Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation)

Hearing	Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Committee	U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation
Date	February 6, 2025

 

Hearing Takeaways:

• The Current Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) and Counter-UAS Technology Landscape: The hearing focused on the current UAS technology landscape and the use of counter-UAS technologies to combat unauthorized drones. Subcommittee Members and the hearing’s witnesses discussed how drones are increasingly being deployed in the U.S. for commercial, emergency response, and recreational purposes. They noted however that drones are also being used in unauthorized, reckless, and/or malicious ways. They warned that this misuse of drones could disrupt airport operations, interfere with emergency response efforts, threaten critical infrastructure, endanger public events (including large sporting events), and pose national security concerns. They expressed interest in maximizing the benefits of UAS technologies while also supporting counter-UAS technologies to address the misuse of drones. Dr. Cahill cautioned that the improper and imprudent takedown of drones could result in significant collateral damage.
  • Counter-UAS Problems: Full Committee Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D-WA) and Dr. Cahill raised concerns regarding current counter-UAS operations. Full Committee Ranking Member Larsen noted how preliminary results from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Airport Safety and Airspace Hazard Mitigation and Enforcement program had found that counter-UAS technologies do not always operate as described by their manufacturers, may interfere with FAA and airport radars, and disrupt local telecommunications. Dr. Cahill asserted that counter-UAS technologies must be tested before the technologies are implemented. She mentioned that the FAA is currently working to develop and standardize a testing process for counter-UAS technologies.
  • Drone Detection, Tracking, and Identification (DTI) Technologies: Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY) and the hearing’s witnesses expressed interest in the use of drone DTI technologies as a tool for addressing drone threats. They stated that while drone DTI technologies could help entitles (such as airports) identify and report unauthorized drone incursions, they noted that the users of these technologies must rely upon federal law enforcement agencies to bring down the unauthorized drones. Subcommittee Ranking Member Steve Cohen (D-TN) mentioned how Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority and FedEx (which are in his Congressional District) are pioneering the safe use of drones for airport perimeter security, runway inspections, and aircraft parts delivery. Dr. Cahill also stated that several types of DTI sensors run afoul of Title 18 of the U.S. Code and asserted that the operators of these systems must be granted relief.
  • Drone Swarming Threats: Rep. Tom Barrett (R-MI) and Dr. Cahill raised concerns regarding drone swarming threats, which entail the use of numerous coordinated drones working together to accomplish a shared mission. Dr. Cahill indicated that researchers are looking into technologies that can respond to multiple aircrafts at the same time.
  • Airport Counter-UAS Capabilities: Subcommittee Members and the hearing’s witnesses expressed significant interest in protecting airports from unauthorized UAS operations. Subcommittee Republicans and Ms. Ellman discussed the potential for drone jamming technologies and geofencing technologies as a means of protecting airports from rogue drones. Dr. Cahill cautioned however that drone jamming technologies could create unexpected frequency emissions with adverse impacts. Mr. McLaughlin further discussed how his airport, Dallas Fort Worth International Airport, maintains a robust drone detection system with 24/7 monitoring and engages in robust planning to protect against a potential adverse drone incident. Mr. McLaughlin and Ms. Ellman stated however that such 24/7 monitoring capabilities might not be necessary or feasible for all airports (especially smaller airports) and that airports should be empowered to choose their own UAS detection and mitigation systems. 
  • Military Counter-UAS Capabilities: Rep. John Garamendi (D-CA) and Dr. Cahill expressed interest in having the U.S. study how UAS and counter-UAS technologies are being used within the Russia-Ukraine War. Dr. Cahill remarked that the counter-UAS technology being developed in Ukraine needs to be applied to U.S. military bases. She mentioned how Eielson Air Force Base and Fort Greely in Alaska have both experienced drone incursions.
  • Civilian Counter-UAS Capabilities: Dr. Cahill also stated that some counter-UAS technologies should be made available for civilian operations. She commented however that she could not discuss such counter-UAS technologies in a public setting as these technologies have national security implications.
  • Potential for UASs to Address Aviation Noise: Del. Eleanor Holmes-Norton (D-DC) and Ms. Ellman further expressed interest in the potential for drones to address aviation noise problems through reducing the need to deploy nosier aircrafts (such as helicopters) in many circumstances. Ms. Ellman noted how drones tend to be electric- and battery-powered, which makes them less noisy than traditional aircrafts.
• Counter-UAS Policy Issues and Proposals: Subcommittee Members and the hearing’s witnesses expressed interest in exploring policy issues and proposals related to counter-UAS technologies. They expressed interest in policies that would promote the safe deployment of innovative counter-UAS technologies and that would support the U.S.’s leadership in these technologies. They specifically highlighted the role of existing FAA programs, research centers, and UAS Test Sites in supporting UAS innovation.
  • Current Restrictions on Counter-UAS Activities: Dr. Cahill and Ms. Ellman stated that federal statute treats unmanned aircrafts as having the same protections as manned aircrafts. They asserted that this treatment limits the operation of counter-UAS technologies (because drone takedowns are akin to manned aircraft takedowns). Dr. Cahill further stated that non-kinetic solutions for mitigating and taking down drones potentially violate several sections of Title 18 of the U.S. Code. She indicated that these sections include the Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices Act, the Wire Tap Act, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). She added that these non-kinetic solutions may violate other federal statutes meant to protect the privacy of U.S. citizens. She stated that anyone conducting counter-UAS activities must therefore receive relief from the aforementioned statutes or face arrest.
  • Privacy Rules Governing UAS Activities: Several Subcommittee Republicans raised concerns regarding the potential for drones to engage in illegal spying and voyeurism when drones fly over private property. These Subcommittee Republicans, Dr. Cahill, and Ms. Ellman noted that the victims of this drone-enabled spying and voyeurism cannot shoot down the privacy-infringing drones themselves and must contact law enforcement officials to pursue the privacy-infringing drones. Rep. Bob Onder (R-MO) and Dr. Cahill emphasized that current laws do not distinguish between the takedown of manned and unmanned aircrafts, which can subject people that takedown privacy-infringing drones to significant legal liability (including imprisonment and large fines). They expressed interest in reforming these laws so that the laws acknowledge that the takedown of certain unmanned aircrafts is not as problematic as the takedown of manned aircrafts.
  • Ensuring the Adequacy of FAA Staff: Subcommittee Democrats, Dr. Cahill, and Ms. Ellman discussed the importance of FAA staff in developing strong federal UAS policies. Subcommittee Democrats and Dr. Cahill expressed particular concerns that President Trump’s recently issued Fork in the Road memorandum to federal employees and that the U.S. Department of Government Efficacy’s (DOGE) recent activities could cause many FAA employees with strong technical expertise regarding drones to leave the Agency.
  • Airport Coordination with Law Enforcement Agencies on Counter-UAS Operations: Mr. McLaughlin testified that the airport works closely with state, local, and federal law enforcement partners when it detects unauthorized drones and relies upon these law enforcement partners to mitigate these drones. He stated that the federal government should have a persistent authority to mitigate drones at airports. He commented that this persistent authority would empower the federal government to respond immediately when unauthorized drones are detected at airports. Rep. Hillary Scholten (D-MI) and Mr. McLaughlin also raised concerns that the FAA does not permit airports to access the Agency’s data regarding whether or not a drone is authorized to fly near an airport. Mr. McLaughlin indicated that while there does not exist an automated system for information sharing between airports and the FAA, he testified that Dallas Fort Worth International Airport engages in strong information sharing with its FAA tower partners. He stated however that this information sharing process is cumbersome and manual.
  • Provision of Counter-UAS Authorities to State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies and Select Private Sector Entities: Ms. Ellman and Mr. McLaughlin expressed support for providing appropriate-trained state and local law agencies with greater authorities to mitigate unauthorized drones. They noted how only federal law enforcement agencies can currently mitigate drones and that these federal agencies often cannot quickly respond to such unauthorized drones. They asserted that that state and local law enforcement agencies could supplement federal drone response efforts with proper authority, safety-tested technology, advanced training, and strict federal oversight. Ms. Ellman also expressed support for providing similar capabilities to select private sector entities (so long as they meet the aforementioned criteria). Dr. Cahill asserted that the federal government remains the best suited entity for performing done mitigation given the potential for drone takedowns to have unintended consequences of drone takedowns. She expressed receptiveness however toward granting state and local law enforcement agencies permission to use DTI systems so long as these agencies receive appropriate training and coordinate their efforts with the federal government.
  • Protections for Stadiums and Large Events: Subcommittee Members and Ms. Ellman also expressed support for legislative efforts to better protect stadiums and large events from unauthorized drones. Ms. Ellman stated that there does not exist a privacy interest regarding Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs) and that drone restrictions for large events help protect the safety of Americans.
  • Current Prohibitions of Foreign Drones: Full Committee Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D-WA) noted how the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 prohibits the U.S. Department of Transportation from operating or procuring drones, associated elements, or counter-UAS technologies manufactured by a covered foreign entity. He commented that this prohibition is largely focused on China. He stated however that the law includes an exemption for testing and evaluating UAS detection and mitigation systems. Dr. Cahill remarked that the ability to test drones manufactured by a covered foreign entity is important because these drones compose a large portion of the drone market. She highlighted how DJI (which is a Chinese company) manufactures the most popular consumer drones. She stated that the failure to test the signatures of foreign-manufactured drone systems would make it impossible to develop counter-drone systems that can identify these drones.
  • Counter UAS Training Capabilities: Rep. Scholten and Dr. Cahill expressed interest in having the U.S. government design a counter-UAS training curriculum. They commented that this training curriculum would allow for counter-drone technologies to be more quickly deployed upon the passage of new federal drone legislation and would reduce the potential for dangerous drone takedowns.
  • Counter-UAS Testing Capabilities: Dr. Cahill also discussed how the number of companies able to develop and test counter-UAS technologies and some DTI systems is limited because such development and testing requires the authority to interfere with an aircraft. She stated that this current limitation is causing many companies to test their counter-UAS and DTI systems in other countries. She further mentioned how the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 had sought to address this limitation through including language to allow seven FAA UAS test sites to support counter-UAS testing. She noted however that these test sites were not granted the authority to perform UAS mitigation.
  • The FAA’s Remote ID Rule: Ms. Ellman highlighted how the FAA’s Remote ID rule had taken effect in 2024. She explained that this rule requires virtually all drones are to broadcast a “digital license plate number” that is accessible to the public through a smart phone application. She asserted that more work must be completed to improve compliance with the rule and public understanding of how the rule works. Dr. Cahill commented however that bad actors tend to turn off their drone’s Remote ID and take other measures to hide their identities and activities. She remarked that there remain challenges identifying whether unauthorized drones pose legitimate threats.
  • The FAA’s Part 108 and Section 2209 Rulemakings: Ms. Ellman discussed how the FAA’s Part 108 rulemaking under development would enable Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) drone capabilities, increase transparency in the airspace, and incentivize electronic conspicuity. She also discussed how the FAA’s Section 2209 rulemaking would require the FAA to establish a process for private sector entities to prohibit or limit unauthorized drone operations over their properties. She lamented how these rulemakings have been under development for several years (despite Congressional mandates for the FAA to complete the rulemakings). She called on the Second Trump administration to finalize these rulemakings.
  • FAA Public Communications: Subcommittee Members, Dr. Cahill, and Ms. Ellman called on the FAA to improve its communication of its drone findings to the public. They stated that the U.S. government’s failure to properly communicate the details of the recent drone sightings over New Jersey had fostered unnecessary public panic. Ms. Ellman suggested that the U.S. launch a public education campaign to highlight that a drone’s Remote ID details are publicly available with smartphone applications. She commented that this education would enable users to determine whether sighted drones are being used lawfully and would support the reporting of unlawful drones.
  • The Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act: Subcommittee Members expressed support for the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act. This bipartisan legislation would reform and expand the existing counter-UAS authorities granted to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ). This legislation also includes a counter-UAS pilot program for state and local law enforcement agencies, which would extend counter-UAS authorities to non-federal entities for the first time ever. They lamented that Congress had been unable to advance the legislation during the previous 118th Congress and expressed hope that the current 119th Congress could advance the legislation. Ms. Ellman stated that the legislation could be further improved through expanding access to drone detection technologies, expanding the number of areas that can participate in the legislation’s counter-UAS pilot program, and including deadlines and accountability mechanisms for interagency collaborative processes.

Hearing Witnesses:

1. Dr. Catherine Cahill, Ph.D., Director, the Alaska Center for UAS Integration (ACUASI), University of Alaska Fairbanks
2. Lisa Ellman, Executive Director, Commercial Drone Alliance (CDA)
3. Chris McLaughlin, Executive Vice President of Operations, Dallas Fort Worth International Airport (DFW)

Member Opening Statements:

Subcommittee Chairman Troy Nehls (R-TX):

• He first mentioned how the U.S. had recently experienced two fatal aviation accidents and applauded the efforts of first responders and investigators in responding to these accidents.
  • He stated that the Subcommittee would review the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) findings regarding these accidents and would work to ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place to protect against the recurrence of such tragedies.
  • He indicated that the Subcommittee would continue to monitor the investigation and keep members appraised as new information becomes available.
• He then expressed interest in reviewing the current landscape of counter-UAS technologies in the U.S.
• He discussed how UASs are “extremely popular” among the American people and highlighted how there are over one million drones registered with the FAA.
  • He emphasized that this number of registered drones is expected to grow significantly in the coming years.
• He noted how aviation hobbyists, professional photographers, real estate professionals, and law enforcement officials are increasingly using drone technology.
  • He commented that Drone as First Responder (DFR) programs have proven to be a “crucial tool” for law enforcement officials as part of their efforts to protect and serve their communities in a timely and efficient manner.
  • He also commented that drones could transform the delivery of essential goods (such as medicines and commercial goods) to communities.
• He remarked however that the “wide range integration” of small drones into U.S. airspace at low altitudes poses “unique challenges” both on the ground and in U.S. airspace.
• He stated that drone challenges had been recently manifested in New Jersey where more than 5,000 reported drone sightings had been submitted to local, state, and federal authorities.
  • He noted that while federal authorities within the Trump administration have indicated that there had been no nefarious drones and that the drone operators had been authorized, he raised concerns over the fact that 5,000 reports had been received.
  • He asserted that the aviation community must better educate the public on lawful drone operations.
• He remarked that the recent drone sightings in New Jersey demonstrate the ease with which bad actors could use drones with nefarious and malicious intent or conduct illicit drone operations.
• He stated that the U.S. must continue to support and foster new aviation technologies and asserted that the future of U.S. aviation depends on such new technologies.
  • He commented that this responsibility includes ensuring the appropriate and safe use of counter-UAS technologies in U.S. airspace by authorized users so that civil aviation safety is not jeopardized.
• He remarked that the U.S. must establish a properly scaled, well-balanced, and legally sound framework for counter-UAS authorities and the corresponding technologies.
• He recounted how the U.S. House Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, Homeland Security, and the Judiciary had worked together during the previous 118th Congress to develop comprehensive drone legislation.
  • He explained that this legislation had sought to reform and “reasonably expand” the existing counter-UAS authorities granted to the DHS and the DoJ.
• He commended this legislation for having included a counter-UAS pilot program for state and local law enforcement agencies and noted that this pilot program would have extended counter-UAS authorities to non-federal entities for the first time ever.
  • He also applauded how the Committee had been able to expand and improve this pilot program during the legislation’s markup.
• He acknowledged that this legislation had ultimately not been signed into law and expressed his commitment to working with stakeholders and other Committees to further improve the legislation.

Full Committee Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D-WA):

• He first remarked that the recent aviation accidents are “stark reminders” of the complexity of U.S. airspace system and the importance of ensuring aviation safety.
  • He expressed his gratitude regarding the efforts of the NTSB, the FAA, and the U.S. Army in responding to these accidents.
  • He asserted that the Congress must allow the NTSB to complete its reviews of the accidents before it considers potential legislative responses.
• He then discussed how the growing number of drone uses presents both new opportunities and challenges for U.S. airspace.
• He recounted how alleged drone sightings in December 2024 across the U.S. (particularly in the northeast corridor) had captured the nation’s attention.
  • He noted how the FAA and federal security partners had indicated that over 5,000 drone sightings had been reported over the span of a few weeks.
  • He stated that while these sightings were confirmed to be a combination of authorized commercial drone operations, crewed aircrafts, and other traditional airspace users, he acknowledged the confusion and concern that these drone sightings had caused across local communities.
• He warned that misguided drone operations could bring U.S. airports to a standstill, threaten critical infrastructure, and potentially endanger national security.
  • He noted how an estimated 1.12 million small UASs are expected to be registered in the U.S. by 2028.
• He asserted that Congress must ensure that appropriate federal agencies and other eligible entities have the necessary authorities and resources to address the safety and security risks posed by UASs.
• He discussed how the FAA’s mission is to ensure that the U.S. possesses the safest airspace system in the world and commented that this task is “exceedingly more complex” due to new entrants.
  • He mentioned how Congress had directed the FAA under the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 to ensure that technologies to detect and mitigate potential risks by errant or hostile drones do not adversely impact the safe and efficient operation of the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS).
• He stated that while the drone industry has made significant improvements in developing counter-UAS technologies, he noted how preliminary results from the FAA’s Airport Safety and Airspace Hazard Mitigation and Enforcement program indicate that some counter-UAS technologies have problems.
  • He elaborated that these preliminary results indicate that these counter-UAS technologies do not always operate as described by their manufacturers, may interfere with FAA and airport radars, and disrupt local telecommunications.
• He called for the FAA to play a significant role in the testing, approval, and deployment of UAS detection and mitigation systems.
• He then discussed how unlawful and unauthorized drone breaches have suspended airport operations and disrupted flights for thousands of passengers.
  • He mentioned how these disruptions have included the 2023 ground stop at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport and the 2018 disruption at London Gatwick Airport.
• He expressed interest in using the hearing to learn about the challenges that airports face in dealing with these breaches.
• He lastly recounted how the Committee had approved the bipartisan Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act during the previous 118th Congress.
  • He commented that this legislation would have supported scalable integration of counter-UAS technologies and ensured the safety of the flying public and the people on the ground.
• He mentioned how the Committee is working in a bipartisan manner to ensure that law enforcement and other entities have “reasonable” expansions of their counter-UAS authorities and that counter-UAS technologies can be deployed safely.
• He expressed interest in having the Committee work with the U.S. House Committees on Homeland Security and the Judiciary to reintroduce and pass the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act during the current 119th Congress.

Rep. Tracey Mann (R-KS):

• He discussed how the recent aviation accident at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (which had involved a flight traveling from his state of Kansas) had harmed Kansas and expressed his hope that Kansas could recover from this accident.
• He remarked that the U.S. must determine the cause of this recent aviation accident and that Congress must work in a bipartisan manner to ensure that similar aviation accidents do not occur moving forward.

Subcommittee Ranking Member Steve Cohen (D-TN):

• He first stated that the Subcommittee would study the recent aviation accident at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport to identify potential policies that could protect against future aviation accidents.
• He then mentioned how Congress had recently passed the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 into law.
  • He commented that this law had expanded air traffic control workforce training, improved runway safety through new detection systems, and mandated 25-hour cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) to enable better investigations.
  • He also highlighted how the law directs the FAA to address near misses and runway incursions.
• He remarked that the U.S. must invest in resilient airport infrastructure and enhance helicopter safety.
• He stated that the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024’s measures are “critical” and noted that the law’s measures are still in the process of being implemented.
  • He asserted that aviation safety must remain the top priority for policymakers and commented that policymakers must be nimble in responding to product changes.
• He criticized President Trump for attributing the recent aviation accident at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives.
  • He stated that there is no evidence that DEI initiatives had played any role in this accident and called these claims “baseless.”
• He then recounted how there had been many claims in late 2024 that drone swarms were shutting down airports and threatening public safety.
• He noted how a full review from the FAA, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and DHS had found that these sighted drones had posed no credible security threats.
  • He indicated that many of these sighted drones had been misidentified commercial drones, law enforcement operations, and fixed-wing aircrafts.
• He then discussed how drones are becoming an increasingly common presence in the U.S.’s airspace and stated that drones both offer opportunities for innovation and present risks.
  • He elaborated that unauthorized, reckless, or malicious drone activities can disrupt airport operations, threaten critical infrastructure, and pose national security concerns. 
• He mentioned how a responsible drone integration project is occurring at the Memphis International Airport (which is located within his Congressional District) under the FAA’s BEYOND Program.
  • He explained that Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority and FedEx are pioneering the safe use of drones for airport perimeter security, runway inspections, and aircraft parts delivery.
  • He noted how this initiative includes BVLOS operations, which enable drones to operate without a direct line of sight while maintaining strict safety standards.
• He stated that his hometown of Memphis, Tennessee is proving that properly managed drones can enhance safety and efficiency (rather than create new risks and public concern).
• He remarked however that the U.S. still has drone challenges and discussed how drones have interfered with commercial flights, obstructed operations, and facilitated criminal activities.
  • He mentioned how a man had been arrested in 2024 for attempting to use a drone to attack a power grid in Nashville, Tennessee.
• He stated that these incidents demonstrate the need for Congress to ensure that its laws and regulations keep pace with drone technology.
• He mentioned how Congress had developed the bipartisan Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act during the previous 118th Congress.
  • He explained that this legislation had sought to renew and reform current legal authorities that provide the DHS and the DoJ with tools to detect and mitigate credible threats posed by drones.
• He expressed hope that Congress could pass the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act during the current 119th Congress.

Witness Opening Statements:

Dr. Catherine Cahill (Alaska Center for UAS Integration, University of Alaska Fairbanks):

• She stated that her organization, the Alaska Center for UAS Integration (ACUASI) at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, is one of the U.S.’s top unmanned aircraft programs.
  • She noted how ACUASI works with “cutting edge” UAS and counter-UAS technologies that are required to safely integrate unmanned aircrafts into the NAS.
• She remarked that unmanned aircrafts have “tremendous potential” to increase aviation safety through performing the difficult, dull, and dangerous missions that put the pilots of manned aircrafts at risk.
• She cautioned however that UAS technologies can also be used for negative purposes.
  • She referenced a recent drone collision over the Palisades Fire and mentioned how U.S. adversaries are employing drones in Ukraine and the Middle East.
• She contended that the U.S. must be a global leader in the development, testing, and implementation of safe counter-drone technologies.
  • She commented that these technologies would allow for the discrimination between authorized unmanned aircrafts, unauthorized unmanned aircrafts, and manned aircrafts.
  • She also commented that these technologies would allow for the safe removal of rogue UASs.
• She noted how federal statute defines unmanned aircraft as an aircraft and associated systems that are operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft.
• She asserted that the key takeaway from the definition of unmanned aircraft is that UASs are considered to be aircrafts and have the same protections as manned aircrafts.
  • She also noted how interfering with the flight of an unmanned aircraft violates the Aircraft Sabotage Act and aircraft piracy provisions under Title 49 of the U.S. Code.
• She further noted how federal statute defines a counter-UAS technology as a system or device capable of lawfully and safely disabling, disrupting, or seizing control of a UAS.
• She then discussed how there exist multiple different ways to mitigate or take down a drone and commented that these methods predominantly fall into two categories: kinetic solutions and non-kinetic solutions.
  • She explained that kinetic solutions cause direct physical damage to the UAS and indicated that these solutions can involve nets, projectiles, and lasers.
  • She explained that non-kinetic solutions do not directly damage the UAS and indicated that these solutions can involve hacking, jamming, and spoofing.
• She remarked that non-kinetic solutions for mitigating and taking down drones potentially violate several sections of Title 18 of the U.S. Code.
  • She indicated that these sections include the Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices Act, the Wire Tap Act, and the CFAA.
  • She added that these non-kinetic solutions may violate other federal statutes meant to protect the privacy of U.S. citizens.
• She stated that anyone conducting counter-UAS activities must therefore receive relief from the aforementioned statutes or face arrest.
• She also discussed how there exist systems capable of doing standalone detecting, tracking, and identifying of an unmanned aircraft.
  • She stated that several types of DTI sensors run afoul of Title 18 of the U.S. Code and asserted that the operators of these systems must be granted relief.
• She remarked that the biggest challenge of employing counter-drone technologies is the potential for damage to people and property on the ground and interference with other aviation safety systems.
• She noted how the authority for conducting counter-UAS activities has been confined to five agencies because of the physical and privacy risks associated with conducting these operations and the potential classified nature of the responses of these systems.
  • She indicated that these five agencies include the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), the U.S. Department of Energy, DHS, the DoJ, and the FAA.
• She stated that the recent drone sightings in New Jersey demonstrate that there does not exist a consensus regarding who should possess counter-UAS authorities.
• She noted that while there had been significant support for permitting state and local entities to shoot down the drones sighted in New Jersey, she asserted that the risk of unintended consequences from a mitigation attempt by these entities would be too high without appropriate training and coordination.
  • She expressed receptiveness however towards granting state and local authorities the permission to use DTI systems.
• She discussed how the number of companies able to develop and test counter-UAS technologies and some DTI systems is limited because such development and testing requires the authority to interfere with an aircraft.
  • She noted that these limits still exist when the development and training involve interference with a company’s own aircraft.
• She stated that this current limitation is causing many companies to test their counter-UAS and DTI systems in other countries.
• She mentioned how the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 had sought to address this limitation through including language to allow seven FAA UAS test sites to support counter-UAS testing.
  • She noted however that these test sites were not granted the authority to perform UAS mitigation.
• She concluded that the U.S. must be a leader in UAS technology and cannot afford to lag its adversaries in implementing this technology.

Ms. Lisa Ellman (Commercial Drone Alliance):

• She discussed how her organization, the Commercial Drone Alliance (CDA), is an independent non-profit organization composed of leaders for the commercial drone industry.
  • She mentioned how CDA works with governments to support safe and secure commercial drone integration.
• She remarked that drone technology has “greatly” improved over the previous decade and commented that this technology has provided lifesaving, societal, and economic benefits for all Americans.
  • She noted how communities throughout the U.S. employ drone technology to respond to natural disasters, promote public safety, inspect critical infrastructure, and deliver food, medicine, and household goods.
  • She also highlighted how the drone industry is projected to contribute billions of dollars to the U.S. economy over the next decade.
• She acknowledged however that drone technology could be used in harmful ways and stated that careless, clueless, and criminal drones could pose public safety and homeland security threats.
• She stated that the commercial drone industry views innovation and security as complementary objectives.
  • She commented that CDA seeks to both highlight the public safety and other benefits of drones and mitigate the threats associated with drone misuse.
• She remarked that policymakers should take two “common sense steps” related to drone policy: establishing a foundation for safe and secure drone operations and expanding legislative authorities to address non-compliant drones.
  • She asserted that these actions in tandem will enhance transparency and enable federal authorities to address potentially nefarious drone operators while supporting lawful operators and promoting American industry.
• She stated that there already exist tools to establish a safe and secure foundation for drone operations and highlighted how the FAA’s Remote ID rule had taken effect in 2024.
  • She explained that virtually all drones are now required to broadcast a “digital license plate number” that is accessible to the public through a smart phone application.
• She asserted that more work must be completed to improve compliance with the FAA’s Remote ID rule and to promote public understanding of how the rule works.
• She further mentioned how there are two new FAA rules under development that would improve transparency and security.
  • She indicated that the FAA’s Part 108 rulemaking would enable routine BVLOS drone operations while improving low-altitude airspace awareness.
  • She indicated that the FAA’s Section 2209 rulemaking would enable the prohibition of unauthorized drone flights over certain sensitive sites.
• She lamented how Congressionally-mandated deadlines for both aforementioned rulemakings have been ignored.
  • She expressed hope that Congress will continue to hold the FAA accountable for finishing these rulemakings.
• She then remarked that Congress must expand existing counter-drone legislative authorities.
  • She commented that current federal criminal laws (such as those meant to protect landline telephones) can prevent the use of helpful technologies that can increase transparency.
• She applauded the U.S. House Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure, Homeland Security, and the Judiciary for drafting the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act.
  • She also thanked the Committee for its continued engagement with stakeholders to make further improvements to the legislation.
• She urged the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate to work together to pass federal drone legislation and to properly resource federal agencies so that the agencies can swiftly implement the legislation.
  • She stated that this legislation should include a way for appropriately trained private sector and law enforcement entities to use advanced drone detection capabilities, a robust mitigation pilot program limited to flight restricted areas, and streamlined interagency approval processes with accountability mechanisms.
• She remarked that Congress can enable the benefits of drone technology while protecting citizens from rogue actors.

Mr. Chris McLaughlin (Dallas Fort Worth International Airport):

• He first expressed his condolences to the family and loved ones impacted by the recent aviation accidents.
  • He commented that these “heartbreaking events” underscore the critical importance of ensuring the safety of the NAS.
• He then discussed how his airport, the Dallas Fort Worth International Airport, is the world’s third busiest airport and noted how the airport handles over 80 million passengers annually.
• He mentioned how he had recently served on the FAA’s UAS Detection and Mitigation Systems Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC).
  • He indicated that he had co-chaired the ARC’s working group on operational requirements for UAS detection and mitigation systems
• He discussed how the ARC’s report had highlighted that airports face unique challenges with drone threats due to the dynamic nature of airport environments.
  • He commented that airports are unique amongst critical infrastructure in that airports must manage airspace in real time and ensure that drone operations do not disrupt commercial operations.
  • He also commented that airports must ensure that counter-UAS efforts do not unintentionally jeopardize commercial operations.
• He noted how Dallas Fort Worth International Airport manages high volumes of aircrafts and stated that an unauthorized drone in its airspace could introduce “catastrophic” safety risks to passengers and crew.
• He remarked however that Dallas Fort Worth International Airport does not oppose drones and stated that authorized drones can serve invaluable tools for airports through enhancing operational safety, efficiency, and innovations.
  • He commented that the “thoughtful” integration of authorized drones can support a safe and secure environment that offers numerous benefits while addressing risks.
• He called it “vital” for the U.S. to ensure safety while supporting UAS integration in the evolving airspace and stated that drone detection has served as a “critical first step” for enabling Dallas Fort Worth International Airport to address UAS presence.
  • He mentioned how the airport has partnered with the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) on drone detection since 2017 and has piloted a second system through an FAA-approved process.
  • He further expressed the airport’s intention to install a permanent drone detection solution with FAA approval.
• He remarked that the Dallas Fort Worth International Airport’s drone detection system has been effective.
  • He noted how this system has identified thousands of legitimate drone flights in the airport’s five-mile radius annually and has identified approximately 150 drone flights that were operating inappropriately.
• He stated that distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate drone flights can be difficult because airports lack independent access to FAA data on authorized drones.
  • He asserted that better data sharing between airports and the FAA would enhance airport safety.
• He remarked however that data sharing alone is not a sufficient strategy for addressing drone-related risks and stated that drone mitigation is important for airports in extreme situations.
  • He noted how drone mitigation authority is currently limited to certain federal agencies whose physical presence at airports is insufficient.
• He asserted that state and local law enforcement agencies with advanced capabilities are better physically positioned to respond to drone incidents near airports.
• He remarked that state and local law enforcement agencies could supplement federal drone response efforts with proper authority, safety-tested technology, advanced training, and strict federal oversight.
  • He commented that these measures could enhance drone response times and improve coordination.
• He stated that the aviation sector already has similar models for success and commented that these models have been effective for decades.
• He mentioned how Dallas Fort Worth International Airport’s police department has a close working relationship with federal partners and noted how these federal partners provide training, guidance, and oversight for the department’s canine and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams.
  • He called this oversight and training “invaluable” and stated that the ability of the department’s officers to respond to incidents relieves an otherwise heavy burden on federal resources.
• He remarked that the federal government remains best-positioned to lead drone detection and mitigation efforts.
  • He asserted however that willing airports can play a broader role in supporting the federal government through pilot programs that enable airports to acquire and use drone mitigation systems tailored to their unique circumstances.
• He expressed the Dallas Fort Worth International Airport’s commitment to work with Congress and its federal partners to develop counter-UAS strategies that meet the needs of all airports.
• He lastly stated that the acquisition and deployment of any UAS detection and mitigation system should remain optional for airports.
  • He elaborated that these systems should be tailored to account for the airport’s size, traffic, financial resources, and overall impact on the NAS.

Congressional Question Period:

Subcommittee Chairman Troy Nehls (R-TX):

• Chairman Nehls noted how Ms. Ellman’s testimony had criticized the FAA for ignoring Congressionally-mandated deadlines related to its Part 108 rulemaking and its Section 2209 rulemaking. She asked Ms. Ellman to explain why the FAA has ignored Congressionally-mandated deadlines for these rulemakings.
  • Ms. Ellman discussed how the FAA’s Part 108 rulemaking would enable BVLOS drone capabilities, increase transparency in the airspace, and incentivize electronic conspicuity. She noted how this rulemaking has been under development for several years. She also mentioned how the FAA’s Section 2209 rulemaking would require the FAA to establish a process so that private sector entities could prohibit or limit unauthorized drone operations over their properties. She expressed CDA’s support for both rulemaking efforts and asserted that these rulemakings should proceed. She stated that the reasons behind these rulemaking delays remain unclear and commented that interagency reviews have likely contributed to these delays. She expressed hope that the Trump administration would work to swiftly advance these two rulemakings.
• Chairman Nehls then asked Mr. McLaughlin to comment on the current multi-agency coordination process for counter-UAS activities in the event that an aircraft’s mitigation is required.
  • Mr. McLaughlin expressed gratitude for the Dallas Fort Worth International Airport’s current relationships with its federal and local partners. He stated that partnerships between agencies are necessary for ensuring safety and security at airports. He recommended that Congress provide persistent authority to agencies that already can mitigate drones under certain circumstances. He noted how these agencies currently require individual approval each time that they seek to mitigate drones. He indicated that this approval can take days to obtain and asserted that this approval is needed near instantaneously.
• Chairman Nehls asked Mr. McLaughlin to indicate whether the Subcommittee could address the current challenges that state and local agencies face when seeking to obtain drone mitigation approvals.
  • Mr. McLaughlin answered affirmatively.
• Chairman Nehls recounted how he had visited a Wisconsin airport that could detect drones within their airspace. He stated however that this airport could not remove drones from their restricted airspace in a timely and efficient manner and instead must rely upon federal agencies to remove said drones. He described this inability of airports to remove unauthorized drones as concerning and commented that the American public would likely share his concerns. He then displayed a prototype of a DedroneDefender, which he explained is a $50,000 device that can jam a drone’s signals to force the drone to return to its operators. He questioned why U.S. airports do not all possess counter-UAS technologies (such as the DedroneDefender). He also stated that the DedroneDefender would not interfere with airplane takeoffs and landings. He expressed frustration with the U.S.’s failure to deploy counter-UAS technologies that could address drones flying in restricted airspaces. He warned that the U.S.’s failure to deploy these technologies could lead a bad actor to execute a drone attack against an aircraft. He asserted that sufficient counter-UAS technologies already exist and stated that Congress and the FAA should do more to address rogue drones. He remarked that the number of drones would only proliferate in the coming years and that drones would pose greater threats to the U.S. public.

Subcommittee Ranking Member Steve Cohen (D-TN):

• Ranking Member Cohen noted how Dallas Fort Worth International Airport detects more than 5,000 drones in its airspace annually and that 150 of these detected drones are operating inappropriately. He asked Mr. McLaughlin to recommend additional tools and authorities for airports need to better respond to unauthorized drone activity.
  • Mr. McLaughlin first emphasized that Dallas Fort Worth International Airport had only detected 5,000 drones in its airspace. He stated that there could have been additional undetected drones within the airport’s airspace and commented that all technologies have limitations. He then remarked that airports require the ability to continue planning with their state and local partners through tabletop exercises and response protocols. He testified that current technologies allow for airports to detect and track “many” drones and to identify the pilots of these drones in some cases. He remarked that better drone DTI technologies would be helpful. He stated that these capabilities would enable airports to determine whether a given drone poses a threat or is simply being operated by a careless or clueless operator.
• Ranking Member Cohen asked the witnesses to confirm that drones now have “license plates” that can be used for identification purposes.
  • Mr. McLaughlin answered affirmatively.
  • Ms. Ellman mentioned how the FAA’s Remote ID rule had gone into effect in 2024. She stated that virtually all drones flying within the NAS are now required to be broadcasting a “digital drone license plate” that identifies them within the airspace.
• Ranking Member Cohen asked Mr. McLaughlin to clarify his requests to Congress given the recent implementation of the FAA’s Remote ID rule.
  • Mr. McLaughlin remarked that technologies do not all share the same capabilities. He stated that airports require “highly effective” technologies that enable them to reliably and quickly detect, track, and identify drones. He testified that most of the unauthorized drone breaches at Dallas Fort Worth International Airport were accidental in nature. He indicated that these drone operators will not engage in future drone breaches at the airport. He testified however that the airport has had a “couple” of unauthorized drone breaches that were criminal in nature. He remarked that the airport desires drone mitigation capabilities for criminal drone breaches. He highlighted how there exist both kinetic and non-kinetic forms of drone mitigation. He stated that non-kinetic drone mitigation is the safer approach within the airport environment. He asserted that his airport’s top priority will always be the safety of its aircrafts.
• Ranking Member Cohen then noted how Mr. McLaughlin’s testimony had argued that the acquisition and deployment of UAS detection and mitigation systems should remain optional for airports given variations in airport sizes. He acknowledged that the UAS technology needs of Dallas Fort Worth International Airport differ from those needs of smaller airports. He asked Mr. McLaughlin to indicate whether there should exist federal minimum standards for airport drone detection capabilities.
  • Mr. McLaughlin noted how the U.S. has over 450 commercial airports and how these commercial airports vary significantly in terms of size. He remarked that all airports have very different capabilities and asserted that U.S. policymakers must recognize this dynamic. He stated that the top priority of airports is to protect their airspaces. He asserted that the best way to accomplish this objective is to deconflict manned aircrafts that are entering or exiting their airspaces. He noted how there exist a variety of mechanisms that could be used for drone mitigation once the aircrafts have been safely removed. He suggested that a small airport could wait until a drone leaves its airspace. He stated however that larger airports cannot afford to wait until a drone leaves its airspace and must take quicker action to address drones.
• Ranking Member Cohen then remarked that there had been significant misinformation surrounding the recent drone sightings in New Jersey. He noted how Ms. Ellman had called for the establishment of a public information campaign to distinguish between legal drones and actual security threats. He asked Ms. Ellman to recommend elements that this campaign should include and to identify who should lead the campaign.
  • Ms. Ellman noted the intent of the FAA’s Remote ID rule for drones is to provide transparency for the airspace. She described the rule’s intent as “very laudatory” and expressed the commercial drone industry’s support for the rule’s intent. She remarked however compliance with this rule could be stronger. She also stated that people should use smartphone remote identification applications to see if they can identify drones in flight. She noted that there exists a significant amount of publicly available drone-related information that would enable people to determine whether drones are operating legally. She added that this information enables people to report drone issues to law enforcement agencies. She remarked that the public often does not know how to obtain information on drones. She suggested that the CDA and the federal government should therefore embark on a public information campaign to educate people on how to determine whether drones are operating legally.

Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY):

• Rep. Massie asked Dr. Cahill to provide a more detailed description of DTI technologies.
  • Ms. Ellman remarked that there exist a variety of DTI technologies. She noted how drones can be acoustically tracked and have their locations identified through the triangulation of sensors. She also noted how the emissions of a drone and its operator can be used to locate the drone. She indicated that other DTI technologies include cameras and radars. She stated that most DTI technologies do not violate Title 18 of the U.S. Code so long as the users of these technologies do not hack into the frequencies of a drone.
• Rep. Massie asked Ms. Ellman to indicate whether there exist other laws that impede DTI technologies.
  • Ms. Ellman mentioned how the DoJ, the FAA, DHS, and the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had issued interagency guidance in August 2020 that identifies every single law that could potentially impede the use of counter-drone detection and mitigation technologies. She expressed her willingness to share this guidance with Rep. Massie. She noted how laws that impede such technologies include laws meant to prevent landline telephone hacking, computer fraud, computer abuse, and aircraft sabotage. She indicated that these laws include various provisions of both Title 18 and Title 49 of the U.S. Code.
• Rep. Massie asked Mr. McLaughlin to discuss the DTI technologies that Dallas Fort Worth International Airport uses.
  • Mr. McLaughlin mentioned how Dallas Fort Worth International Airport has used one DTI technology in conjunction with the TSA for approximately six years. He also mentioned how the airport has piloted another DTI technology. He stated that these DTI technologies are passive systems that enable the airport to identify UASs within its airspace and the locations of the pilots of these UASs. He commented that this ability to identify the locations of UAS pilots enables the airport to follow up with the pilots to have conversations.
• Rep. Massie stated the job of air traffic controllers is already challenging and commented that U.S. policymakers do not want to further complicate this job. He asked Mr. McLaughlin to discuss how Dallas Fort Worth International Airport integrates its drone activities with the activities of air traffic controllers.
  • Mr. McLaughlin indicated that Dallas Fort Worth International Airport’s drone activities are housed in a different location than air traffic control activities. He testified however that the airport control center and the FAA’s air traffic control towers are always in communication. He mentioned how an FAA-approved counter-UAS policy governs the airport. He stated that a key element of this policy is active communication between parties when there are no threats. He testified that the airport has quarterly meetings with the FAA, its airlines, and airport stakeholders to ensure that communications channels are available. He then discussed how his airport works with other parties to determine whether identified UAS threats are credible, are imminent, and will impact the airport’s actual airspace (as opposed to only the airport’s property boundaries). He testified that the airport will directly coordinate with the FAA’s air traffic control towers when it determines that an actual threat exists. He also mentioned how the FAA’s air traffic control towers often identify drone sightings and indicated that the FAA will communicate these sightings to his airport.
• Rep. Massie noted how Mr. McLaughlin had indicated that most of the unauthorized drones identified by Dallas Fort Worth International Airport have not received civil or criminal penalties. He elaborated that these unauthorized drone breaches tend to be accidental in nature. He asked the witnesses to indicate the civil and criminal penalties associated with operating a drone within an airport’s airspace.
  • Dr. Cahill stated that there exist numerous rules pertaining to airspace violations and noted how drones can illegally collect information within an airport’s restricted airspace. She remarked that the illegal operation of a drone at an airport interferes with the airport’s operations and an aircraft’s ability to operate. She commented that there exist several statutes related to this issue.
  • Ms. Ellman remarked that the penalties associated with unauthorized drone breaches depend on which rules and laws are being violated. She stated that drone operators cannot operate their drones recklessly, endanger the public, and violate restricted airspace. She expressed her willingness to follow up with Rep. Massie on the specific criminal penalties associated with different types of unauthorized drone breaches.

Full Committee Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D-WA):

• Ranking Member Larsen noted how the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 prohibits the U.S. Department of Transportation from operating or procuring drones, associated elements, or counter-UAS technologies manufactured by a covered foreign entity. He commented that this prohibition is largely focused on China. He stated however that the law includes an exemption for testing and evaluating UAS detection and mitigation systems. He asked Dr. Cahill to discuss the importance of providing research facilities (such as ACUASI) with the ability to test drones that are otherwise banned.
  • Dr. Cahill remarked that the ability to test drones manufactured by a covered foreign entity is important because these drones account for a large portion of the drone market. She highlighted how DJI (which is a Chinese company) manufactures the most popular consumer drones. She stated that the inability to test the signatures of foreign-manufactured drone systems would make it impossible to enable counter-drone systems that could identify these drones. She stated that the exemption allowing test sites to purchase foreign-manufactured drones is thus important for supporting counter-drone response capabilities.
• Ranking Member Larsen then asked Dr. Cahill to opine on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) technology to enable the autonomous use of drones. He also asked Dr. Cahill to discuss how AI technology-enabled drones are tested against.
  • Dr. Cahill remarked that it is more challenging to identify the operator of a pre-programmed drone. She stated however that a drone operator could have a greater likelihood of detection if the operator is constantly communicating with their drone. She also stated that the operator of a drone with a Remote ID can be easily identified. She commented however that bad actors tend to turn off their drone’s Remote ID and take other measures to hide their identities and activities. She remarked that there remain challenges associated with determining whether unauthorized drones pose legitimate threats.
• Ranking Member Larsen then expressed support for the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act and commented that the legislation requires no changes. He asked Ms. Ellman to discuss the changes that the CDA would like to make to this legislation.
  • Ms. Ellman first thanked Ranking Member Larsen and the Committee for working with the CDA to develop the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act. She expressed the CDA’s gratitude that the legislation is continuing to be improved. She then remarked that additional improvements could be made to the legislation. She stated that detection technology should not be controversial and asserted that states, localities, and “appropriately trained” private sector entities should be provided broad access to this technology. She also advocated for expanding the number of areas that can participate in the legislation’s counter-UAS pilot program. She commented however that this pilot program should remain in flight-restricted areas. She lastly discussed how the legislation establishes interagency collaboration processes. She stated that these processes should include deadlines and accountability mechanisms to ensure that the processes proceed and are implemented as quickly as possible.
• Ranking Member Larsen commented that Ms. Ellman’s suggested improvements to the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act are helpful.

Rep. Scott Perry (R-PA):

• Rep. Perry first expressed his condolences for the families impacted by the two recent aviation accidents. He then mentioned how Dallas Fort Worth International Airport had developed its own drone detection system. He asked Mr. McLaughlin to discuss the FAA’s process for approving airport drone detection systems. He also asked McLaughlin to provide recommendations for how the Committee could assist other airports in developing such systems.
  • Mr. McLaughlin clarified that Dallas Fort Worth International Airport has not developed its own drone detection system. He testified that the airport is using a drone detection system via an existing TSA contract. He also mentioned the airport had run a drone detection pilot program that had received approval under the FAA’s 7460 approval process. He explained that this approval process ensures that airport installations are safe around aircrafts.
• Rep. Perry commented that Dallas Fort Worth International Airport had obtained a FAA pre-approved drone detection system. He asked Mr. McLaughlin to indicate whether any airport could purchase a FAA-approved drone detection system.
  • Mr. McLaughlin answered affirmatively. He also stated that Dallas Fort Worth International Airport had experienced a quick approval process from the FAA for its drone detection system. He remarked however that many airports do not realize how easy it is to obtain FAA-approved drone detection systems.
• Rep. Perry asked Mr. McLaughlin to indicate whether airports are not purchasing FAA-approved drone detection systems due to a lack of awareness, costs, or a combination of a lack of awareness and costs.
  • Mr. McLaughlin remarked that airports are not purchasing FAA-approved drone detection systems due to a combination of factors. He discussed how most airports operate at least 16 hours a day and indicated that larger airports (such as Dallas Fort Worth International Airport) operate 24 hours a day. He noted that drone detection systems require 24-hour monitoring and response capabilities. He stated that the cost of these drone detection systems is therefore an issue for airports. He remarked however that his airport views it as in its best interest to always keep its airfield running (which necessitates a drone detection system).
• Rep. Perry asked Mr. McLaughlin to indicate how many people are dedicated to operating the Dallas Fort Worth International Airport’s drone detection system.
  • Mr. McLaughlin noted that Dallas Fort Worth International Airport does not require any new employees to operate its drone detection system because the airport already has a standing team focused on monitoring. He stated however that a smaller airport might need to add staff to enable 24-hour monitoring of a drone detection system.
• Rep. Perry then criticized the FAA for failing to meet Congressionally-mandated deadlines in its rulemakings. He commented that the FAA’s failure to meet these deadlines hinders the U.S. drone industry’s global competitiveness. He asked Ms. Ellman to discuss how the FAA’s tardiness in meeting these rulemaking deadlines impacts the U.S. drone industry. He also noted how Ms. Ellman had stated that everyone should have access to Remote ID information for drones. He posited a scenario in which a person flies a drone within the parameters of their own private property. He asked Ms. Ellman to indicate whether other people should have the right to identify the owner of said drone if it is flying on private property.
  • Ms. Ellman first remarked that the FAA’s rulemaking delays have caused frustration for the drone community. She mentioned how the FAA’s Part 108 rulemaking would enable BVLOS drone capabilities for commercial, compliant, and authorized drone users. She stated that providing a more normalized and transparent set of rules for drones would promote compliance and enable the identification of outliers. She also mentioned how the FAA’s Section 2209 rulemaking has been outstanding since 2016. She noted that the FAA has not yet finalized this rulemaking (despite being mandated to do so). She stated that while the FAA had performed laudatory work in developing these rulemakings, she indicated that these rules had stalled in the interagency review process during the previous Biden administration. She called on the Trump administration to finalize these rulemakings. She applauded the first Trump administration’s drone policy agenda (specifically regarding drone innovation and drone security). She expressed hope that the second Trump administration would build upon this progress. She then acknowledged that there exist legitimate privacy concerns regarding the ability to identify drones. She expressed appreciation for how the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act had focused on flight-restricted areas. She commented that there does not exist a privacy right when drones fly into flight-restricted areas (such as near airports, crowded stadiums, and nuclear energy facilities).
• Note: Rep. Perry’s question period time expired here.

Rep. Sharice Davids (D-KS):

• Rep. Davids first acknowledged the recent aviation accidents and mentioned one of the planes involved in the accidents was coming from her state of Kansas. She expressed her condolences to those impacted by these accidents. She noted how the NTSB is investigating these accidents and expressed confidence that the Subcommittee would work to prevent similar accidents from occurring in the future. She then expressed interest in the increasing importance of communication and coordination within the NAS, especially considering the proliferation of commercial and personal drones. She expressed interest in learning more about how federal partners are working with stakeholders on communication and coordination efforts related to drones. She noted how Dallas Fort Worth International Airport has partnered with TSA on drone detection efforts since 2017. She asked Mr. McLaughlin to recommend how communication and coordination efforts between federal partners and industry stakeholders on drone issues could be improved. She also asked Mr. McLaughlin to identify any positive elements of current communication and coordination between federal partners and industry stakeholders.
  • Mr. McLaughlin remarked that local partnerships between industry stakeholders and government bodies are very important. He stated that these partnerships should involve tabletop and full-scale exercises. He also stated that these partnerships should include TSA, FAA, airlines, airports, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). He mentioned how the FAA mandates that airports perform triennial exercises that simulate real crashes and real responses. He noted that these exercises are not entirely drone-related. He testified that Dallas Fort Worth International Airport had held a triennial exercise in 2024 and indicated that 26 different local agencies had participated in this exercise. He remarked that the relationships built between these partners over time is a “critical factor” in keeping the NAS safe. He stated that drones are a relatively new issue for the commercial aviation sector. He asserted that using partnerships to address this issue constitutes the best approach for ensuring safety.
• Rep. Davids expressed interest in identifying barriers from the FAA or the TSA that could impede the ability of airports to address drones.
  • Mr. McLaughlin remarked that the single biggest barrier that an airport could face in responding to a drone attack is the lack of real-time drone mitigation authorities for certain law enforcement agencies. He noted that these law enforcement agencies currently lack standing and persistent drone mitigation authority. He recommended these law enforcement agencies be granted such authority.

Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN):

• Rep. Burchett asked Ms. Ellman to indicate whether drones can legally be shot down using firearms if they infringe upon one’s airspace.
  • Ms. Ellman answered no. She stated that there exist safety concerns associated with shooting firearms into the air and commented that such use of firearms could endanger other aircrafts. She also noted how drones are considered aircrafts under the law. She stated that shooting down a drone is therefore the same as shooting down an aircraft.
• Rep. Burchett asked Ms. Ellman to comment on how drones could be addressed if the drones are being used to spy on people.
  • Ms. Ellman remarked that technology-neutral privacy laws and rules would continue to apply to instances where drones are being used to spy on people.
• Rep. Burchett then asked Mr. McLaughlin to discuss the Dallas Fort Worth International Airport’s drone detection system. He also asked Mr. McLaughlin to indicate how the airport responds to inappropriately operating drones. He further asked Mr. McLaughlin to indicate whether foreign entities are operating drones around the airport.
  • Mr. McLaughlin testified that he is unaware of any foreign entities operating drones around the Dallas Fort Worth International Airport. He stated that the airport had observed a “limited number” of unauthorized drone uses in restricted space. He indicated that the airport first attempts to identify the location of the pilots behind unauthorized drones and will send law enforcement agencies to interview said pilots. He also mentioned how his airport will coordinate with other law enforcement agencies to interview these drone pilots if the drone pilots are located outside of the airport’s jurisdiction. He then discussed how Texas law deems knowingly operating a drone in unauthorized airspace as a Class B misdemeanor. He stated that his airport can therefore pursue local criminal charges when drones operate in unauthorized airspace. He commented that such events are rare.
• Rep. Burchett interjected to comment that such actions to address unauthorized drone use occur after the drone has already violated the airspace. He asked Mr. McLaughlin to confirm that Dallas Fort Worth International Airport does not take unauthorized drones out of the airspace. He also asked Mr. McLaughlin to indicate how his airport knows where such unauthorized drones come from.
  • Mr. McLaughlin noted that Dallas Fort Worth International Airport had only identified unauthorized drones within its airspace in 150 instances. He stated that the airport has found “casual” conversations with the pilots of unauthorized drones can educate the pilots about their breaches and enable these pilots to safely enjoy their drones without impacting the NAS.
• Rep. Burchett then noted how President Trump had indicated that the FAA had authorized drones for research and various other reasons. He asserted that the FAA under the Biden administration had acted in “complete secrecy.” He asked the witnesses to indicate whether the Biden administration’s approach to drone policy had benefited other parts of the federal government.
  • Mr. McLaughlin commented that he could not answer Rep. Burchett’s question.
• Rep. Burchett asked the witnesses to indicate whether Congress could ensure that the FAA would be transparent with other government bodies moving forward regarding drone-related risks.
  • Mr. McLaughlin remarked that transparency constitutes the best approach for developing a common understanding of what is occurring within the drone space.
• Rep. Burchett then asked Dr. Cahill to indicate whether she has any concerns regarding counter-UASs. He also asked Dr. Cahill to comment on the safety of counter-UAS technologies.
  • Dr. Cahill stated that she does have concerns regarding certain counter-UAS technologies. She asserted that counter-UAS technologies must be tested before the technologies are implemented. She mentioned how some studies have found that counter-UAS technologies could produce frequencies that cause interferences. She remarked that a rigorous testing process for counter-UAS technologies would enable the FAA to determine which systems are safe to operate and can be deployed. She mentioned that the FAA is currently working to develop and standardize such a testing process for counter-UAS technologies.
• Rep. Burchett then mentioned how a small drone had recently collided with a crewed aircraft performing a firefighting mission in California. He asked the witnesses to indicate whether the use of counter-UAS technology could have prevented this collision. He also asked the witnesses to indicate the technology that a manned aircraft have onboard if the aircraft were to detect a drone operation within their vicinity.
  • Dr. Cahill noted that the recent collision between a Super Scooper and a drone in California had involved a DJI Mini drone. She indicated that this DJI Mini drone weighed less than 250 grams and therefore was not required to be registered. She mentioned how this DJI Mini drone had operated inside a TFR, which meant that the drone had been operating illegally. She stated that a counter-drone in this instance could have been appropriate and commented that unauthorized drone users should not be operating within TFRs. She remarked that the Super Scooper in this instance would have had no way of knowing that there had been a drone within its vicinity.
• Rep. Burchett raised concerns over the potential for an unauthorized drone to cause an aviation accident. He expressed support for bolstering the U.S.’s ability to bring down unauthorized drones.

Rep. Hank Johnson (D-GA):

• Rep. Johnson first provided condolences for those impacted by the recent aviation accidents and expressed gratitude for the first responders that had responded to these accidents. He then discussed how the advent of readily available complex task drones presents new challenges. He stated that the U.S. must strengthen its ability to counteract the misuse of such drones. He raised concerns over the potential for drones to be weaponized, used for surveillance, and deployed against critical infrastructure. He asserted that drones must be used responsibly and ethically. He then mentioned how President Trump had recently issued his Fork in the Road memorandum to 2 million federal employees (including FAA employees). He stated that this memorandum had called on these employees to retire and had indicated that certain federal jobs would be reclassified or terminated. He asked Ms. Ellman to discuss the challenges that the Fork in the Road memorandum poses to the FAA as it seeks to retain current employees with experience integrating drones into the NAS. He also asked Ms. Ellman to discuss how this memorandum impacts the FAA’s ability to attract new talent.
  • Ms. Ellman remarked that collaboration between the FAA and the drone industry is key. She stated that this collaboration is often not occurring in public.
• Rep. Johnson interjected to ask Ms. Ellman to discuss the Fork in the Road memorandum’s impact on the FAA’s ability to do its work.
  • Ms. Ellman called it critical for the FAA to possess necessary staff resources.
• Rep. Johnson interjected to ask Ms. Ellman to indicate whether recent pressures on FAA staff to leave their positions (in the form of both financial incentives and threats) are undermining the FAA’s ability to fulfill its mission.
  • Ms. Ellman testified that the FAA staff that she has worked with are very professional and possess specialized expertise.
• Rep. Johnson interjected to ask Ms. Ellman to confirm that FAA staff are currently being “terrorized.”
  • Ms. Ellman commented that she could not speak to the current state of mind of FAA staff.
• Rep. Johnson interjected to ask Ms. Ellman to indicate whether she would face challenges working in an uncertain work environment. He also asked Ms. Ellman to indicate whether the Fork in the Road memorandum is adversely impacting FAA employees.
  • Ms. Ellman commented that she could not speak on the Fork in the Road memorandum.
• Rep. Johnson interjected to ask Ms. Ellman to indicate how she would respond to the current situation at the FAA if she were an employee at the Agency.
  • Ms. Ellman commented that the current situation at the FAA is likely fostering uncertainty for the Agency’s employees.
• Rep. Johnson interjected to ask Dr. Cahill to opine on the Fork in the Road memorandum’s impact on FAA employees.
  • Dr. Cahill described the people that she works with at the FAA as professionals. She raised concerns that the Fork in the Road memorandum might indiscriminately eliminate FAA employees with long careers and expertise. She added that this memorandum might disproportionately impact FAA employees with specialized expertise. She further raised concerns that the Fork of Road memorandum might impact ACUASI’s future work if the FAA were to lose certain employees.

Rep. Burgess Owens (R-UT):

• Rep. Owens remarked that the Committee’s drone policies impact sectors beyond aviation. He indicated that these sectors include transportation, agriculture, wildfire response, construction, rail, law enforcement, insurance, recreation, and retail. He warned that China is outcompeting the U.S. in the drone space, which threatens the U.S.’s economic leadership and national security. He asserted that the Committee must be a leader in developing the U.S.’s drone policies. He mentioned how Congress had previously failed to pass the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act during the previous 118th Congress. He stated that this legislation remains a top priority for the current 119th Congress. He expressed confidence in the Committee’s ability to develop bipartisan drone legislation. He then noted how Dr. Cahill’s testimony had highlighted the potential for UAS technology to enhance the quality of life in rural and isolated communities. He noted however that Dr. Cahill’s testimony had also highlighted the challenges posed by the limited personnel and resources within these communities to counteract nefarious UAS activities. He asked Dr. Cahill to address how the Committee could balance the need to foster UAS innovation and the need to ensure national security.
  • Dr. Cahill called the potential value of counter-UAS technologies “tremendous” and commented that these technologies could especially benefit rural communities. She also mentioned how larger counter-UAS technologies are currently being developed. She stated however that these larger counter-UAS technologies pose greater risks. She remarked that the U.S. must have robust understandings of these technologies and know how to mitigate these technologies. She stated that U.S. policymakers must balance the potential benefits of drone technologies (e.g., the ability to deliver time sensitive medications) with the potential risks (e.g., the ability to harm other aircrafts and deliver weapons). She asserted that counter-UAS technologies could help ensure that drones are being operated safely. She commended the Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act and expressed support for improving counter-UAS authorities.
• Rep. Owens then asked Ms. Ellman to identify actions that the Committee could take to best craft drone legislation does not quickly become obsolete.
  • Ms. Ellman remarked that technology generally advances at a faster pace than public policy. She stated that there currently exist antiquated laws and rules that apply to drone technology. She commented that these antiquated policies limit the U.S.’s ability to respond to criminal drones. She contended that U.S. drone policy should be technology-neutral, performance-based, and risk-based. She stated that drone technologies would vary in terms of their suitability for a given environment. She asserted that the U.S. should not be prescriptive in terms of dictating which types of drone technologies should be used. She stated that drone technology users should be empowered to determine which technologies are most appropriate for accomplishing their objectives so long as the technologies do not impact the NAS or safety.
• Rep. Owens expressed interest in the innovation occurring within the drone technology space.

Rep. André Carson (D-IN):

• Rep. Carson mentioned how his Congressional District includes Indianapolis, which hosts the world’s largest single day sporting event (the Indianapolis 500). He stated that unauthorized drone operations have been a persistent problem that can interfere with sporting events at stadiums. He mentioned how the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 had included policies to address some of these concerns and asserted that more work must be done regarding the issue. He asked the witnesses to discuss existing concerns regarding problematic drone operations near major events. He also asked the witnesses to indicate whether additional changes are needed for TFRs for major events to strengthen safety and reduce possible disruptions.
  • Ms. Ellman discussed how major sporting events across the U.S. have increasingly experienced careless, clueless, and criminal drone operations in recent years. She noted how these major sporting events have received protections in the form of Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) and TFR issuances. She stated that commercial drone operators know not to fly over major sporting events. She also mentioned how the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 had included a large public gatherings provision to protect concerts from unauthorized drones. She expressed support for legislative efforts to protect stadiums from unauthorized drones. She contended that more stadiums should be eligible for protections from unauthorized drones. She stated that there does not exist a privacy interest regarding TFRs and that drone restrictions for large events help protect the safety of Americans.

Rep. Tony Wied (R-WI):

• Rep. Wied discussed how aviation is especially critical for his Congressional District and noted how his Congressional District contains two international airports. He also mentioned how his Congressional District contains the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA), which hosts the annual EAA AirVenture Oshkosh. He remarked that U.S. aviation systems must be reexamined and improved and asserted that safety must remain the U.S.’s top aviation priority. He expressed his condolences for the victims of the recent aviation accidents. He then discussed how UAS technologies present a wide range of uses across many different applications. He asserted that the Subcommittee must ensure that the use of UAS technologies do not compromise safety or security. He asked the witnesses to indicate whether there exist certain areas where drones cannot fly due to the erection of barriers that prevent flight.
  • Ms. Ellman discussed how geofencing technology creates virtual boundaries for drones. She noted how drone manufacturers have reduced their installations of geofencing technologies in their drones. She remarked that this situation underscores the need for federal legislation because geofencing technology prevents “careless and clueless” drone users from infringing upon airports. She stated that drone geofencing technology is not broadly used (outside of commercial drone operators).
• Rep. Wied asked the witnesses to indicate whether technology exists that would prevent a drone from coming near a given area.
  • Dr. Cahill noted that there exist technologies that can take down an aircraft that infringes upon a given area. She stated however that these technologies require human intervention to take down aircrafts. She also indicated that these technologies are currently illegal in most areas of the U.S.
• Rep. Wied asked the witness to indicate whether the U.S. could ever develop technology that would prevent a drone from coming near a given area.
  • Dr. Cahill remarked that the drone jamming technology that Rep. Wied had posited is possible. She stated however that drone jamming would interfere with other frequencies and could create unexpected frequency emissions with adverse impacts. She mentioned how the U.S. military performs jamming exercises in Alaska and must alert all airmen within the state when these exercises occur. She commented that these alerts enable the airmen to avoid the areas being jammed.
• Rep. Wied acknowledged that drone jamming technologies meant to protect certain areas (such as airports) from drones could have unintended consequences. He then asked Mr. McLaughlin to indicate whether airports (including smaller airports) are generally safe from problematic drones.
  • Mr. McLaughlin answered affirmatively. He remarked that the U.S. airspace is the safest system in the world. He acknowledged that while small UASs can hinder airport operations, he stated that there exist mechanisms to keep airports of all sizes safe. He commented that these mechanisms might vary across airports depending on the airport’s size.

Rep. Valerie Foushee (D-NC):

• Rep. Foushee noted how Dallas Fort Worth International Airport is one of a limited number of airports with a drone detection system. She asked Mr. McLaughlin to share the lessons that the airport had learned from this system. She also asked Mr. McLaughlin to recommend how these UAS detection and mitigation lessons could be applied to other airports.
  • Mr. McLaughlin mentioned how the Dallas Fort Worth International Airport has possessed a drone detection system for almost eight years. He remarked that all drone detection systems have strengths and weaknesses. He acknowledged that while the airport’s drone detection system is not foolproof, he stated that the drone detection system enables the airport to narrow its focus. He elaborated that this capability enables his airport to provide additional scrutiny to suspicious drones that might be nefarious. He also discussed the need for constant real-time coordination between airports and their federal, state, and local law enforcement partners. He commented that this coordination enables airports and law enforcement partners to mitigate drone situations as they arise.
• Rep. Foushee also asked Mr. McLaughlin to recommend how the FAA or the TSA could improve the deployment of counter-UAS mitigation efforts at airports.
  • Mr. McLaughlin remarked that the federal government should have a persistent authority to mitigate drones at airports. He stated that this persistent authority would empower the federal government to respond immediately when unauthorized drones are detected at airports.
• Rep. Foushee then expressed interest in ensuring that AI technology is deployed in a safe and secure manner. She asked Ms. Ellman to discuss the extent to which AI technology is being used in drone and other UAS technologies.
  • Ms. Ellman discussed how automation technology has existed within the aviation space for many years and commented that this technology has made air travel safer. She also noted how drones are becoming increasingly automated. She stated that the FAA’s Part 108 rulemaking would establish a framework for the safe use of automated technologies. She called it urgent that the FAA advance this rulemaking.
• Rep. Foushee asked Ms. Ellman to indicate whether there exist other safeguards in place to prevent the remote access of drones from unauthorized operators.
  • Ms. Ellman remarked that cybersecurity protections for drones are key and that the drone industry can leverage existing cybersecurity work. She expressed support for having stakeholders work with the federal government on developing cybersecurity protections for drones.

Rep. Tom Barrett (R-MI):

• Rep. Barrett expressed concerns regarding the potential for drones to be used in a nefarious manner. He commented that these nefarious uses could be the result of negligence, intentional disregard for laws, or purposeful actions. He also mentioned how there had occurred a significant increase in drone use over the previous decade. He recounted how there had occurred a drone attack on a Saudi Arabian oil refinery in 2019. He highlighted how this attack had shut down one of the world’s largest oil refineries for a significant period of time. He noted that while there exist counter-drone technologies that can disable drones, he questioned whether these technologies would be effective in responding to large numbers of drones at once. He asked the witnesses to discuss how the U.S. could respond to large numbers of drones that pose national security threats.
  • Dr. Cahill remarked that swarming is of “great concern” to the counter-UAS space. She indicated that researchers are looking into technologies that can respond to multiple aircrafts at the same time. She stated that some counter-UAS technologies can address multiple drones at the same time. 
• Rep. Barrett interjected to ask Dr. Cahill to clarify whether counter-UAS technologies meant to respond to multiple drones simultaneously would not be precluded from responding to autonomous drones.
  • Dr. Cahill stated that counter-UAS technologies could respond to autonomous drones. She indicated that there exist counter-drone manufacturers that are working on technologies meant to respond to autonomous drones.
  • Ms. Ellman stated that the FAA’s Section 2209 rulemaking is meant to protect against autonomous drone threats aimed at oil and gas facilities and other critical national infrastructure.
• Rep. Barrett commented that bad actors tend not to follow federal rules.
  • Ms. Ellman expressed agreement with Rep. Barrett’s comment. She stated that the FAA’s Section 2209 rulemaking would provide another enforcement mechanism for unauthorized drones after said drones engage in illegal behavior.
• Rep. Barrett then questioned Ms. Ellman’s recommendation regarding technology-neutral vantage point rules and mechanisms for drones. He asked Ms. Ellman to indicate whether the same privacy rules should apply to both aircrafts that fly 1,000 feet above a property and drones that fly 100 feet above a property. He commented that viewing the ground from an aircraft flying at 1,000 feet is fundamentally different from viewing the ground from a drone in a purposeful way. He mentioned how the Michigan legislature had passed a bill that would extend legal liability to drone operators for the actions of their drones. He asked Ms. Ellman to indicate whether similar federal legislation would address drone-related privacy concerns.
  • Ms. Ellman expressed the CDA’s willingness to work with Rep. Barrett on addressing issues stemming from technology-neutral privacy rules for drones.

Del. Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC):

• Del. Holmes Norton first provided her condolences to the people impacted by the recent aviation accidents. She stated that these accidents demonstrate the need to make safety paramount in managing the NAS. She noted how the National Capital Region (which includes her Congressional District) has the U.S.’s most restricted airspace. She also mentioned how the airspace near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport is among the U.S.’s most congested airspace. She noted that the FAA prohibits flying drones within a 15-mile radius of Washington, DC. She asked Mr. McLaughlin to recommend considerations for the federal government as it deploys counter-drone measures to protect the National Capital Region from aircraft interference.
  • Mr. McLaughlin remarked that safety must be paramount in managing the NAS and called it critical for traditional aircrafts to have safe passages to their destinations. He stated that rigorous safety testing is key for ensuring these objectives. He asserted that counter-drone systems cannot be deployed close to airports if there exist any safety questions surrounding said systems.
• Del. Holmes-Norton then mentioned how she serves as co-chair of the Congressional Quiet Skies Caucus and stated that Washington, DC is “plagued” by airplane and helicopter noise. She expressed interest in the potential for drones to reduce aviation noise. She elaborated that drones could reduce the need for helicopters in certain circumstances. She asked Ms. Ellman to discuss how the increased use of drones could reduce aviation noise.
  • Ms. Ellman discussed how drones are generally much quieter than larger manned aircrafts and noted how drones tend to be electric- and battery-powered. She stated that the integration of drones into the NAS would have many environmental benefits (including reductions in noise).
• Del. Holmes-Norton then asked Dr. Cahill to recommend actions that Congress could take to ensure that the public receives more information on drone and counter-drone activities.
  • Dr. Cahill remarked that Congress must set expectations for federal agency communications to stakeholders. She mentioned how the U.S. had not promptly provided communications regarding the recent New Jersey drone sightings. She commented that many people had developed conspiracy theories regarding the New Jersey drone sightings before these sightings had been explained. She remarked that the U.S. government should provide more timely updates when future drone sightings occur as to what is known and what is unknown. She stated that establishing expectations for federal agency communications would help to foster trust with the public. She also remarked that the U.S. government should explain the importance of drone testing and the reason for drones flying in the NAS. She further stated that the U.S. government should explain the importance of drone testing over sensitive areas and why such testing does not always need to be publicized.

Rep. Bob Onder (R-MO):

• Rep. Onder mentioned how he is a pilot and noted how pilots are instructed to not enter Class Bravo airspace without permission. He asked Mr. McLaughlin to indicate whether 150 drones had entered Dallas Fort Worth International Airport’s Calls Bravo airspace without permission.
  • Mr. McLaughlin stated that 150 drones had likely entered Dallas Fort Worth International Airport’s Calls Bravo airspace without permission.
• Rep. Onder noted that an airplane pilot that entered Class Bravo airspace without permission would be alerted and required to report the breach. He asked Mr. McLaughlin to indicate whether Dallas Fort Worth International Airport can generally locate the operator of a drone that has breached the airport’s airspace. He also asked Mr. McLaughlin to indicate whether these drone operators face consequences for such breaches. He further asked Mr. McLaughlin to identify said consequences.
  • Mr. McLaughlin testified that Dallas Fort Worth International Airport can generally locate the operator behind a drone that has breached the airport’s airspace. He clarified that while the airport cannot always locate said pilot, he indicated that the airport could locate said pilot more than 50 percent of the time.
• Rep. Onder interjected to comment that a drone’s license plate and/or signature enables airports to locate the operators of drones.
  • Mr. McLaughlin also commented that many of the operators behind airport drone breaches are young people that are simply unaware of the rules governing drones.
• Rep. Onder then posited a scenario in which a drone illegally breaches a private property to engage in spying. He noted how it would be illegal for someone on this private property to shoot down the drone. He asked the witnesses to indicate what a person can do when a drone violates their privacy. He also asked the witnesses to indicate what laws the drone operator is violating in this scenario.
  • Ms. Ellman noted how the FAA’s Remote ID rule requires that all drones to broadcast a license plate when flying in the NAS. She stated that the person whose privacy is being violated in Rep. Onder’s scenario should use a smartphone application to identify the operator of the drone. She also stated that this person could call their local law enforcement agency to report the privacy infringing drone.
• Rep. Onder commented that a drone that illegally breaches a private property to engage in spying would be violating laws related to trespassing and voyeurism. He then noted how Dr. Cahill had indicated that counter-drone systems might violate Titles 18 and 49 of the U.S. Code. He stated that these laws were likely passed during a time when all aircrafts were manned. He commented that disrupting manned aircraft communications and navigation systems could endanger people. He noted however that drones are inanimate objects. He asked Dr. Cahill to indicate whether Congress should change current laws or the FAA should change current regulations to account for unmanned aircrafts.
  • Dr. Cahill remarked that there should occur some evaluation of current drone laws and regulations. She noted that the takedown of an unmanned aircraft carries a punishment of 20 years’ imprisonment and $200,000 in fines.
• Rep. Onder asked Dr. Cahill to confirm that federal law does not distinguish between the takedown of a manned aircraft and the takedown of an unmanned aircraft.
  • Dr. Cahill confirmed that federal law does not distinguish between the takedown of a manned aircraft and the takedown of an unmanned aircraft.
• Rep. Onder stated that a punishment of 20 years’ imprisonment for taking down a manned aircraft seems appropriate. He asserted however that the same punishment would be inappropriate for a person that takes down an unmanned aircraft that is engaged in voyeurism. He commented that federal law should distinguish between the takedown of manned aircrafts and the takedown of unmanned aircrafts.
  • Dr. Cahill expressed support for having federal law distinguish between the takedown of manned aircrafts and the takedown of unmanned aircrafts. She asserted however that laws regarding unmanned aircraft takedowns should be “reasonable.” She elaborated that these laws should consider the impact of taking down aircrafts. She noted how the takedown of aircrafts could result in collateral damage.
• Rep. Onder expressed agreement with Dr. Cahill’s assertions that the laws governing unmanned aircraft takedowns should be reasonable.

Rep. Laura Gillen (D-NY):

• Rep. Gillen remarked that the unauthorized use of drones is a major issue in her Congressional District. She noted how her Congressional District is located near John F. Kennedy International Airport, which is one of the world’s busiest airspaces. She lamented that the risk of a UAS incursion into the airport is “all too real.” She asked Mr. McLaughlin to indicate whether the U.S. is taking all possible actions to secure its airports and to avert potential disasters.
  • Mr. McLaughlin recommended that airports like John F. Kennedy International Airport use drone DTI technologies. He stated that these technologies enable airports to more quickly and more appropriately respond to aviation threats.
• Rep. Gillen noted how some state and local law enforcement agencies have advanced capabilities that enable them to respond to drone incidents near airports. She asked Mr. McLaughlin to recommend additional authorities or resources that Congress could provide to these law enforcement agencies to identify and takedown unauthorized drones.
  • Mr. McLaughlin expressed support for empowering local law enforcement agencies to respond to unauthorized drones. He stated that local law enforcement agencies operating counter-drone programs should have a high degree of training, be subject to federal oversight, and have the ability to invest in safety-tested technologies. He remarked that these local law enforcement agencies could serve as “force multipliers” for the federal government. He commented that the federal government lacks sufficient resources to provide omnipresent drone monitoring. He asserted that local law enforcement agencies could therefore support the federal government in combating unauthorized drones.
• Rep. Gillen then mentioned how the DoD had established a Joint Counter-small UAS Office and had issued a strategy for countering unmanned systems. She stated that counter-UAS technology can be used to respond to killer drones (which are being used by Russia, Iran, and Hamas). She asked Dr. Cahill to discuss how the U.S. can make use of counter-UAS technology to protect its military bases, critical infrastructure, and homeland.
  • Dr. Cahill called it important for the U.S. military to possess counter-UAS capabilities. She noted how the U.S. government is currently learning from Ukraine’s experience using UAS and counter-UAS technologies. She stated that counter-drone researchers are experiencing challenges obtaining permission to test these technologies within the U.S. She noted that these researchers are thus performing much of this counter-drone technology testing in Ukraine. She remarked that the counter-UAS technology being developed in Ukraine needs to be applied to U.S. military bases. She mentioned how Eielson Air Force Base and Fort Greely in Alaska have both experienced drone incursions. She asserted that the counter-drone technologies at U.S. military bases need to be improved and strengthened.

Rep. Jefferson Shreve (R-IN):

• Rep. Shreve mentioned how his Congressional District includes the Indianapolis International Airport, which has the U.S.’s second largest FedEx air hub. He commented that counter-UAS issues are therefore important to his Congressional District. He then recounted how he had served in the Indianapolis city government and noted how the Indianapolis Airport Authority is a municipal corporation that owns and operates six airports. He mentioned how the Indianapolis Airport Authority possesses a nascent system for counter-UAS operations. He asked Mr. McLaughlin to identify which airport authorities possess the most evolved UAS technology systems that other airport authorities could seek to replicate.
  • Mr. McLaughlin first commended the Indianapolis International Airport’s operations. He then remarked that Dallas Fort Worth International Airport has performed high quality counter-drone work in recent years. He mentioned how the airport works with various associations, including the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) and the Airports Council International (ACI), on counter-drone efforts. He further mentioned how the Core 30 airports communicate on a regular basis to discuss issues, trends, and opportunities. He remarked that the airport community works closely together to address shared challenges and commented that the Indianapolis International Airport is an important part of this community.
• Rep. Shreve then discussed how the U.S. possesses the largest and most complicated air traffic control system in the world. He asked Mr. McLaughlin to indicate whether there exist foreign countries that have better developed counter-UAS technology systems that the U.S. could seek to replicate. He commented however that the U.S.’s larger geography requires it to develop larger systems for counter-UAS operations.
  • Mr. McLaughlin remarked that there exist foreign airports that have made more progress in developing systems for counter-UAS operations. He attributed this further progress to the fact that some countries had provided their airports with counter-UAS authorities earlier. He stated that U.S. airports engage in information sharing with foreign airports and highlighted how some of these foreign airports maintain advanced counter-UAS processes.
• Rep. Shreve asked Mr. McLaughlin to identify specific foreign airports with more advanced systems for counter-UAS operations.
  • Mr. McLaughlin identified Heathrow Airport in London as an airport possessing a strong system for counter-UAS operations.
• Rep. Shreve asked Mr. McLaughlin to indicate whether the structure that manages Heathrow Airport functions similar to Indianapolis Airport Authority. He noted that the Indianapolis Airport Authority involves a single entity that manages the airspace for various regional airports.
  • Mr. McLaughlin noted that Heathrow Airport and London Gatwick Airport are separate entities. He also stated that Heathrow Airport had likely sought to learn lessons from the London Gatwick Airport drone incident in 2018.

Rep. John Garamendi (D-CA):

• Rep. Garamendi recommended that the U.S. learn lessons from how drone and counter-drone technologies are being used within the Russia-Ukraine War.

Rep. Hillary Scholten (D-MI):

• Rep. Scholten first provided her condolences to those impacted by the recent aviation accidents. She expressed confidence in the NTSB’s ability to investigate these accidents and to support Congress’s efforts to promote aviation safety. She then discussed how there have been reported UAS sightings at the two airports within her Congressional District. She indicated that while she supports the authorized use of drones to bolster aviation safety, she stated that she has heard increasing concerns regarding the risks that drones might pose to airport infrastructure. She noted that the FAA does not permit airports to access the Agency’s data regarding whether or not a drone is authorized to fly near an airport. She asked Mr. McLaughlin to discuss the importance of information sharing between the FAA and airports. She also asked Mr. McLaughlin to address how the lack of accessible FAA data might impede an airport’s drone detection efforts.
  • Mr. McLaughlin clarified that there does not exist an automated system for airports to access FAA data regarding whether or not a drone is authorized to fly near an airport. He called it very important for airports and their FAA tower partners to be in regular and consistent communication. He testified that Dallas Fort Worth International Airport engages in strong information sharing with its FAA tower partners. He stated however that this information sharing process is cumbersome and manual.
• Rep. Scholten then stated that Dallas Fort Worth International Airport and Gerald R. Ford International Airport have benefited from partnering with the TSA to detect drones. She asked Mr. McLaughlin to discuss how pilot counter-drone programs have provided his airport with additional tools to understand the UAS process. She also asked Mr. McLaughlin to discuss how Congress could support the continuation of collaborative efforts between the TSA and airports.
  • Mr. McLaughlin remarked that Dallas Fort Worth International Airport’s work with TSA enables the airport to narrow its focus when assessing potential drone threats. He stated however that the TSA’s drone detection system has limitations, which means that his airport cannot exclusively rely upon the system when assessing potential drone threats. He remarked that his airport can use the TSA’s drone detection system’s information to better allocate its limited resources. He stated that the U.S. needs to develop more ubiquitous drone technology to enable more targeted threat assessments.
• Rep. Scholten then expressed disappointment regarding recent accusations that gender and race had played a role in the recent aviation accidents. She mentioned how the Committee has long championed the continued growth and training of aviation professionals. She highlighted how the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 had included provisions related to aviation professional training. She asked Ms. Ellman to discuss the importance of federal aviation training programs for ensuring that all counter-UAS operators can appropriately make use of detection and mitigation technologies.
  • Ms. Ellman remarked that counter-UAS training is critical. She stated that enabling the use of drone detection technologies would support the training of law enforcement agencies and private sector entities. She commented that only law enforcement agencies should have access to drone mitigation technologies. She then remarked that the counter-UAS training curriculum should foster an understanding of the airspace, detection technologies, and mitigation technologies. She stated that there now exists robust counter-UAS experience because of existing federal authorities and test programs. She stated that the U.S. government could immediately start designing a counter-UAS training curriculum. She commented that this training curriculum would allow for counter-drone technologies to be more quickly deployed upon the passage of new federal drone legislation.

Rep. Jeff Van Drew (R-NJ):

• Rep. Van Drew recounted how there had recently occurred numerous drone sightings above his state of New Jersey. He noted that the Biden administration had initially expressed uncertainty regarding the nature of these drones and had provided assurances that these drones did not pose concerns. He also noted that while the DoD had made these same assurances, he highlighted how the U.S. military had employed specialized radars to track these drones. He mentioned how the FAA had subsequently restricted airspace to address drone sightings over critical infrastructure and military operations. He further noted how the FBI had investigated these drone sightings. He stated that the FAA has now claimed that these drone sightings were the result of the FAA’s drone testing activities. He questioned why the FAA had decided to restrict airspace if these drone sightings had involved FAA drone testing activities. He also questioned why the FAA had not communicated its drone testing activities with the FBI or the DoD. He expressed interest in obtaining additional information regarding these drone sightings. He then asserted the Biden administration had caused the U.S. to become less globally competitive in terms of innovation. He remarked that the Committee must work to improve the U.S.’s national drone infrastructure and protection system. He mentioned how the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center is located within his Congressional District. He asked Ms. Ellman to indicate whether the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center and the FAA Modernization Office should be used to advance drone infrastructure.
  • Ms. Ellman answered affirmatively. She mentioned how the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center is engaged in counter-drone technology testing under the FAA Airport Safety and Airspace Hazard Mitigation and Enforcement program and called this testing important.
• Rep. Van Drew expressed agreement with Ms. Ellman’s response. He then asked Ms. Ellman to explain her support for counter-drone systems.
  • Ms. Ellman remarked that the commercial drone community believes that drone innovation and drone security function in tandem. She stated that the CDA wants to enable the beneficial use cases of commercial drones while recognizing the potential for drone technology to be misused.
• Rep. Van Drew then mentioned how Congress had directed the FAA to issue a rulemaking to establish no-fly zones around critical infrastructure and sensitive sites. He stated that the Biden administration had failed to advance this rulemaking. He asked Ms. Ellman to discuss how a federal framework for no-fly zones over private sector sites intersect with expanded authorities for counter-UAS activities.
  • Ms. Ellman lamented that the FAA has not issued Section 2209 rulemaking, even though Congress had mandated this rulemaking in 2016. She expressed hope that the FAA could issue this rulemaking soon. She stated that the FAA’s Section 2209 and Part 108 rulemakings would support the development of the U.S. drone industry and expressed support for the advancement of these rulemakings. She noted how the FAA’s Section 2209 rulemaking would enable the limitation of drones over certain critical infrastructure facilities (such as oil and gas facilities and utilities). She stated that this rulemaking would enable the use of counter-drone technologies as a protective measure for sensitive areas.
• Rep. Van Drew remarked that the Committee must take additional actions to address drones.

Rep. Salud Carbajal (D-CA):

• Rep. Carbajal first provided his condolences for those impacted by recent aviation accidents. He also expressed disappointment with President Trump for blaming these aviation accidents on DEI policies. He then asked Dr. Cahill to discuss how Congress could balance the need to protect critical infrastructure and communities from nefarious drone threats with the need to ensure the safety of the NAS.
  • Dr. Cahill remarked that communications will be critical for ensuring proper responses to drone threats. She noted how the U.S. government possesses the authority to obtain necessary information for performing risk-benefit evaluations. She raised concerns that a poorly trained drone mitigation system operator might takedown a drone in a manner that creates collateral damage or other unintended consequences. She stated that having the best possible information available for making drone mitigation decisions and coordinating drone mitigation decisions with appropriate government agencies will be key. She commented that these decisions will involve multiple stakeholders that will entail privacy, security, and airspace considerations. She expressed concerns that a lack of training would cause drone mitigation system operators to make decisions that fail to properly account for drone mitigation risks.
• Rep. Carbajal then mentioned how the CDA has called on Congress to leverage other accountability mechanisms to streamline interagency approval processes for expanded counter-UAS detection and mitigation technology use. He asked Ms. Ellman to elaborate on this recommendation.
  • Ms. Ellman expressed the CDA’s appreciation for how proposed legislation would establish an approval process for the use of counter-drone technologies. She also expressed the CDA’s desire to prevent unnecessary barriers to the use of counter-drone technologies that do not involve safety and security. She further remarked that counter-drone programs should move forward expeditiously. She stated that legislative timelines would provide accountability mechanisms to ensure that these programs are not unnecessarily delayed.
• Rep. Carbajal then mentioned how the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 had directed the FAA to hire more individuals to fill key aviation safety roles. He asked Ms. Ellman to discuss the importance of growing the FAA’s technical expertise regarding drones in the Agency’s aviation safety positions.
  • Ms. Ellman discussed how the FAA has employees that possess specific expertise on drone technology. She noted that the FAA must provide waivers, exemptions, or other types of approvals to enable the flying of commercial drones in an expanded manner. She commented that staff will be needed to provide these waivers, exemptions, and other types of approvals. She also stated that the FAA requires staff to complete its Part 108 rulemaking. She remarked that the FAA must be appropriately resourced to ensure that federal drone policy adequately addresses drone technology.

Rep. Dina Titus (D-NV):

• Rep. Titus first raised concerns that DOGE could target FAA staff needed to develop drone-related policies. She then discussed how her region of southern Nevada has a very busy airspace that involves commercial airports, U.S. Air Force bases, helicopter tours, private planes, and drones. She noted how these drones have commercial, emergency response, and recreational applications. She also mentioned how Nevada is one of seven states with an FAA UAS Test Site. She applauded how the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 had continued these FAA UAS Test Sites through fiscal year (FY) 2028. She asked Dr. Cahill to discuss FAA UAS Test Site activities and to address how these Sites are working on counter-drone technologies.
  • Dr. Cahill expressed gratitude to Congress for extending FAA UAS Test Sites as part of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. She testified that ACUASI is working on counter-drone technologies. She noted how several FAA UAS Test Sites are working with federal partners to test the safety and security of counter-drone systems (including drone mitigation systems and drone DTI systems). She mentioned how there are projects through the FAA Air Transportation Centers of Excellence and Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts that allow for FAA UAS Test Sites to work counter-drone operations with a federal authority that can mitigate drones. She expressed support for using FAA UAS Test Sites to support drone testing because these Sites have extensive safety track records. She also stated that these Test Sites tend to involve areas with minimal ground hazards, which eliminates the potential for collateral damage. She remarked that FAA UAS Test Sites have taken advantage of their granted capabilities. She noted how Congress had enabled Test Sites to purchase covered drone systems to test drone systems from foreign adversaries. She indicated that while Test Sites want to engage in more of this testing, she stated that there still exist restrictions that limit this testing. She remarked that FAA UAS Test Sites will play an important role in supporting drone testing in a known and safe area with FAA involvement.
• Rep. Titus mentioned how the State of Nevada UAS Test Center works with several stakeholders, including the University of Nevada, Las Vegas and the Desert Research Center. She asked Dr. Cahill to indicate whether collaboration between FAA UAS Test Sites and outside stakeholders is a common practice.
  • Dr. Cahill answered affirmatively. She noted how FAA UAS Test Sites are all working with various universities, public agencies, and commercial providers to engage in drone testing. She also noted how FAA UAS Test Sites now possess the ability to engage in civilian operations in addition to public operations. She stated that these Test Sites can now fly a 1,320-pound aircraft as a civil aircraft to support the commercialization of a drone. She called this a “major advantage” for the drone community in terms of pursuing innovation.
• Rep. Titus then expressed interest in the potential for drones to be used in firefighting. She commented that this application could be beneficial in the western U.S. She asked Ms. Ellman to discuss how drones could support firefighting operations.
  • Ms. Ellman stated that drones can play an important role in firefighting operations. She noted how the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 had encouraged the study of the use of drones to combat and prevent wildfires. She expressed her willingness to work with Rep. Titus to address the issue.

Subcommittee Chairman Troy Nehls (R-TX):

• Chairman Nehls noted that while many drone operators mistakenly pilot drones into restricted airspaces, he stated that he is more concerned regarding malicious drone operators that intentionally pilot drones into restricted airspaces. He asked the witnesses to indicate whether the U.S.’s over 450 commercial airports are currently equipped to mitigate drones operated by bad actors.
  • Dr. Cahill answered no.
  • Ms. Ellman answered no.
  • Mr. McLaughlin answered no.
• Chairman Nehls remarked that while the U.S. has the safest aviation record in history, he asserted that the Committee must remain vigilant in protecting against future aviation accidents. He stated that protecting against future aviation accidents would entail listening to industry stakeholders.

Rep. Nellie Pou (D-NJ):

• Rep. Pou first provided her condolences to those impacted by the recent aviation accidents. She expressed interest in reviewing the NTSB’s future reports regarding these accidents. She also asserted that workforce diversity policies had not been responsible for these accidents. She expressed interest in ensuring that the U.S. has enough well-trained air traffic controllers and in addressing the root causes of the recent accidents. She then discussed how mysterious drone sightings over her state of New Jersey in 2024 had created concerns for the state’s residents. She asked Dr. Cahill to indicate whether federal, state, or local entities should be primarily responsible for addressing invasive drones. She also asked Dr. Cahill to provide recommendations for improving drone response coordination across federal, state, and local entities.
  • Dr. Cahill called it important for there to exist communication between federal, state, and local entities related to drone response. She stated that many Americans are unaware of the FAA’s Remote ID rule for drones and commented that this rule needs to be better publicized. She also discussed how many Americans do not realize how much drone testing activity is occurring within New Jersey, including at the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center. She stated that while the FAA has approved this drone testing activity, she noted that there does not exist a list detailing approved drone testing activity. She remarked that this lack of a list had made it difficult for the FAA to discern which drone testing activities had been legal. She elaborated that while legal drone operators must provide NOTAMs to the FAA, she commented that the FAA might not always realize that legal drone activities are occurring.
• Rep. Pou remarked that many of her constituents had been very concerned regarding the recent drone sightings over New Jersey. She commented that the absence of information regarding drone testing activities had contributed to these concerns. She then mentioned how she had recently traveled to New Orleans to learn from law enforcement agencies about threats to highly attended large events. She stated that protecting these events is a priority for her given how her Congressional District will host the final game of the upcoming 2026 World Cup. She asked Ms. Ellman to provide recommendations for how Congress could help protect large public sporting events from malicious drone operators.
  • Ms. Ellman noted how Congress has recognized the sensitive nature of airspace surrounding sports stadiums through enabling the issuances of TFRs. She stated that commercial drone operators know not to fly near sports stadiums without permission. She remarked that Congress should grant authority to properly trained states and localities to make use of advanced drone detection technologies and drone mitigation technologies (when necessary) at large events.

Rep. Nicholas Begich (R-AK):

• Rep. Begich discussed how drones present an asymmetric capability and noted how drones are low cost, commercially available, and easy-to-use. He asked Dr. Cahill to indicate where the authority for counter-UAS activities should reside.
  • Dr. Cahill remarked that the authority for counter-UAS activities should reside at the federal level. She noted how the takedown of drones could result in accidents or unintended consequences. She asserted that the federal government is best equipped to perform cost-benefit evaluations regarding drone takedown decisions. She then discussed how airport environments are unique in that their airspace can be sterilized and their grounds can be controlled. She stated that airports are therefore better suited to work with federal agencies on counter-UAS activities.
• Rep. Begich asked Dr. Cahill to indicate whether there exist any specific counter-UAS technologies that should be made available to civilian populations.
  • Dr. Cahill answered affirmatively. She stated however that she could not discuss such counter-UAS technologies in a public setting. She also noted how these counter-UAS technologies have national security implications. She elaborated that the specifications of these technologies can convey classified information.
• Rep. Begich then asked Dr. Cahill to recommend how the FAA can provide ACUASI with the authority to develop best practices and protocols for addressing UAS threats.
  • Dr. Cahill applauded the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 for permitting ACUASI to purchase covered drones and to support counter-drone testing. She stated however that ACUASI still lacks the authority to directly engage in this testing. She suggested that the FAA could embed an authorized employee within ACUASI to enable this testing or delegate FAA UAS Test Sites the authority to engage in this testing. She remarked that commercial drone operators are currently limited regarding where they can test drones. She stated that FAA UAS Test Sites are optimal testing environments because they have minimal ground hazards. She also stated that permitting commercial drone operators to test their drones at FAA UAS Test Sites will enable the faster deployment of drone technologies.
• Rep. Begich thanked Dr. Cahill for her leadership on drone technology and called it important for Alaska to remain a leader in drone research.