stated that the U.S. must therefore continue to sustain its deterrence efforts against China.

Sen. Chris Coons (D-DE):

• Sen. Coons first remarked that it was important that the U.S.’s support for Taiwan be bipartisan in nature and commented that such bipartisan support currently existed. He then asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to identify the most critical investment that Congress could make in Taiwan to help ensure and strengthen deterrence and U.S. military readiness in the Indo-Pacific region.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner reiterated his previous recommendation that the U.S. support Taiwan’s coastal defense, cruise missile, and defensive naval mine capabilities. He also called it important for Taiwan to pursue reserve reforms and civil-military integration efforts.
• Sen. Coons interjected to note how there was ongoing tension in Taiwan over their military planning efforts. He asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to address how the U.S. could help support the advancement of Taiwan’s defense reforms.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner expressed encouragement with the direction that the Taiwanese leadership was moving in terms of its capability development, reserve reforms, and other defense reforms. He remarked that the U.S. government needed to convey a uniform message regarding Taiwan and work with its allies and partners to support Taiwan.
• Sen. Coons asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to indicate how much harm would funding the U.S. government through a year-long CR do to the U.S.’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner mentioned how the DoD had raised concerns over the prospects of using a CR to fund the U.S. government. He stated that the U.S. government needed stability in its budgeting cycles.
• Sen. Coons then remarked that the U.S. ought to work in close coordination with its European allies and partners to strengthen its trade investment relationships. He mentioned how Taiwan was one of the world’s greatest sources of advanced semiconductor chips and noted how the U.S. had recently experienced significant supply chain disruptions and challenges. He asked Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink to provide recommendations for engaging liberal democracies and Taiwan in efforts to develop standards for the digital economy. He also asked Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink to provide recommendations for how the U.S. could better engage its European allies on strengthening economic and security ties with Taiwan.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink remarked that resilient and diverse supply chains were “absolutely critical” for Taiwan, as well as for the global economy. He testified that the U.S. had engaged in a “range of dialogues” with Taiwanese partners on these issues. He also mentioned how the U.S. had worked to ensure that Taiwan carried out its export control and other screening policies designed to protect their most important technologies and trade secrets. He remarked that the U.S.’s European partners would be critical in these efforts and testified that the U.S. had engaged the EU on this topic.

Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX):

• Sen. Cruz contended that the Biden administration’s policies were making the world more dangerous. He asserted that the U.S.’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and actions on the Nord Stream 2 had created a perception amongst America’s enemies that the U.S. was weak, which had led America’s enemies to become “substantially” more bellicose. He remarked that the aforementioned events had made it “substantially more likely” that China would launch an amphibious assault against Taiwan sometime between now and the end of 2024. He also asserted that the Biden administration’s policy regarding Taiwan had been incoherent and had undermined Taiwan’s interests. He criticized the White House’s recent posting and subsequent deletion of a social media posting about COVID-19 vaccine donations in Taiwan due to the posting’s inclusion of an official flag of Taiwan. He recounted that this incident has forced Taiwan to request that the White House not cause unnecessary speculation or misunderstanding due to the removal of the social media posting. He also mentioned how the Biden administration had imposed a policy that forbid Taiwan from displaying national symbols of their sovereignty on U.S. soil. He noted how he had introduced bipartisan legislation to permit Taiwan from displaying national symbols of their sovereignty on U.S. soil. He further mentioned how he had heard from officers at several military bases that the DoD was requesting stricter enforcement of the ban on Taiwanese national symbols of sovereignty. He asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to indicate the Biden administration’s policy regarding the ability of Taiwanese allies to display their national symbols of sovereignty and to address whether this policy had been memorialized in a written memorandum.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner indicated that the U.S. Department of State had oversight over this particular issue and that he would therefore defer to Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink on the issue. He testified that he was not familiar with the DoD issues that Sen. Cruz had raised and expressed his willingness to look into these issues.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink remarked that the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific region policy was focused on demonstrating the U.S.’s credibility of its commitment to the region and its allies. He stated that the Biden administration had revitalized its engagement with allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific region in a manner that improved the U.S.’s national security and prosperity and countered China’s aggressive and coercive actions.
• Note: Sen. Cruz’s question period time expired here.

Sen. Tim Kaine (D-VA):

• Sen. Kaine remarked that the Biden administration was working in earnest to rebuild the U.S.’s alliances around the world and highlighted the U.S.’s efforts to deliver COVID-19 vaccines to other countries (including Taiwan). He also indicated his support for the recent announcement that the U.S. would engage in a more “potent” partnership around submarines within the Indo-Pacific region that would involve Australia and the UK. He expressed confusion however as to why the partnership between the U.S., the UK, and Australia had come as a surprise to France. He commented that the U.S. should have sought to include France in its efforts within the Indo-Pacific region given how France was both a U.S. ally and an Indo-Pacific nation. He asked the witnesses to indicate whether they were involved in the crafting of the partnership between the U.S., the UK, and Australia on submarines and to explain why France had not been included in this partnership.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner testified that he was involved in the latter stage of the negotiations between the U.S., the UK, and Australia and indicated that these negotiations had started prior to his confirmation. He remarked that the agreement between the countries was very particular to their specific strategic needs and was based on preexisting bilateral cooperation. He stated that the negotiations between the U.S., the UK, and Australia were held in secret due to the sensitive nature of the subject. He commented that Australia was best suited to explain their own engagement with France on their submarine deal.
• Sen. Kaine stated that France was an Indo-Pacific country and a great ally of the U.S. He asserted that France could play a key role in supporting Taiwan and deterring Chinese aggression.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner remarked that the U.S. already engaged France on defense issues within the Indo-Pacific region. He stated that the U.S. looked forward to continuing this engagement with France moving forward.
• Sen. Kaine interjected to ask Assistant Secretary Ratner to confirm that France was not involved in the recent negotiations between the U.S., the UK, and Australia. He also asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to indicate whether the U.S. expected Australia to provide France with notice about these negotiations after they had been completed.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner noted how the U.S. was engaged in several multilateral agreements within the Indo-Pacific region and stated that these agreements were all meant to be complementary to one another.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink testified that the U.S.’s negotiations with the UK and Australia to develop a partnership occurred prior to his confirmation. He remarked that the partnership constituted a “very significant” strategic move that contributed to peace and stability across the Indo-Pacific region. He noted how President Biden had publicly stated that the rollout of this partnership could have been handled better. He indicated that the Biden administration had taken several actions to engage with French and EU allies on ways to advance their shared interests within the Indo-Pacific region.

Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA):

• Sen. Markey mentioned how President Biden had previously stated in January 2017 that it was difficult to envision a plausible scenario in which the first use of nuclear weapons would be necessary given the U.S.’s non-nuclear weapons capabilities and the nature of the threats against the U.S. He expressed his agreement with this statement. He asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to indicate whether these statements were still applicable to the current situation in the Indo-Pacific region.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner testified that the DoD was currently conducting a review of the U.S.’s global nuclear posture and related questions surrounding the proper role of nuclear weapons. He indicated that this review would likely be completed early next year.
• Sen. Markey expressed his hope that the DoD’s global nuclear posture review would draw inspiration from President Biden’s 2017 statement and would conclude that the U.S. should never be the first country to use nuclear weapons in a non-nuclear war setting. He then mentioned how the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recently referred to China’s test of an orbital hypersonic missile as a “Sputnik moment.” He commented that this comment suggested that there existed a technological gap between the U.S. and China that the U.S. would need to fill. He asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to confirm that the U.S. exceeded the next eleven countries combined in terms of defense spending. He noted that one of these eleven countries was China.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner stated that the U.S. had the world’s largest defense budget. He indicated that he was unsure as to whether its defense spending exceeded that of the defense spending of the next eleven countries combined.
• Sen. Markey mentioned how DoD witnesses had previously testified that China’s development of nuclear capable hypersonic missiles was meant to counter U.S. missile defenses. He asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to indicate whether the U.S.’s regional or homeland-based missile defense architecture posed a threat to China’s strategic deterrence.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner remarked that the purpose of the U.S.’s missile defense system was to enhance stability and deter aggression. He stated that the U.S.’s missile defense system did not pose a threat to China.
• Sen. Markey asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to confirm that U.S.’s existing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were faster than the hypersonic glide vehicles that the U.S., China, and Russia were currently “rushing” to develop.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner indicated that he could provide an answer to Sen. Markey’s question in a classified setting.
• Sen. Markey mentioned how the Union of Concerned Scientists had stated that the U.S.’s ICBMs were more than 20 times the speed of sound. He commented that there did not appear to exist evidence to suggest that Chinese hypersonic weapons would be able to exceed the speeds of the U.S.’s existing weapons. He then asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to confirm that the Chinese would only still have only one-quarter of the amount of the U.S.’s warheads if China were able to produce 1,000 deliverable warheads by 2030.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner confirmed Sen. Markey’s statement. He noted however that the U.S. did not deploy all of its available warheads. He remarked that there remained reasons to be concerned about China’s nuclear buildup, despite the U.S.’s nuclear weapon size advantage.
• Sen. Markey asserted that the DoD and weapons manufacturers should not be overstating the threat posed by Chinese hypersonic missiles or seek to push the U.S. into an arms race with China.

Full Committee Ranking Member Jim Risch (R-ID):

• Ranking Member Risch asked the witnesses to address whether there was an official position on policy regarding the ability of Taiwanese allies to display their national symbols of sovereignty.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink noted that the U.S. had maintained a policy of prohibiting Taiwanese partners from displaying symbols of sovereignty on U.S. facilities for the previous four decades. He indicated that these national symbols of sovereignty included flags and military uniforms. He stated that this policy remained in effect.
• Ranking Member Risch interjected to ask Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink to indicate whether this policy was formalized in writing.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink testified that there existed a written policy regarding the U.S.’s contact guidelines. He also stated that the U.S. Department of State provided both guidance and encouragement to U.S. government officials to meet with Taiwan partners in a way that was fully in accordance with the U.S.’s “unofficial but vitally important” relationship with Taiwan. He expressed uncertainty as to whether the contact guidelines covered the uniform or flag issue. He indicated his willingness to follow-up with Ranking Member Risch on the issue. He reiterated that the U.S.’s policy on Taiwanese national symbols of sovereignty had been long standing.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner noted that the DoD’s guidance on the display of national symbols of sovereignty required adherence to the U.S. State Department’s guidance on this topic.

Full Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-NJ):

• Chairman Menendez noted how former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had rescinded previous U.S. Department of State guidance on Executive Branch contacts with Taiwan at the end of the Trump administration. He mentioned how the U.S. Department of State had issued new guidance in April 2021 that permitted working level meetings with Taiwanese counterparts in federal buildings. He acknowledged that while this issue was different from the issue of Taiwanese national symbols of sovereignty, he commented that this development was still noteworthy. He then mentioned reports from earlier in the year that the U.S. was “seriously” considering changing the name of the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office to the Taiwan Representative Office. He indicated that this name change was meant to elevate the U.S.’s treatment of Taiwan. He stated however that this name change would still be consistent with the One China Policy and the Taiwan Relations Act. He asked the witnesses to indicate whether Taiwan had made an official request for the U.S. to consider changing the name of the Office.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink stated that he believed that Taiwan had made such a request and expressed his willingness to confirm this.
• Chairman Menendez also mentioned how Taiwan had requested that the U.S. provide forward deployment of its customs personnel to Taiwan so that passengers traveling from Taiwan to the U.S. could have an easier travel experience.
  • Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink indicated that he was not aware of this request from Taiwan. He expressed his willingness to look into the issue and follow up on it with Chairman Menendez.
• Chairman Menendez then discussed how Taiwan was interested in accessing the U.S.’s surplus defense equipment.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner expressed his willingness to further discuss this issue in a classified setting.
• Chairman Menendez then asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to provide the view of the Biden administration regarding the prioritization of providing Taiwan with asymmetric weapons for the island’s force modernization. He also asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to address how the DoD defined the term “asymmetric” and to indicate whether Taiwan had the same definition of the term.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner remarked that the DoD viewed Taiwan’s development of asymmetric capabilities as a priority for both Taiwan and the U.S. He indicated that the DoD had defined these asymmetric capabilities as capabilities that were credible, resilient, mobile, distributed, and cost-effective. He stated that there was consensus “by and large” between the U.S. and Taiwan on the definition of asymmetric defense capabilities and strategies. He remarked that the DoD and the U.S. government as a whole was taking a proactive approach to try to support the development of these capabilities. He expressed his willingness to provide further details about these efforts in a classified session.
• Chairman Menendez asked Assistant Secretary Ratner to indicate the operational concept that would be most appropriate to follow for an overall defense concept when discussing Taiwan.
  • Assistant Secretary Ratner remarked that there existed a “wide range” of reforms and capabilities that would be important for Taiwan’s defense in addition to the provision of arms. He testified that the U.S. was engaged on various issues related to Taiwan’s defense, including on issues of concept development, analysis, and doctrine. He stated that the U.S. was looking at operational concepts that would take advantage of Taiwan’s geography, technology, economic strengths, and capabilities. He also mentioned how the U.S. was helping Taiwan to develop the role of its reserves and improve its civil-military integration.
• Chairman Menendez then indicated that he was aware of at least one DSP-5 license that had been awaiting approval from the U.S. Department of State for five months after clearing the DoD’s review process. He noted that this DSP-5 license would cover upgrades for Taiwan’s M60 tanks. He expressed frustration with the U.S. Department of State’s lack of action on this DSP-5 license. He expressed interest in having the U.S. Department of State provide him with an update on the license. He also indicated that he would request the Committee staff to set up a classified briefing with Assistant Secretary Ratner to address the questions that he was unable to answer in a public setting.